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ABSTRACT 
A FORGOTTEN SHADE OF BLUE:  
SUPPORT FOR THE UNION AND A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC IN 
SOUTHEASTERN KENTUCKY DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 
Howard L. Muncy 
May 2020  
This thesis analyzes Southeastern Kentucky’s political and military support for the Union 
during the Civil War era.  In the decades prior to the 1860 election, Kentucky developed 
deep social and economic ties with all sections of the country.  After the secession winter 
that followed Abraham Lincoln’s presidential election, the statewide population divided 
and pockets of significant Confederate sympathies emerged.  Kentucky’s southeastern 
counties aligned with the Union at the outbreak of the Civil War because of a strong 
national identity and the absence of a large slave population.  As the war unfolded, 
Southeastern Kentuckians played an important role in the disruption of repeated 
Confederate invasions.  Kentucky split again in the emancipationist phase of the war 
when guerilla warfare engulfed the slave state, but southeastern Kentuckians continued to 
support federal efforts with votes, enlistments, and service.  In the final months of the 
conflict, and the years that followed, a core of Kentucky’s southeastern counties did not 
drift toward the Confederacy’s “lost cause,” nor to the Democratic Party, as did much of 
the state.  Instead, citizens from Southeastern Kentucky offered robust support for Union 
veterans and other Republican candidates who ran for both state and federal offices. This 
thesis illuminates the political activity and military service of citizens from Southeastern 
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Kentucky during those turbulent years with attention to national events and other local 
populations proximate to the region of study.  
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“THESE HONORED DEAD” 
When the full history of the war is written we shall 
realize more than we do our debt to the loyal people 
of the South.  There [was] a larger proportion of 
descendants of revolution soldiery in Kentucky than 
any other state [who could] overflow their 
mountains and reinforce the nation.  
– Theodore Roosevelt, 1897.1
This master’s thesis analyzes Union support from the Southeastern Kentucky 
population during the Civil War era.  In 1861, when citizens across the South debated 
secession, Kentucky legislators rejected Governor Beriah Magoffin’s Confederate 
maneuvering and pursued the impossible path of neutrality before eventually siding with 
the Union.  As Kentucky Unionists and the state’s General Assembly sought to preserve 
Kentucky’s place in the nation—Confederate sympathies endangered the state’s loyal 
position from within.  Political and military leaders from the newly formed confederacy 
added to the internal threat of disunion and tried to reverse Kentucky’s chosen course 
with a series of invasions and raids throughout the duration of the war.  Historians have 
long sought to explain Kentucky’s motives and loyalty during the period.  To complicate 
Kentucky’s Civil War legacy, the rise of a Confederate identity in the postwar period has 
done much to distort the state’s important contributions to the Union victory.  However, 
1 From Theodore Roosevelt’s 1897 speech at Boston’s Trinity Church as quoted in Anne 
Marshall’s Creating a Confederate Kentucky: The Lost Cause and Civil War Memory in 
a Border State (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 120.    
2 
modern Civil War scholars have started to devote more historical attention to the 
significance of the Border States, including Kentucky.  Much of the early historiography 
on the Appalachian regions of the United States identified a strong Union sentiment, but 
some modern works have pushed back against those conclusions with new claims that the 
unionism was overestimated.  New studies that focus on smaller segments of the 
American population during the secession crisis, within smaller defined areas, advance a 
more complex understanding of the war.  This thesis seeks to add to that secondary 
literature with focus on residents and soldiers in the southeastern region of Kentucky.  
Evidence suggests that the southeastern population of Kentucky formed a deep loyalty to 
the Union that, unlike many other areas in the state, increased as the war progressed.  
Events and records reveal a pattern of social, military, and political support from the area 
that proved vital to the Union and unique from the other portions of the Commonwealth. 
To understand Southeastern Kentucky’s Unionism at the outset of the Civil War, 
Chapter One of this study analyzes the election of 1860.  The chapter seeks to create a 
national context of Abraham Lincoln’s election before the analysis turns to Kentucky’s 
statewide outlook on the presidential race and then narrows down to examine results from 
a few counties in Southeastern Kentucky.  Lincoln finished last in a four-way contest 
among the 1860 Kentucky electorate and the eventual sixteenth president registered less 
than one percent of the total state vote.  A defined geographic area in Southeastern 
Kentucky offered Lincoln a significant portion, of his otherwise miniscule, political 
support in the Commonwealth.  Chapter One also focuses on Kentucky’s early 
abolitionist and antislavery movements.  The chapter identifies a combination of 
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religious, economic, and social forces that shaped opinions in the local area prior to the 
outbreak of war. 
Chapter Two examines the formation of Kentucky Union military regiments 
during 1861.  The need for military volunteers to protect Union interests interconnected a 
mixture of federal, state, and local officials.  Politicians tapped influential rural citizens to 
recruit and organize Union troops in Southeastern Kentucky.  Many of those prominent 
individuals possessed valuable experience with raising troops from America’s previous 
wars and recruiting officers observed both patriotism and duty in their recruits.  Chapter 
Two explores a variety of primary accounts and statistics to capture the sentiment of the 
region as the Civil War entered its first year.  Actions in 1861 from Southeastern 
Kentucky’s politicians in the General Assembly, and attitudes from area voters in 
statewide elections, reflect the same Unionist spirit observed in volunteers during the 
1861 call to arms. 
Chapter Three and Chapter Four present narrative histories of Kentucky’s 
important Civil War events and features soldiers’ experiences from Kentucky regiments 
that fought in the Western Theatre of Union military operations.  Chapter Three focuses 
on the winter invasion of 1862 with attention to the repulse of Confederates at the Battle 
of Mill Springs.  Following that Confederate failure, General Braxton Bragg and Kirby 
Smith’s larger invasion in the summer campaign of 1862 reveals another example of the 
Confederates’ difficulty with turning the state toward their cause.  Chapter Four explores 
the second half of the Civil War and examines Kentucky’s reactions to emancipationist 
policies.  As a new resistance to federal policies emerged and violent guerilla attacks 
engulfed the state, Southeastern Kentucky’s Union support remained firm.  A 
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combination of strong political and military support from Kentucky’s southeastern 
counties contrasted with the fracturing loyalty found in other regions of the state during 
the final years of the war.     
The thesis concludes with examination of Kentucky’s postwar sentiment.  
Historians have claimed that Kentucky joined the Confederate cause in the aftermath of 
the war, but the southeastern population chose a post-war Republican identity.  Majority 
support for Republican Union veterans at the federal and state level from Southeastern 
Kentuckians marked a stark departure from other regions of the state.  A lingering pride 
in Union military service, combined with mountain Unionists’ violent encounters with 
pro-Confederate raiders, hardened the loyal sentiments of the population. 
Regardless of origin, motivation, or location, Kentucky men who served in Union 
Blue contributed to the North’s victory.  Historian Richard Current Nelson summarized 
the importance of southern soldiers: 
The Union cause was aided by men who did nothing more heroic than 
garrison posts or guard bridges at some distance behind the lines . . .. Men 
of that kind at least made it possible for other soldiers to be released for 
combat with the rebels.  Indeed, anyone who joined the Union army, or 
who served with loyalist state troops instead, or who merely resisted the 
Confederate draft helped the cause by depriving the Confederacy of its 
most desperately needed resource—military manpower.2 
Historian William W. Freehling took a slightly different stance with Kentucky’s early 
actions in mind.  Freehling added: 
Kentuckians contributed most to the Union’s interval of preparation by 
what they did not do, namely, disrupt either Grant’s or Buell’s sanctuary 
to receive supplies. . . . By lacking the zeal to harass Yankees who would 
subdue slaveholders, Kentuckians vindicated what more zealous prewar 
Southerners had long worried about: The most northern third of the South 
2 Richard Nelson Current, Lincoln’s Loyalists: Union Soldiers from the Confederacy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 195.  
5 
might become fatally indifferent to Lower South proslavery 
preoccupations.3 
Southeastern Kentuckians contributed in a variety of ways throughout the entire war 
including State Guard service, as part of large armies engaged in important battles, and, 
at times, by Freehling’s concept of “what they did not do” in effort to deprive 
Confederates.4  
Early historians questioned Kentucky’s role in the Civil War.  E. Merton Colter 
labeled Kentucky a “pariah” to the Union who aligned with the Confederacy after the war 
was over.5  Modern historians have pushed back on those early claims and found 
Kentucky’s Unionism, particularly at the beginning of the war, essential for the nation’s 
survival.  Indeed, Kentucky’s choice to remain in the Union made a significant difference 
in the federal prosecution of the war throughout the conflict.  This study illuminates how 
that one segment of the Kentucky population provided support, endured privation, and 
remained steady in the face of violence for preservation of the Union.  Furthermore, this 
thesis seeks to establish the role Southeastern Kentuckians played in the Civil War era 
and to understand how their actions helped the Commonwealth, and the nation, avoid a 
Confederate fate in a period of contested loyalties.  
3 William W. Freehling, The South vs. The South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners 
Shaped the Course of the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press), 72. 
4 Ibid.  
5 For a strong rebuke of Coulter’s conclusions see Thomas C. Mackey’s “Not a Pariah, 
but a Keystone: Kentucky and Secession,” in Sister States, Enemy States: The Civil War 
in Kentucky and Tennessee, editors Kent T. Dollar, Larry H. Whiteaker, and W. Calvin 
Dickinson, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2009), 25-45. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
“GENTLEMEN, I TOO, AM A KENTUCKIAN”: 
KENTUCKY AND THE ELECTION OF 1860 
I. 
The election of Abraham Lincoln broke the United States apart.  In the Fall of 
1860, eligible voters from thirty-three states cast ballots in the federal election—with 
fifteen of those states still maintaining a legal form of slavery.  After decades of sectional 
political turmoil, the new Republican platform that emerged from the May 1860 Chicago 
convention—with its amalgam of northern political interests—signaled, to most 
southerners, overtures of an unacceptable outlook for the future of the country.  
Republican promises to limit the spread of slavery to western territories generated much 
of the South’s rejection.  However, other planks of the Republican platform, including 
federal plans connected to western land policy, tariffs, and the building of a 
transcontinental railroad, raised additional southern concerns about the young Republican 
Party’s proposed role of government in the lives of Americans.  The new energy 
observed in the North’s collective commitment to a free labor ideology stoked southern 
fears about the possibility of a transformed country.  Staunch supporters of slavery, with 
predictions of their own electoral defeat, maneuvered away from the politics of 
compromise and advocated for an immediate separation.  Other citizens from the 
northernmost slaveholding states rejected such drastic action and offered guarded support 
with some forming conservative groups such as the Conditional Unionists.  In sum, the 
7 
election of 1860 revealed a spectrum of complex opinion regarding the future of slavery 
and the United States, it uncovered a variety of philosophical and economic outlooks, and 
it exposed opposing forms of constitutional interpretation.   
Leading up to the election, opinions hardened in southerners toward what they 
feared was a new aggressive hostility toward slavery.  Many in the South cast the 
northern acceptance of the Republican Party as evidence of a potential threat to their 
entire way of life.  Richmond, Virginia and Charleston, South Carolina newspapers 
seized the opportunity to advance claims of the coming northern industrial drudgery and 
warned of underlying long-range political plans to transform the South.6  The hysteria 
caused southerners to overestimate northern support for radical efforts to attack slavery 
where it existed.  In fact, the selection of Abraham Lincoln as the candidate to bear the 
Republican’s new program of economic and political reform resulted from an internal 
effort to find a moderate candidate to thwart the more ambitious antislavery wing of the 
Republican Party.7  As a new political party, less than a decade old, the Republicans 
wanted to appeal to voters in the southern portions of free states such as Illinois, Indiana, 
and Ohio.  Radical efforts to attack slavery in the South would have produced another 
electoral loss that resembled Republican John C. Frémont’s 1856 presidential campaign 
against Democrat James Buchanan.  Even though the selection of Lincoln multiplied 
critics on both sides of the slavery argument, in 1860 many Republicans believed that a 
centrist and moderate approach was crucial for electoral success.    
6Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party 
Before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 66.  
7 Richard Cawardine, Lincoln: A Life of Purpose and Power (New York: Knopf 
Publications, 2006), 118-126.  
8 
The 1860 election did not result in a clean, nor quick, political split limited to just 
two opposing sides.  Prior to the wrangling of the National Convention in Chicago, 
political divisions occurred during the Charleston Democratic Convention within a bloc 
of southern slave states.  Southern fire-eaters, concentrated but not limited to South 
Carolina, had hoped for secession for over a decade and made up the most extreme group 
of voters.8  But a series of late 1850s events brought broader swaths of southern opinion 
closer to their position.  The 1857 Scott v. Sandford Supreme Court case that denied 
freedom to a former slave named Dred Scott, and the outrage that surrounded radical 
abolitionist John Brown’s failed October 1859 raid on Harper’s Ferry, combined to either 
embolden advocates for slavery’s expanse or instilled fear of northern abolitionist 
designs—in many instances the combination accomplished both.9  These two crucial 
developments worked in tandem to create a majority of delegates within the Deep South 
who rejected the moderate Democrat Stephen Douglas and it caused many southerners to 
throw their support behind the more hardline proslavery candidate John C. Breckinridge.  
In addition to the Republican Lincoln and the two competing Democratic candidates, a 
viable fourth candidate emerged in Constitutional Unionist John Bell to muddle the 
situation.  A former Whig and Tennessee native, Bell promoted a platform of moderation 
and compromise.  The Constitutional Union Party wanted to capture conservative voters 
put off with the more radical voices coming from the far wings of the Democrat and 
8 Douglas R. Egerton, Year of Meteors: Stephen Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, and the 
Election that Brought on the Civil War (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010), 70-76. 
9 For more on the implications of the Dred Scott decision see Earl M. Maltz’s Dred Scott 
and the Politics of Slavery. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007).  Southern 
opinion toward John Brown’s raid is thoroughly covered in Stephen B. Oates’s, To Purge 
This Land With Blood: A Biography of John Brown (Amherst: The University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1970). 
9 
Republican parties in a schemed effort to peel off enough electoral votes to send the 
election to the House of Representatives.10  The four-candidate race exposed the deep 
fault lines from the fracturing American political landscape. 
An examination of the latitudinal center of the United States reveals the most 
evidence of a split political opinion during the pivotal 1860 presidential campaign.  With 
the northern-most states offering strong support for the Republican candidate Lincoln, 
and the Deep South safe in the Breckinridge column, in 1860 the Border States, free and 
slave, emerged as the most contested region in the election.  Pennsylvania and the 
Midwestern states of Indiana and Illinois helped tip the election of 1856 for Democrat 
James Buchanan.  Those same three states, alongside Ohio and the Upper South, 
appeared to strategists of the day as the political battleground for the presidency.  
Historian James McPherson concluded that “the campaign resolved itself into two 
separate contests: Lincoln vs. Douglas in the North; Breckinridge vs. Bell in the South.  
Republicans did not even have a ticket in ten southern states . . ..”11  The five slave states 
that included Lincoln as a candidate on their ballots produced only a small quantity of 
votes for the eventual president and various levels of support for each of the other three 
candidates appeared on the final tallies. 
Among the five states that practiced slavery but included Abraham Lincoln as a 
choice for president was the Republican’s birth state—Kentucky.  As a former territory of 
Virginia, the Bluegrass State inherited a strong foundation for the “peculiar institution” of 
slavery long before 1792 statehood.  Kentucky experienced minor efforts to rid the 
10 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 221-222.  
11 Ibid., 223.  
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commonwealth of slavery during the early debates of its first two state constitutions.  
After the unsuccessful effort to abolish slavery from the outset, Kentucky moved forward 
with slavery woven deep into the social and economic fabric of the Commonwealth.  A 
New History of Kentucky estimated the number of 1850 slaveholding families in 
Kentucky at just over a quarter of total households—a rather large number among the 
fifteen total slave states.12  But an uneven geographical distribution of slave ownership 
existed within that amount across the state.  Most Kentuckians, like most other 
southerners, never owned slaves because of either cost or, the less likelihood, objection.13  
Portions of the state not conducive to the financial support of slave labor were another 
factor.  Mountainous regions of Kentucky, like areas of eastern Tennessee, western North 
Carolina, and western/southwestern Virginia, produced isolated localities separated from 
the planation life experienced in larger portions of those states.  Mountainous locations 
formed a blend of social bonds and institutions both connected to, and unique from, 
broader state and national trends. 
Perhaps the political traditions experienced in Kentucky’s seven decades of 
statehood did as much, if not more, than geographic factors to distinguish the slave state 
from the others that held humans in bondage.  Many believe that the rise of Henry Clay to 
national prominence created strong bases of intrastate support for Whig politics.  The 
local Kentucky politicians who supported ideas fundamental to the party’s cause 
benefitted and many of the Commonwealth’s citizens developed a level of widespread 
Whig loyalty not observed in any of the other southern states.  Central to Clay’s identity 
12 Lowell Harrison and James C. Klotter, A New History of Kentucky (Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 1997), 168.  
13 Ibid. 
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lay the belief in an American System—a plan that combined federal tariffs, banking, and 
infrastructure projects to accelerate economic development.14  Policies of legislative 
compromise contributed to Clay’s legacy as well.  Clay helped Congress navigate 
through three potential constitutional crises with legislative efforts to heal the nation in 
1820, 1833, and 1850.  Notable state historian and Clay biographer James Klotter 
claimed that for those citizens of the Commonwealth who constructed a strong 
antebellum self-view, “many Kentuckians had been well inculcated in Clay’s vision of 
America and accepted it as their own.”15   
Recent scholarship also points to a deeper economic picture as the primary 
catalyst for Kentucky’s antebellum political leanings.  In James A. Ramage and Andrea 
S. Watkins’s Kentucky Rising: Democracy, Slavery, and Culture from the Early Republic 
to the Civil War, the authors argued that Jeffersonian Republicanism declined in 
Kentucky in the pre-war decades.16  Ramage and Watkins suggested that many elements 
of the pure Jeffersonianism that dominated southern political culture ran counter to the 
idea of the numerous “frontier men and women [who] came to Kentucky for the 
opportunity to work hard, earn money, and rise in society; [they had] no intention to live 
poor in a poor man’s country.”17   Evidence of a distinct economic mindset was present 
throughout the four decades prior to the Civil War when Kentuckians displayed a devout 
14 For more on Henry Clay see Robert Remini, Henry Clay: A Stateman for the Union 
(New York: WW Norton & Co., 1991) and James Klotter, Henry Clay: The Man Who 
Would Be President (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).   
15 James C. Klotter, “Kentucky, the Civil War, and the Spirit of Henry Clay,” The 
Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 110, (2012), 251.  
16 James A. Ramage and Andrea S. Watkins, Kentucky Rising: Democracy, Slavery, and 
Culture from the Early Republic to the Civil War, (Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 2011). 
17 Ibid., 89.  
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political loyalty and provided reliable vote returns for Whig candidates—a trend not 
observed in any other southern state.  Most of the South, in those same years, offered 
near unwavering support for Jeffersonian, and later, Jacksonian candidates.  Henry Clay’s 
influence was the most common conclusion for historians seeking to explain the 
motivation of Kentucky’s political behavior during that period.  However, instead of the 
talented Clay directing the state’s political whims, sentiment from the population may 
have at least aligned, or at most shaped, Henry Clay’s core convictions.  Jeffersonian 
purity and Jacksonian philosophy stood at odds with federal guidance in economic 
policy—and sometimes the two political movements produced politicians quick to 
challenge federal authority.  Historian Stephen Fackler claimed early Kentuckians 
“wanted secure land titles, cheap money, and relief from debts.  But most were unwilling 
to flout the Constitution to achieve their ends.”18  This opinion led many Kentucky 
homesteaders to vote from the economic and political perspectives that they found in 
“Henry Clay’s and Alexander Hamilton’s nationalistic vision to succeed in diversified 
farming.”19  The election of 1860 reflected interesting residues of Kentucky’s decades 
long political heritage. 
Closer examination of the voting citizens of Kentucky in 1860—drawn from a 
population of just over one-million and one-hundred thousand (1,155,684) residents—
revealed a complex picture of the presidential election.  The state held the ninth largest 
18 Stephen W. Fackler, “John Rowan and the Demise of Jeffersonian Republicanism in 
Kentucky, 1819-1831,” The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society Volume 78 
(1980), 23. 
19 Ramage and Watkins, Kentucky Rising, 89.  
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population total in the Union and the third most among slave states.20  Of the presidential 
candidates’ success in Kentucky, Constitutional Unionist John Bell received (45.2%) 
66,501 votes, Southern Democrat John Breckinridge (36.4%) 53,143, Northern Democrat 
Stephen Douglas (17.5%) 25,638, and Republican Abraham Lincoln (0.9%) 1,364. 
Nationally, Bell carried the Bluegrass State along with Virginia and Tennessee.  To the 
west, Stephen Douglas carried neighboring Missouri.  These four states’ results reflected 
the Upper South’s reluctance to vote in lockstep with the Deep South or with the 
Republicans of the North.  The returns from Kentucky signaled a desire to avoid the more 
extreme candidates in search for either a moderate politician or a compromise to deal 
with the national emergency.  Breckinridge secured a narrow victory in Maryland and 
scored his only comfortable win in the entire Border Region with Delaware’s small 
population.  The aftermath of the 1860 election produced, and continues to produce, a 
multitude of speculative questions from political observers and historical scholars alike.  
One can only guess where Kentucky’s Bell voters would have turned had Bell not run.  A 
unified Democratic ticket may have carried all the southern states and made larger gains 
into the Midwest.  Seldom asked, however, are two-related questions, specific in nature 
but worthy of historical attention: where was Lincoln’s minimal support in Kentucky and 
what drove that support? 
Lincoln’s lack of political appeal throughout the entire South resulted from the 
Republicans’ strong stance against slave expansion in the West.  Traditional voters of the 
Whig party, the previous opposition to the Democrats, did not transition into the ranks of 
20 Kenneth H. Williams and James Russell Harris, “Kentucky in 1860: A Statistical 
Overview,” The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 103, (Autumn 2005), 751. 
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Republicans in the South during the 1850s as happened in the North.  Instead, many 
searched for a middle ground and joined various parties such as the nativist Know-
Nothings, the American Party, and the Constitutional Unionists.  Conservative citizens 
opposed to Democratic threats of secession, but not ready for an attack on southern 
slavery, wandered in a “political desert” where consensus was slow to coalesce.21  Many 
former southern Whigs, alarmed at new attitudes toward slavery, tossed their lot in with 
the Democratic Party and acted as moderates.  Regardless of party affiliation, larger 
segments of the Border State electorate, including Kentucky, feared that the “election of a 
Republican president would galvanize the northern and southern extremists.”22 Abraham 
Lincoln’s background and Kentucky roots did little to attract a significant number of 
Kentucky voters in favor of the Republican candidate.  
Born in 1809 in Hardin County to parents Thomas and Nancy Lincoln, Abraham 
Lincoln came from a typical early Kentucky family.  The Sinking Spring Farm 
represented then, and still symbolizes today, a frontier opportunity to advance up the 
American social ladder.  But Kentucky’s rampant issues with clear land titles dampened 
that opportunity in the early 1800s and the Lincolns moved to another nearby farm at 
Knob Creek.  Abraham Lincoln’s first seven years of life brought exposure to the 
Kentucky frontier lifestyle including the hard realities associated with rugged farming, 
21 Thomas C. Mackey, “Not a Pariah, but a Keystone: Kentucky and Secession,” in Sister 
States, Enemy States: The Civil War in Kentucky and Tennessee, editors Kent T. Dollar, 
Larry H. Whiteaker, and W. Calvin Dickinson, (Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 2009), 29.  
22 Christopher Phillips, The Civil War in the Border South, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 
2013), 5.  
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limited educational opportunities, and even a near drowning.23  In 1816, the Lincoln 
family moved across the Ohio River to a location in Indiana.  Even though the move 
meant a permanent departure from the Commonwealth, the future president continued to 
develop important relationships connected to Kentucky for the rest of his life.  Wife Mary 
Todd, law partner William Herndon, best friend Joshua Speed, and newspaper editor 
George Prentice of the Louisville Journal stand out as a few examples of the many 
Kentuckians who surrounded and influenced Abraham Lincoln.24  Aside from the long 
list of direct Kentucky relationships, perhaps political influence represented a more 
important aspect of potential appeal for voters in 1860.  Historian Stephen Oates wrote: 
Like his father, young Lincoln was a Clay man and “all but worshipped 
his name.”  He liked Clay’s ringing nationalism.  He liked Clay’s 
economic program, whose goal of sectional interdependence and national 
unity appealed to Lincoln’s love of logic, of symmetry and stability.  And 
he liked Clay’s stand on slavery and colonization.”25  
As a staunch Whig, Abraham Lincoln’s political career, until his election as 
president, resulted in more defeats than victories.  Illinois leaned toward Jacksonian 
candidates in the time of Lincoln’s earliest races for public office.  The mid-term election 
of 1846 provided one bright spot in a long list of defeats when local leaders of the Whig 
party, along with Illinois voters, awarded Lincoln a two-year legislative term, 1847-1849, 
in the United States House of Representatives.  Lincoln’s commitment to towing the 
Whig Party line from his Illinois days made little impression on most of the voters in 
23 The historiography on Abraham Lincoln’s early biography is large.  Lowell Harrison’s 
Lincoln of Kentucky (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000); David H. 
Donald’s Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) offer some of the most useful 
analysis on Lincoln’s first years in Kentucky.    
24 Harrison, Lincoln of Kentucky, vii.  
25 Stephen B. Oates, With Malice Toward None: A Biography of Abraham Lincoln (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1977), 21.  
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Kentucky during the 1860 election.  Paradoxically, Lincoln’s political philosophy paired 
much better with his native Kentucky during the 1830s and 1840s than it did in Illinois.  
However, enough had changed in the minds of Kentucky voters during the 1850s to 
marginalize any benefit from Lincoln’s history of Whig loyalty going into the 1860 
election. 
Attitudes toward slavery and disunion accounted for the biggest challenge in the 
political environment that Abraham Lincoln encountered in Kentucky.  The Kentucky 
sentiment against disunion damaged John Breckinridge’s ability to carry the state, but 
those same threats connected to the Breckinridge candidacy also influenced opinion 
against Abraham Lincoln.  As 1920s historian E. Merton Coulter surmised: 
As threats were frequently heard from the South during this campaign that 
secession must follow if Lincoln is elected, the Breckinridge Democrats 
were assaulted on all sides by their Kentucky opponents with the charges 
of standing for disunion.  Their party was committed to secession, it was 
said, if Lincoln succeeded. Their candidate, Breckinridge, was a 
disunionist.26
This political sentiment resulted in an act of collective self-interest for a substantial 
number of Kentuckians who wanted to avoid the violence that might engulf the state.  
Breckinridge garnered the vote of those who put slavery above all else, but Lincoln had 
no real constituency in Kentucky for appeal.  Instead, his possible victory represented a 
real threat of future trouble to most Kentuckians.  John Bell benefitted the most in this 
political climate.  Historians attribute Bell’s appeal in the Border States to the large 
number of voters who sought to protect the state from becoming an up-close battleground 
for the conflict.   Scores of Douglas supporters might fit a similar categorization.  In 
26 E. Merton Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky, (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1926), 22.  
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judgement of the immediate aftermath of the election when Kentuckians rejected 
secession, Coulter provided a similar conclusion: 
But here on this borderland the preservation of the Union and the 
preservation of slavery went hand in hand; for if the country divided, 
Kentucky would almost sure to be on the frontier, regardless of which side 
she should choose.  The destruction of the Union would sound the doom 
of slavery; for if she went with the South, it would make the northern 
banks of the Ohio a refuge for fugitive slaves, and if she should go with 
the free North she could not hope to maintain slavery long.  It took no 
great amount of foresight to show that disunion must ultimately destroy 
slavery in Kentucky.27  
If this opinion was prevalent in Kentucky after the election, amidst a wave of secession, 
one could reason that some semblance of the same line of thought influenced voters’ 
choices during the election.  In a desperate pitch for union, Kentucky voters felt 
compelled to reach for a kind of hopeful status quo.  The final election results from 
Kentucky in 1860 reflect such a conclusion.  The political positions of the four candidates 
left a small bloc of voters who were either ardent enough against slavery to disregard the 
threats of disunion or with enough political desire for change to reject the self-preserving 
sentiments as the only constituency for Lincoln to capture in Kentucky.  Few voting 
Kentuckians arrived at such a position.
II.  
In 1860, one-hundred and ten counties comprised Kentucky.  Of those numerous 
counties in the election of 1860, Jackson County offered Republican Abraham Lincoln 
his greatest Kentucky support.  Jackson County, carved out of portions of Madison, 
Estill, Owsley, Clay, Rockcastle, and Laurel counties in 1858, represented one of the 
27 Ibid., 12. 
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youngest counties of the nation on the eve of the Civil War.28  Jackson County lies near 
the center of the Kentucky Appalachian Mountain chain that cuts in a diagonal line across 
the southeastern portion of the state.  The northwestern-most boundary of the county 
adjoined Madison County and acted as a passage into the central Bluegrass Region of the 
state.  The inaugural population of Jackson County in the 1860 census recorded 3,087 
residents.  The number of slaves included in that same count totaled seven and belonged 
to four separate slaveholders.  Of the other thirteen Appalachian counties classified as 
“Southern Eastern Highland” counties, all boasted slave populations of seventy or more, 
with eleven of the total fourteen counties that listed over one-hundred slaves each.29  In 
short, each county in the region had at least ten times more slaves than Jackson County 
and adjacent Estill County possessed the most with over five-hundred.  For comparison, 
just to the north, in the “Lexington/Inner Bluegrass Region,” Madison County recorded 
over six-thousand humans in bondage.30  The census listed twenty-one free blacks for 
Jackson County, amounting to the only county in the region, and state, and possibly the 
entire South, with a number of free blacks that surpassed the number of slaves.  
Statewide, Jackson County possessed the fewest number of slaves.  
Of the 390 votes counted in Jackson County for the 1860 presidential election, 
over a quarter (25.8%) went to Lincoln.  The next two highest percentages of Republican 
voters in the state occurred in the two Ohio River counties of Campbell (11.9%) and 
28 “Report on the History of Jackson County to 1918 by Isaac Anderson Bowles,” retyped 
and mimeographed by the Public Relation and Power Use Department of Jackson County 
R.E.C.C. in McKee KY, (1974), located in the Jess Wilson Collection at the Clay County 
Historical Society, Manchester Kentucky.  
29 Williams and Harris, “Kentucky in 1860: A Statistical Overview,” 750.  
30 Ibid., 748.  
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Kenton (7.5%).31  For comparison, in forty-five counties statewide, nearly half of the 
Commonwealth, Lincoln received either one or zero votes.32  The finally tally in Jackson 
County awarded Constitutional Unionist John Bell 140 votes, Southern Democrat John 
Breckinridge 136 votes, Republican Abraham Lincoln 101 votes, and Northern Democrat 
Stephen Douglas 13 votes.  The newly formed county voted with Kentucky in the 
selection of John Bell as its winner but provided Abraham Lincoln some of his strongest 
support from any area in the nation with legal slavery.  The near absence of slavery 
attributed to this total, but elements of abolitionism made an impact as well. 
More so than other slave states, Kentucky experienced limited, yet important, 
abolitionist activity.  As a Presbyterian minister, David Rice rose as one of the earliest 
Kentucky voices against slavery.33  Rice’s pamphlet Slavery Inconsistent with Justice and 
Good Policy attacked slavery in Kentucky from a religious and moral standpoint during 
the earliest statehood debates in 1792.  Rice predicted that the end of slavery would 
transform Kentucky into a more virtuous society and would boost an influx of “useful” 
citizens.34  Another Kentucky minister, Baptist David Borrow, took a similar stance 
against the institution of slavery.  Borrow published a fifty-five-page pamphlet in 1808 
that denounced the limited opportunities afforded to blacks and argued that the Kentucky 
economy drove inequality among the entire population.35  In 1821, the Kentucky 
Abolition Society published a year-long series of monthly newsletters entitled Abolition 
31 Ibid., 763.  
32 Ibid., 762.  
33 Harrison and Klotter, A New History of Kentucky (1997), 174. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 175.  
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Intelligencer and Missionary Magazine edited by another minister, John Finley Crowe.36  
Abolitionists and emancipationists advocated for change and operated early in 
Kentucky’s history.  In the 1830s another group emerged in the antislavery effort—
proponents for colonization. 
The American Colonization Society rose as a suitable alternative for many 
Kentuckians put off by radical abolitionism.  The fundamental mission of colonization 
included the emancipation of slaves coupled with deportation to the African colony of 
Liberia.  Thirty-one colonization societies existed in Kentucky in 1832 and Henry Clay 
emerged as one of the scheme’s leading figures.  Pulitzer Prize winning historian Eric 
Foner assessed the appeal and evolution of colonization in places like Kentucky.  Foner 
claimed, “Planters and political leaders from the Upper South dominated the American 
Colonization Society.  Few were more adamant about linking colonization with 
emancipation than Henry Clay.”37  The Kentucky-backed approach later echoed with 
Abraham Lincoln and Foner added: 
Clay’s outlook on slavery—condemnation of the institution and 
affirmation of the blacks’ humanity coupled with the conviction that 
emancipation could only come gradually and should be linked with 
colonization—strongly affected Lincoln’s.  More than once during the 
1850s when speaking about slavery and race, Lincoln quoted or 
paraphrased Clay.  “I can express all my views on the slavery question,” 
he once said, “by quotations from Henry Clay.”38 
Colonization drew contemporary criticism, and for modern Americans, the practice 
appears in hindsight as an inhumane solution to a vile institution.  While many of these 
assessments are undeniable, in mid-nineteenth century Kentucky, colonization became 
36 Ibid. 
37 Eric Foner, The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery (New York: 
W.W. & Norton, 2010), 18. 
38 Ibid., 18-19.  
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the most attainable end to slavery for those committed and willing to lend their voice to 
stop human bondage within a slave society. 
Supporters of colonization and other emancipationist efforts moved the debate 
over slavery to the forefront of Kentucky political thought in the antebellum years.  
Kentuckians agreed to call a third constitutional convention in 1848.  While the primary 
purpose of the convention centered upon a growing state debt, legislative spending, 
spoils, and gerrymandered districting; eager Kentuckians, against slavery, inserted the 
issue for discussion.39  Debates across the state turned violent while those opposed to 
slavery remained hopeful for some type of political success.  In the end, however, the 
new 1850 Kentucky Constitution not only fell short to the hopes of those against the 
practice of slavery, but the whole process strengthened the institution and provided a 
serious setback to the abolitionists and emancipationists in the state.40  In addition, the 
proslavery victory emboldened advocates to further antagonize and silence opponents of 
slavery.  Even with Henry Clay as an admired advocate of colonization, and numerous 
moderate citizens seeking to move the Commonwealth away from slavery, the abject 
failure of antislavery measures in 1849 secured slavery’s immediate future in Kentucky.  
The political victory further empowered slavery’s supporters and even pushed some 
frustrated Kentucky abolitionists to look for residence in other states.41  
Areas in Southeastern Kentucky experienced only limited exposure to antislavery 
efforts prior to the 1830s and 1840s.  Much of the historical record trace early efforts of 
Kentucky abolitionism to the central and northern portions of the state where slavery 
39 Watkins and Ramage, Kentucky Rising (2010), 270. 
40 Ibid., 271-273.  
41 Harrison and Klotter, A New History of Kentucky (1997), 178. 
22 
thrived.  A far higher percentage of the state’s slave population accompanied the location 
of the bourgeoning communities and economy of the central Bluegrass Region.  The 
Jackson Purchase and other portions of Western Kentucky also surpassed Appalachia in 
both free and slave populations in the decades following statehood.  The counties south 
of Lexington and east of Bowling Green remained isolated in this American period of 
economic growth.  But Appalachian Kentucky was not devoid of slavery, nor of citizens 
interested in the issue.  Estill, Clay, and Knox Counties combined to list 1,345 slaves in 
the 1860 census.42  Political and religious developments brought voices opposed to 
slavery to mountainous areas as attention to the issue rose on at the national level. 
Cassius Marcellus Clay and John Gregg Fee became the two most significant 
figures associated with abolitionism in Southeastern Kentucky.43  The two men were of 
different backgrounds, possessed different philosophies on how to rid the nation of 
slavery, and held conflicting views on matters of self-defense—views often challenged 
by angry Kentucky mobs.  But both Clay and Fee shared a common passion against the 
institution of slavery, and both wanted to convince Kentuckians of slavery’s detrimental 
effects on society.  The citizens of Appalachia Kentucky, overall, were more receptive to 
antislavery and abolitionist messages than their northern or western Kentucky neighbors.  
Clay delivered a political approach and Fee appealed with a religious one. 
Cassius Clay, as a prominent politician, took a more aggressive stance against 
slavery than did his Kentucky counterparts.  Cassius bore the same last name as 
Kentucky’s most famous statesman, and older cousin, Henry Clay.  Educated at Yale, 
42 Williams and Harris, “Kentucky in 1860: A Statistical Overview,” 750.  
43 Christopher Phillips, The Rivers Ran Backwards: The Civil War and the Remaking of 
the American Middle Border (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 64-65.  
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Cassius Clay heard William Lloyd Garrison speak during the abolitionist’s rise to become 
one of the nation’s most important voices against slavery.  Clay’s educational experience 
and exposure to abolitionism brought northern viewpoints into Kentucky.  Furthermore, 
Clay’s success in Whig politics and adherence to Henry Clay’s economic programs of a 
commercialized economy worked to manifest his antislavery views in favor of a 
transformed Kentucky economy.  In the 1844 presidential race between Democrat James 
K. Polk and Whig Henry Clay, Cassius campaigned on Henry’s behalf in the North.  The 
Whigs needed Cassius Clay’s antislavery bona fides to attract wavering northern voters 
and, on one occasion, Clay followed famous Massachusetts senator Daniel Webster in a 
series of speeches delivered on Boston Common.  Cassius Clay aimed his efforts, as a 
spokesman of the South and advocate for Henry Clay, at securing abolitionists who were 
tempted to vote for third-party candidate James G. Birney.44  With Boston as a hub of 
abolitionist activity that included devout followers of Garrison’s ideas found in The 
Liberator, the task represented a show of political confidence in Cassius Clay’s ability to 
appeal to northerners.  But the Kentuckian stopped short of the Garrisonian brand of 
abolitionism noted for overt criticism of America’s founding and constitution.  Instead, 
Clay judged that Garrisonian “abolitionists committed the grave error of attacking the 
Constitution; their efforts brought disruption to the Union rather than a rational solution 
to the problem of slavery.”45  While William Lloyd Garrison converted numerous readers 
with more radical and immediate solutions to ending slavery, those views would have 
driven away Kentuckians.  Cassius Clay’s positions made him a moderate in the North 
44 H. Edward Richardson, Cassius Marcellus Clay: Firebrand of Freedom (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1976), 39-40.  
45 Ibid. 
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and, in the South, as close to a radical as possible with any ability to retain a degree of 
influence.   The political straddle brought numerous threats of bodily harm to Clay, to 
which he responded in kind. 
Cassius Clay earned the nickname “the Lion of White Hall” while defending his 
ideas and his Kentucky home.  Situated between the Bluegrass region and the 
Appalachian Foothills, Clay’s White Hall estate in northern Madison County made for a 
location resembling his national political reputation—positioned between two different 
bodies of opposing opinion.  Resorting to violence for self-protection is where Clay drew 
his biggest distinction from other opponents of slavery around the nation.  Clay’s 1845 
antislavery publication of the True American earned him quick scorn and numerous 
threats from proslavery forces around Central Kentucky.  Cannons, powder, muskets, and 
other arms lined his printing office as a lethal warning to intruders committed to silencing 
his paper or doing him bodily harm.46  Determined not to suffer a fate like the murdered 
abolitionist Elijah Lovejoy of Illinois, Clay’s armed efforts allowed subscriptions of the 
Lexington based paper to climb to over 3,000 in the publication’s duration.  In 1849, 
during the contentious debates of Kentucky’s election of delegates for a third state 
constitutional convention, Clay debated proslavery candidate Squire Turner in Madison 
County.  Turner’s son Cyrus took exception to Clay’s comments and approached the 
podium.  A scuffle ensued between Clay and several proslavery men before an injured 
Clay fatally stabbed Cyrus Turner with a Bowie Knife.47   
46 Ibid., 43-46.  
47 Ramage and Watkins, Kentucky Rising (2010), 271-272. 
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John Fee joined with Cassius Clay in the 1850s.  Fee, a Kentucky born minister 
trained at Lane Theological Seminary, befriended Clay in the late 1840s.  The two 
formed a bond to oppose slavery when Clay gifted a portion of land in southern Madison 
County, near Jackson County, for the purposes of a school.  Fee’s belief of racial 
harmony and opportunity positioned him as a radical outsider in slave state Kentucky.  
Glade, the name of the land Fee received, later became better known as Berea.  The 
American Missionary Association, a protestant-based abolitionist group from New York, 
offered some material aid and kept close ties with Fee’s progress.  Clay’s reputation 
offered a degree of security for Fee to operate, but the pastor faced multiple incidents of 
proslavery harassment of his own.  As Fee’s southern abolitionist experiment expanded, 
the founder of Berea needed additional help.  
George Candee was born in 1831—the same year that literate preacher Nat Turner 
led America’s most violent slave rebellion in Virginia and the same year William Lloyd 
Garrison launched The Liberator.  Candee attended Oberlin College and later graduated 
from Oberlin Theological Seminary just outside of Cleveland in 1857.  When Oberlin 
adopted the policy of admitting students “irrespective of color,” the only college In 
America to do so, the institution attracted national attention.48  The American Missionary 
Association recognized the young pastor’s talents and Candee preached in Appalachia 
under the auspices of the organization.   In 1913, The Berea Citizen conducted an 
interview with Candee from his Ohio home and published an extended work on his 
recollections of antebellum and Civil War experiences in Southeastern Kentucky in a 
48 Cally L. Waite, “The Segregation of Black Students at Oberlin College after 
Reconstruction,” History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 41 (Autumn, 2001), 344, 
published by Cambridge University Press, JSTOR (369200).  
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series entitled “Reminiscences.”49  Candee introduced himself to readers, “I was a born 
Abolitionist.  My father was the keeper of an Underground Railroad station.”50  Interest 
related to travel and residence in the South first arose in Candee in 1854 when two 
Oberlin friends, Humphrey Marshall and O.B. Waters, selected Kentucky as the 
destination to teach students.  With Marshall and Waters planning to take up work in 
Kentucky, Candee’s burning desire to join John G. Fee and offer his services for the 
leader’s abolitionist effort overtook him, and he accompanied the duo on a trip scheduled 
for northern Kentucky.51  Aboard the train to Cincinnati, with expectations to rendezvous 
with John Fee just across the Ohio River, Candee opened a letter that informed him of 
John Fee’s relocation to southern Madison County.  Candee used most of his remaining 
money to get further south to Lexington and held only twenty-three of the twenty-five 
cents needed for the additional stagecoach to Richmond.52  The driver accepted the fare 
as sufficient and Candee arrived penniless in Richmond, Kentucky. 
The young pastor walked south from Richmond in search of Fee and Cassius 
Clay’s antislavery community.  Aware of the danger, Candee recollected: 
I did not mention [Cassius] Clay’s name until I heard it well spoken of at 
Rogersville.  I was afraid enemies of Mr. Fee and Mr. Clay would 
misguide me—or do something worse.  They had quite recently ducked a 
‘wild’ Abolitionist—repeatedly in a watering pond until he swore with his 
hands on his own Bible that he would leave the State and never return.53  
Candee, also aware of Clay’s designs for Berea, referred to John Fee as “a sort of bishop 
in that central place over all his anti-slavery constituency for political reform purposes.”54  
49 The Berea Citizen, Jul. 10, 1913.  
50 The Berea Citizen, Jul. 24, 1913. 
51 Ibid.  
52 The Berea Citizen, Jul. 31, 1913. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid.  
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If Fee was the bishop, Candee seemed poised to act as an itinerant for his message.  One 
of the earliest experiences for Candee included delivering sermons in the winter of 1855 
just outside of Berea.  Soon thereafter, George Candee found himself located further into 
the southern Appalachian Mountains. 
Jackson County and Candee became interwoven around the county’s inception in 
1858.  Theophilus Tolman (T.T.) Garrard, Levi Jackson, and representatives from seven 
separate counties met in March to finalize plans for creation of Jackson County.55  Early 
settlers selected McKee as the county seat.  Local residents, Jerman Thompson, and later 
Solomon Stephens, offered Candee overnight hospitality as he travelled and awaited his 
move into central Jackson County.56  Candee claimed himself as the first person to move 
into McKee and estimated that the entire county did not have a “half dozen slaves,” but 
did have “quite a list of radical abolitionists. . .”57  Among these abolitionist inhabitants 
was a man who mirrored Cassius Clay’s violent style of self-preservation—Bob Nichols. 
Bob Nichols lived in the southern portion of Jackson County at a location called 
Moores Creek.  Nichols read classics such as Newton’s Principia, Harriet Beecher 
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, along with a host of other antislavery and abolitionist 
publications.58  Upon greeting, Nichols recited on frequent occasion that he was “an 
abolitionist, a patriot, and a lover of my country” as a common introduction.59  Described 
55 A Portrait of Jackson County: 1858-2008 (Virginia Beach: Donning Company 
Publishers, 2008), 18. This book was produced by the Jackson County Development 
Association in recognition of the 50th anniversary of the county’s existence.  The book 
offers the best collective history focused on Jackson County.  
56 The Berea Citizen, Sept. 13, 1913.  
57 The Berea Citizen, Sept. 25, 1913 and The Berea Citizen, Oct. 16, 1913.  
58 The Berea Citizen, Oct. 16, 1913.  
59 Ibid. 
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as a “fist and skull pugilist,” Nichols fought back against proslavery in a violent manner.  
Just more than a year after Candee’s arrival in McKee, a neighboring Madison Countian, 
Wash Maupin, traveled to Jackson County to collect information on Candee and his 
followers.  The effort followed John Brown’s raid at Harper’s Ferry in Virginia and came 
after a proslavery mob chased John Fee from his Berea home and out of Kentucky.  
When Maupin arrived in McKee hoping to initiate plans for a similar outcome for George 
Candee, local Jackson Countians informed Maupin that if a Madison County mob 
marched to McKee—armed citizens would meet any effort to harm Candee.  According 
to a witness, the strong rebuke caused a threatened Maupin to ride in fear for the county 
line.60  George Candee avoided the 1859 political exile that John Fee experienced.  The 
threat of mob violence, however, would return. 
Proslavery advocates whipped Jackson Countians into another frenzy following 
the Maupin incident.  An aide to Candee, Jim Seaborn returned to a Jackson County post 
office one morning with news of another hatched plan for proslavery mob violence.  
Seaborn rode south, horseback, for over ten miles to alert Bob Nichols at his Moores 
Creek home of the proslavery threat.  Around 2:00 A.M. Nichols, a Baptist minister, and 
several other armed citizens arrived at McKee to protect Candee.  Townsfolk later 
discovered the threat false and that a town drunk promulgated the entire alarm.  Most of 
the men spent the night in McKee and walked around the streets of the town, armed, the 
next day in a show of force.61  A Richmond Kentucky newspaper, The Mountain 




Perhaps in a stroke of irony, a frustrated John Fee at one time protested to the American 
Missionary Association in 1857 that to have “the protection of a civil officer will not be 
wrong. Paul [the apostle] had an escort of 60 horsemen on one occasion.”62  Candee 
received the protection Fee desired from local residents willing to fight for his safety. 
The combination of a religious Candee and a political Nichols appeared to 
parallel, in many ways, the early relationship of Fee and Clay.  Through Candee’s 
traveling sermons, interaction with residents at Estill County’s Station Camp, Rockcastle 
County, and areas of northern Laurel County brought the pastor into contact with 
abolitionist sympathies just across Jackson County lines.63  Candee wrote of warm 
receptions and of the courteous hosts found in his frequent religious meetings with 
numerous Appalachian citizens.  Bob Nichols admired Cassius Clay’s political abilities 
and welcomed the Lincoln spokesperson to Jackson County in 1860.  Candee recalled: 
While a radical Republican, [Clay] parted with John Fee and other radical 
abolitionists who championed immediate abolition.  He did not stand by 
the Bereans at the time they were mobbed out of the state but did some 
damaging characterizing of Brother Fee for which I criticized him in a 
private letter.64 
In recollection of the period just before the 1860 election, Candee stated: 
[Clay] was a little fearful of the Jackson County radicals.  But when the 
[1860] election campaign was on, the radicals and the conservatives of 
Jackson County united and called Clay to come up and give us a 
Republican speech.  I was appointed committee to send him the invitation; 
which service I performed as gracefully as I could, inviting him to be my 
guest. . .. A great mass of people greeted him.  I doubt if a single man in 
Jackson County who was able to be there was absent.65 
62 Stanley Harrold, “Violence and Nonviolence in Kentucky Abolitionism,” The Journal 
of Southern History, Vol. 57, (Feb., 1991), 27.  
63 The Berea Citizen, Oct. 23, 1913 and The Berea Citizen, Jan. 15, 1914.  
64 The Berea Citizen, Jan. 22, 1914.  
65 Ibid.  
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A banquet followed, and Bob Nichols and his wife provided a portion of the food.  Clay 
spoke to Candee and expressed his surprise about such safety and enthusiastic support.66  
In a May 1860 correspondence with the future president, Clay promised to raise as much 
support as possible for the election.  Lincoln wrote back: 
I shall, in the canvass, and especially afterwards, if the result shall devolve 
the administration upon me, need the support of all the talent, popularity, 
and courage, North and South, which is in the party; and it is with sincere 
gratification that I receive this early indication of your unwavering 
purpose to stand for the right.67 
Candee and Nichols’s relationship did not deteriorate over politics as did Fee and Clay’s.  
Nor did Nichols abandon the protection of his local abolitionist pastor as Fee supporters 
accused of Clay.  After the shelling of Fort Sumter in 1861, Candee did leave the state 
and pro-Confederate sentiment seemed to rise in the county he left behind.  However, 
Candee received a letter only a few weeks after his departure that relayed news of the 
quelling of Confederate voices led, no doubt, by Bob Nichols and men like him. 
III. 
The events in McKee appear to exist as one of the only real examples of success 
related to Cassius Clay’s earlier promise to raise political support for the presidential 
candidate Abraham Lincoln.  Of the 1,364 Kentucky votes counted for Lincoln in the 
election of 1860, 101 Jackson Countians, 56 Estill Countians, 64 Rockcastle Countians, 
and 10 Laurel Countians—all in proximity of McKee influence—cast their votes for the 
Republican candidate.  The amount accounted for nearly 20% of Lincoln’s total 
66 Ibid.  
67 Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Works IV, 1860-61 (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1959), 53.  
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Kentucky vote, but the defined boundary of the populations where the votes appeared 
made up less than 1% of Kentuckians.  
John Bell’s Constitutional Unionism peeled away many of Kentucky’s traditional 
Whig voters.  Even without his candidacy, the support of Lincoln may have only made 
marginal gains.  Samuel Haycraft, a Whig and Union man, tried to convince Lincoln to 
campaign in his birth state during the 1860 race.  After Lincoln denied that request, he 
wrote Haycraft a letter where he offered an optimistic outlook: “Rest fully assured that 
the good people of the South who will put themselves in the same temper and mood 
towards me which you do, will find no cause to complain of me.”68  The results proved 
otherwise. 
A strong stance either against slavery or for abolitionism emerged as the only 
constituency for Lincoln to capture in Border States where sentiments for slavery and/or 
safety existed as the two most important issues.  Opponents of slavery in Kentucky, and 
the nation, witnessed how events and movements in the 1850s eroded the modest gains of 
previous decades.  Increased sectionalism also made it difficult for moderates to justify 
positions that could jeopardize the future political standing of their respective regions of 
the country.  Abraham Lincoln’s non-appearance on ten states’ presidential ballots 
exemplified the level of opposition his candidacy faced. 
Jackson County’s location, economy, and isolation made for an exception.  
Appalachian southerners did not benefit from the slave economy and many of the 
mountain residents harbored suspicions towards the institution.  With Cassius Clay’s 
68 As quoted in Michael Davis’s, The Image of Lincoln in the South (Knoxville: The 
University of Tennessee Press, 1971), 18.  
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example only miles away, one can only wonder how much influence penetrated the area 
before the county’s 1858 formation.  Instead, the vote tally and stories of pastor George 
Candee present the most tangible evidence of the small population’s political departure 
from the rest of the state.  But the label anomaly, the term most often used to describe the 
political action of mountain whites, sells short the values, commitment, and convictions 
of a people who voted and supported an idea.  Isolation and the physical environment 
hardened abolitionists of Appalachia.  Historian Stanley Harrold added: 
Their experience with the issue of violent means in confronting a social 
evil within their society demonstrates the limits of peaceful reform in a 
slave state and suggests the dynamic interaction of abolitionist ideas and 
southern culture.  As members of that culture seeking fundamental change, 
the Kentucky abolitionists may provide a better paradigm of the 
predicament of American reformers than abolitionists in the North, who 
usually confronted slavery only from a great distance.69 
Proslavery advocates willing to engage in violent intimidation forced Kentucky 
abolitionists to develop systems of protection or risk being silenced.  The residents of 
Southeastern Kentucky reflected this conclusion.  The effects raged from their courage in 
ballots to the protection of a northern stranger.  
After winning the election, Abraham Lincoln wrote a speech intended, but never 
delivered, for a Kentucky audience.  The remarks would have been part of Lincoln’s 
communication to Americans along the journey to his inauguration.  Seven states chose 
secession before Lincoln took office, but the speech would have appealed for Kentucky 
to accept the constitutional process.     
Is there a Bell-man, a Breckinridge-man, or a Douglas man . . . amongst 
you would not die by the proposition, that your candidate, being elected, 
should be inaugurated, solely on the conditions of the constitution, and 
69 Harrold, “Violence and Nonviolence in Kentucky” (1991), 38. 
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laws, or not at all.  What Kentuckian, worthy of his birthplace, would not 
do this?  Gentlemen, I too, am a Kentuckian.70 
70 Abraham Lincoln, Collected Works IV (1959), 200. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
“THE UNION SENTIMENT AMONG THE PEOPLE LARGELY 
PREDOMINATES:” SOUTHEASTERN KENTUCKY IN 1861 
In the state of Kentucky during the Civil War era, the southeastern Appalachian 
population provided a great amount of loyalty to the Union in sentiment and action.  The 
philosophies and outlooks that drove this staunch Unionism has long evaded and 
frustrated many Kentucky Civil War scholars.  Some historians dismiss the contributions 
as a southern anomaly, others question the depth and significance of the loyalty of that 
region.  The simple conclusion many researchers put forth is that the area’s lack of a 
slave economy caused Kentucky’s Appalachian residents to develop either a natural 
antislavery mentality or an isolated indifference.  Records and events, however, suggest 
that significant portions of the population from Kentucky’s southeastern mountains 
aligned with the opponents of secession prior to, during, and, unlike much of the state, 
even after the conflict ended.  Evidence also suggests that the alignment resulted from a 
rich Whig political tradition, a strong civic connection to the founding, and a deep 
national pride connected to military service in America’s previous conflicts.  Also 
important for the residents of Southeastern Kentucky were issues related to class.  Many 
of the mountainous citizens cast a suspicious eye towards the central Kentucky 
slavocracy—including a mistrust of the Bourbon aristocracy types found in Lexington.   
These traditions and outlooks combined to form a strong self-view and shaped the 
opinions of residents on the eve of civil war, who in large number, were reluctant to give 
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up on the idea of a United States Republic.  Those factors deserve more weight than 
earlier historians and their historiography have allowed.  During the critical year of 1861, 
the call to arms and political activity in southeastern Kentucky reflected a deep national 
spirit that aided the Union. 
Events following the November 1860 election of Abraham Lincoln revealed 
varying degrees of uncertainty about the future for the state governments and the people 
below the Mason-Dixon Line.  In the cotton producing states of the Lower South, the 
decision to secede came swiftly after Lincoln’s electoral victory.  Beginning in December 
1860, South Carolina led an initial wave of secession that resulted in seven states leaving 
the Union before Lincoln’s March 1861 inauguration.  The remaining eight states with 
slavery, including Kentucky, practiced a more measured caution towards choosing 
disunion in the immediate aftermath of the Republican Party victory.  The Upper South, 
comprised of Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Arkansas, abandoned the Union 
after assessing the federal reaction to the April 12 events at Fort Sumter, Charleston, 
South Carolina.  By the summer of 1861, eleven states claimed to have left the Union for 
the Confederacy and it appeared that more might follow.  Missouri, Delaware, Maryland, 
and Kentucky earned the label “Border States” as a result of their proximity to the free 
North while possessing slavery within their borders.  The historical grouping of the states 
suggests a neat geographic and chronological break, south to north, for state governments 
dissatisfied at the prospects of a new Republican administration and its stated position to 
halt the spread of slavery westward.  However, the political reality within Kentucky 
leading up to, and during, the Civil War was much more complex than textbooks present.  
For citizens of Kentucky, news of regiments on the move struck a deep chord of concern 
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among its population and the path of choosing a side in the Civil War proved to become 
one of the most precarious in the nation.  The state’s demographic mix from its short 
history complicated the path to the Union North or the Confederate South.    
In 1792, when eighteenth century Kentucky leaders secured legislation from 
Virginia for separation, Kentucky became the fifteenth state in the Union and the second 
to form after the ratification of the United States Constitution.  Kentucky attracted most 
of its migrants from Virginia, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina in the sixty years 
between statehood and the Civil War.71  A diverse mix of ideas, experiences, and 
backgrounds flowed into the Commonwealth. Northerners, a few generations removed 
from living near a burgeoning slave economy, and southerners, already acclimated to the 
“peculiar institution,” combined to form a unique culture within the young state’s 
population.  Early efforts to eliminate slavery in Kentucky proved unsuccessful for those 
opposed to the institution and most slaveholders settled in the central and western 
portions of the state—areas with a topography and soil more conducive to the use of 
slave labor.  
At its 1792 inception, Kentucky had three counties—Lincoln, Jefferson, and 
Fayette.  It did not take long for local communities to carve out more counties from 
within the boundaries of these original three to bring local government closer to the 
residents scattered across the Commonwealth.  Clay County became one of the earliest 
and most influential counties in the southeastern portion of Kentucky.  Formed in 1806 
and named after Green Clay, Clay County’s original county lines included the future 
71 James C. Klotter and Lowell Harrison, A New History of Kentucky (Lexington: 
University Press, 1997), 49.  
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county seats of Leslie, Perry, Knott, Owsley, and Lee Counties and portions of future 
Jackson, Laurel, Bell, Harlan, and Breathitt counties.  Like most of antebellum Kentucky, 
Clay County showed enthusiastic support for Whig policies in its first half-century of 
political existence and cast admiration toward the first cousin (Henry Clay) of the 
county’s namesake.  Sociologists Dwight Billings and Kathleen Blee wrote: 
Clay County’s unswerving loyalty from 1828 to 1851 to Henry Clay’s 
Whig Party, a party committed to “enhancing the profitability of 
property,” suggests that is was no different.  The strength of its voters’ 
commitment to the principles of Whiggery placed it among Bluegrass and 
other southeastern counties in the “Whig Gibraltar,” while the actions of 
its county court prior to the emergence of political parties suggest that 
Clay County leaders aggressively pursued policies associated with 
modernization and economic development.72  
Henry Clay’s popularity stemmed from his political ability to capture the frontier 
attitudes connected to Kentucky’s egalitarian spirit and the rise of a professional class.  In 
this environment, Clay rose as a leading spokesman in what state historian James Klotter 
identified as “a hybrid society, with roots planted in both America’s past and in its 
future.”73 
The political and economic activity in areas south of Lexington drew interest from 
a national level.  Henry Clay’s American System sought to advance western frontiersmen 
with a system of tariffs, banking, and internal improvements.  The system appealed to 
most Kentuckians and many of the residents in these underdeveloped areas believed the 
measures were sorely needed.  However, when the Whig Party’s influence faded in the 
1850s following Clay’s death, few Kentuckians sought the move to the new Republican 
72 Dwight B. Billings and Kathleen M. Blee, The Road to Poverty: The Making of Wealth 
and Hardship in Appalachia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 108-109.  
73 James C. Klotter, Henry Clay: The Man Who Would Be President (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 19.  
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Party as an alternative.  As a recent convert to the Republican Party in 1858, 
Pennsylvania Senator Simon Cameron wrote about Kentuckians south of Lexington and 
concluded that “these poor white men of the South, who are our brothers, and our natural 
allies, must be taught . . . we are battling for their rights.”74  As far back as the 1840s, 
prominent northern politicians cast a hopeful eye toward Kentuckian Cassius Clay’s 
efforts to cultivate antislavery sentiments in the slave state and northerners supported his 
efforts in hope that his followers signaled a “harbinger” of hidden southern sentiment.75  
Throughout the Antebellum Era, more mountainous areas of Kentucky established new 
counties as the history of the state progressed.  But even if these localities split 
geographically from parent counties, familial ties and traditions caused them to resemble 
one another in culture, economy, political structure, and outlook. 
The demographic complexity affected Kentucky and debates over Union or 
secession provided a contrast in experience for residents in different regions of the state.  
Arguments reached a fevered pitch after the violent encounter at Fort Sumter on April 12, 
1861.  Accused of harboring deep feelings for the southern cause, Governor Beriah 
Magoffin maneuvered to keep Kentucky “neutral” in the aftermath.76  The political tug-
of-war between Kentucky’s more pro-Union General Assembly and Governor 
Magoffin’s Confederate sympathies produced a series of ill-conceived attempts to 
74 Eric Foner, Free Soil Free Labor Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party 
Before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 120.  
75 Ibid., 120-121.  
76 For more on this period see Robert William Goebel’s, "Casualty of War: The 
Governorship of Beriah Magoffin, 1859-1862," (2005), Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations University of Louisville, Paper 506, and Jacob F Lee’s, "The Union as it 
was and the Constitution as it is": Unionism and Emancipation in Civil War Era 
Kentucky," (2007), Electronic Theses and Dissertations University of Louisville, Paper 
807. 
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remove Kentucky from making a choice of joining either the Union or the Confederacy.77  
On May 16, the House of Representatives voted 69-29 for a resolution of strict neutrality.  
The Senate passed similar legislation and Governor Magoffin declared Kentucky’s 
neutrality in the days that followed. 78   The legislative effort to stay out of the conflict, 
however, made little difference to recruiters who sought soldiers from the state willing to 
fight as agents from the Confederacy and Union made efforts to recruit soldiers from 
across all parts of the state.  
During the days of the state government’s debate that pronounced Kentucky 
“neutral,” William “Bull” Nelson visited President Abraham Lincoln in Washington, 
D.C., to request 5,000 arms to outfit Unionist Kentuckians.79  Nelson developed a 
distribution scheme for the rifles that involved eight prominent Kentuckians, including 
Lincoln friend Joshua F. Speed, to help carry out the plan.  On July 1, federal authorities 
directed Nelson to establish a camp in the southeastern part of the state and to collect 
three regiments of Union-minded Kentuckians.  National, as well as state, politicians 
identified the northern Ohio River region and the Appalachian area as possessing the 
most pro-Union citizens.  Southern historian E. Merton Coulter added, “This was a bold 
and daring attempt to capitalize on the strong Union sentiment that existed in the eastern 
regions of Kentucky and Tennessee, and to lay hold on the strategic passes from 
77 Thomas C. Mackey, “Not a Pariah, but a Keystone: Kentucky and Secession,” in Sister 
States, Enemy States: The Civil War in Kentucky and Tennessee, editors Kent T. Dollar, 
Larry H. Whiteaker, and W. Calvin Dickinson, (Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 2009), 25-45. 
78 Lowell H. Harrison, The Civil War in Kentucky (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1975), 9.  
79 E. Merton Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1926; reprint, (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1966), 
89.
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Tennessee and the Southwest into Virginia.”80  Most of the original 5000 guns federals 
allocated for Kentucky went to the northern and central portion of the state, but the 
southernmost destination, which became Camp Dick Robinson, received a shipment that 
helped outfit some of the southeastern Kentuckians who volunteered to fight for the 
Union.81  The weapons that arrived received the name of “Lincoln Guns” and constituted 
a source of criticism for Confederate supporters inside and outside of Kentucky.   
Newspapers in the northern and more populated parts of the state added to the 
excitement of southern Kentuckians joining the ranks of the Union.  The Louisville Daily 
Journal featured stories connected to the fears of a Confederate invasion.  On August 12 
the paper stated: 
Kentucky Invaded! Arouse, Union Men! We have just received the 
information that a force of between two and three thousand disunion 
troops have marched into Kentucky through the Cumberland Gap.  The 
Union men in that vicinity immediately sent runners to Owsley, Jackson, 
and Estill, and other counties in the region.  The Union men are rapidly 
gathering in those counties and arming with rifles, shotguns, etc.82 
Yet, a coordinated invasion of any real size would not occur for another month.  Fearful 
that the pro-Union headlines might result in accusations of aggression, the paper sought 
to clarify the following day with the reassurance “if the Union troops are mustering in the 
counties of Kentucky near the Cumberland Gap, it is to defend Kentucky soil from 
invasion and not to invade the soil of Tennessee.”83  Nonetheless, uneasy Kentuckians in 
80 Ibid., 102.  
81 Ibid. 
82 The Louisville Daily Journal, August 12, 1861. as found in Kentucky Soldiers and 
Their Regiments in the Civil War: Abstracted from the Pages of Contemporary Kentucky 
Newspapers, Vol. 1, 1861, edited by Stephen L. Wright (Utica: McDowell Publications, 
2009), 89.    
83 The Louisville Daily Journal, August 13, 1861. as found in Kentucky Soldiers and 
Their Regiments in the Civil War: Abstracted from the Pages of Contemporary Kentucky 
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the Southeast poured into Camp Dick Robinson in answer of the call for defense.  On 
September 9, the Louisville Daily Journal reported that “Camp Dick Robinson is 
swelling at a rate of two hundred per day and already extends a mile and a half down the 
road.”84  Local community leaders, not newspapers, likely did more getting men to the 
camp for protection of the state. 
Theophilus Tolman Garrard was one of the earliest and most influential leaders 
who gathered Union troops in Southeast Kentucky.  Garrard formed deep connections to 
Clay County and was from a line of early prominent Kentuckians.  Grandson of 
Kentucky’s second governor James Garrard, Garrard served as a main point of contact for 
General Nelson into the populations of Southeastern Kentucky.  Garrard’s father, Colonel 
Daniel Garrard, became famous for his leadership in marching Clay County troops into 
Canada at the onset of the War of 1812.  Theophilus Garrard, referred to at T.T., already 
had a history of getting southeastern Kentuckians to volunteer for a national cause dating 
back to the conflict with Mexico.  In April 1847, Garrard recruited and collected over 
forty men in Manchester and Booneville to join Company E of the 16th Infantry for the 
Mexican-American War.85  Garrard served as a Captain in the Mexican-American War 
and rose to the rank of Colonel.  Over a decade later, the federal government entrusted 
Garrard again and, in the summer of 1861, selected him to raise a regiment of Union 
volunteers for Camp Dick Robinson.  Nelson’s request of T.T. Garrard violated the 
Newspapers, Vol. 1, 1861, edited by Stephen L. Wright (Utica: McDowell Publications, 
2009), 89.   
84 The Louisville Daily Journal, September 9, 1861.  
85 Papers related to T. T. Garrard’s service in the Mexican-American War are found in 
both the Kentucky Room at the Jackson County Library and at the Clay County 
Historical Society.   
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state’s policy of neutrality; but, both Union and Confederate leaders at the national and 
local levels were nervous about the invasion of troops near the Kentucky-Tennessee 
border.  The recruitment went forward and the 3rd Kentucky Regiment of Infantry (soon 
renamed the 7th) was noted as the only regiment with a full quota of 1000 troops when, 
on September 22, the group mustered in at Camp Dick Robinson.  
T.T. Garrard’s calls for Union service went beyond just his home of Clay County 
and men from surrounding areas started to respond.  A town in neighboring Owsley 
County, Sturgeon provided another important outpost for Garrard’s recruitment.  In 1854, 
the former Justice of the Peace of Clay County, William Clark, left his native county and 
bought a farm in Owsley County at a location named Green Hall (which was to become 
part of Jackson County in 1858).  Once word traveled to the Clarks of Garrard’s call for 
recruits, William’s two sons, Andrew and Henry, enlisted in Company D and made their 
way to Camp Robinson.86  Andrew Clark rose to the title of First Captain of Company D 
for Garrard’s 7th regiment.  Clark, who reenlisted on February 23, 1863, used his own 
influence for an effort like Garrard’s to raise the 47th Kentucky Mounted Infantry of 
which 71 Jackson Countians volunteered.  Another prominent Jackson Countian, Levi 
Pennington, became captain of Company C for the 7th Infantry (Pennington would later 
die at Chickasaw Bluffs in General Grant’s first assault on Vicksburg.)  In all, 31 Jackson 
Countians were part of this earliest company and their service resulted in many of the 
local men fighting in a variety of future campaigns.  
86 James L. Clark, “Clay County’s Andrew Clark and the Civil War in Kentucky,” Clay 
County Ancestral News, (Manchester: Clay County Genealogical and Historical Society, 
2003) 49.  
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A high percentage of other Southeastern Kentuckians answered the call to 
volunteer as well.  Historians credit Captain George M. Jackson, the editor of a Unionist 
newspaper in Winchester named The National Union, for raising the first Kentucky 
recruitment of voluntary troops for Union service.87  A central Kentuckian, Jackson 
organized the volunteers of his group at the Red River Iron Works in Clark and Powell 
Counties.  The Red River Gorge area was important because it formed the boundary 
separating the central Kentucky Bluegrass Region and the mountains of eastern 
Kentucky.  The site of recruitment, on the Appalachian side of Captain Jackson’s native 
Clark County, became an ideal temporary location for receiving Union volunteers from 
the southeastern mountains.  Afterwards, Jackson marched to Camp Robinson and wrote, 
“We reached Camp Dick Robinson about daylight on the morning of August 7th, where 
we met other volunteers, and they commenced pouring in from all points.  Thus, was 
neutrality discarded, and the first camp established on Kentucky soil.”88   
Another Union Captain, T.J. Wright, recounted a positive experience in the 
gathering of recruits in areas of Southeast Kentucky.  Wright met with fresh volunteers of 
the Home Guard during July in Estill County, twice a week, to drill and to maintain an 
organization in case of emergency.  Wright observed that the men were excellent 
marksmen and judged that they had handled firearms since an early age.89  The group 
went to the southern portion of neighboring Madison Country, again where the Bluegrass 
and Appalachia met, and drummed up even more recruits from the mountainous region.  
87 A.C. Quisenberry, “Kentucky’s ‘Neutrality’ in 1861,” Register of Kentucky State 
Historical Society, 15 (Jan. 1917): 10-17.  
88 Ibid., 17. 
89 Wright, T.J., History of the Eighth Regiment of Kentucky Voluntary Infantry During its 
Three Years Campaign, (St. Joseph, MO: St. Joseph Steam Printing Company, 1880), 7.  
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By September, the unit reached enough recruits to form the B, C, and H Companies.  At 
Station Camp, located just a few miles from Jackson County’s northeastern border, 
Wright’s men celebrated the achievement of filling the ranks and local residents provided 
a feast.  Wright observed that the recruits were “followed by drums and fife, appealing to 
the patriotism of the young men to take up arms of the best Government ever vouchsafed 
to man on earth.”90  On September 26, from Station Camp, Captain Wright and Captain 
R. Winbourn split up and made their way deeper into the mountains and arrived at a 
neighboring farm where potential recruits awaited in Owsley County.  Wright recalled 
the experience: 
The surrounding hills re-echoed the sound of our martial band, the music 
of which was not the best, but the patriotic ardor being augmented by the 
rumored invasion of the State by the rebels under Zollicoffer, caused men, 
women and children to collect from all directions, some bearing large 
baskets filled with provisions, all with hearts full of love for our old flag 
and freedom.  At 10 o’clock a.m. several hundreds of eager, expectant 
persons had assembled.91 
When reading personal accounts from the journals or memoirs of military leaders, 
it is important to use other sources of evidence to make sure exaggerations and 
embellishments do not outweigh the trustworthiness of the source.  Taken 
together, however, a pattern of enthusiasm emerges as recruiters made their way 
around the southern mountain counties. 
Statistics of United States enlistment shed some light on the state’s geographical 
pattern of service.  Accurate statistics on Civil War enlistments vary and exactness is 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.  Kentucky Adjutant General D. W. Lindsey 
90 Ibid., 8. 
91 Ibid., 8-9. 
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compiled what historians believe to be one of the more trusted county-by-county lists at 
the end of 1864.92  In the Jackson Purchase region of the state, the seven counties 
classified to that area boasted a population of 64,507 based on the 1860 census and 
provided 650 military personnel for the Union, a rate of 1% of the population.  Historians 
considered that area as one of the strongest for pro-Confederate activity and Lindsey’s 
numbers back that claim.  Based on the same metric, for the Eastern Pennyroyal portion 
of the state made up of sixteen counties ranging from just east of Bowling Green to 
Somerset, the population stood at 153,443 with enlistments at 10,766 or 7%.  For the 
Southern Eastern Highlands, the population was 80,360 with a total enlistment of 6,853 
or 8.5%.  Narrowing down to just Jackson, Clay, Owsley, and Estill Counties, the 
population of those four adjoining counties stood at 21,960 in 1860 and they combined to 
provide 2681 soldiers or 12%.  Three of Kentucky’s larger counties, all north of the 
region, offer an interesting contrast as Jefferson (89,404 population, 6,578 enlistments or 
7%), Fayette (22,599 population, 703 enlistments or 3%), and Madison (17,207 
population, 539 enlistments or 3%) all provide numbers far below their southeastern 
counterparts.93  Some of the percental discrepancy of military enlistment lies in the small 
portion of slaves in the populations of the smaller southeastern counties.  But even with 
slaves removed from the numbers, the southeastern rate of participation still outweighs 
the contributions of the areas listed here.  That also brings into focus an interesting 
historiographical debate as many modern scholars analyze Kentucky’s Unionist activity 
as a mix of interests that included a large portion who fought to protect slavery within a 
92 Kenneth H. Williams and James Russell Harris, “Kentucky in 1860: A Statistical 
Overview,” The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 103 (Autumn 2005): 757. 
93 Ibid., 744-750.  
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constitutional Union.  Motivations to enlist varied across the state and records suggest 
prominent men in the central Bluegrass and western regions of the state fought to protect 
slavery within a constitutional union.94  The protection of slavery did little to motivate the 
men of the Southern Eastern Highlands. 
1861 political activity revealed another aspect of Kentucky’s allegiances as voting 
at the polls matched the Union spirit of the volunteering men who made their way to 
camps.  The state’s bicameral legislature grew in pro-Union sentiment in the summer 
elections of August.  After the vote for the State House of Representatives, pro-Union 
men outnumbered confederate sympathizers at a count of 76-24.  In the Senate the 
number stood at 27-11.  Just how much this vote changed the dynamic of the Kentucky’s 
state legislature is hard to measure, but historians agree that these gains produced sizeable 
majorities in each chamber of the General Assembly.  Billed as a referendum on 
secession, the statewide election that followed the wave of southern secession allowed 
Kentucky voters to express their position on the issue.  Moreover, the results meant that 
the legislature held enough votes to override any of Magoffin’s vetoes and resulted in the 
power to impeach the governor if he tried to aid or shield the Confederacy.95   
Prior to the General Assembly election, Kentucky held an election for federal 
representatives on June 22 due to President Lincoln’s call for a special session.  In the ten 
seats up for grabs, nine Unionist candidates won.  Perhaps more interesting is the gaps 
that exist deeper inside the raw numerical results.  The State’s Rights candidate won the 
94 For more on the motivation of Central Kentucky volunteers see Patrick A. Lewis’s, For 
Slavery and Union: Benjamin Buckner and Kentucky Loyalties in the Civil War 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015). 
95 James C. Klotter, “Kentucky, the Civil War, and the Spirit of Henry Clay,” The 
Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 110 (Summer/Autumn 2012): 259.  
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first district, the far western end of Kentucky, and the victory marked the only race the 
Confederates could claim.  The Unionist candidate took the second and third districts, 
which both were in the next two western-most portions of the state, by an average margin 
of three to one.  In the fourth and fifth districts, located in the central portion of the state, 
the Unionist candidate won by a rate of four to one.  In the seventh, eighth, ninth, and 
tenth districts, which included the northern portion of the state and its most important 
cities, the Unionist candidate won between 60% and 80% of the vote in each.  The final 
election tallies of 1861 suggest that Kentucky objected to secession and the Confederacy.  
In the sixth district, which included the Southeastern Appalachian counties, the Unionist 
candidate won 8,181 of the 8,410 votes cast—a total of 97%.96  These numbers in total, 
and the absence of enough serious secessionist sentiment to even field a viable candidate 
in the sixth district, reveal that Confederate support lagged Unionist sentiment throughout 
most of the state in 1861.  In the southeastern mountains, however, the Confederate spirit 
not only lagged—it was nearly non-existent.    
Confederate military strategy targeted Kentucky in the late summer of 1861 
around the same time that the political picture came into focus.  Events in the far western 
portion of the state occurred first and the actions prompted decisions from the new 
General Assembly.  By September 3, Confederate General Leonidas Polk’s troops 
occupied the bluff above Columbus Kentucky near the Mississippi River.  On September 
10, Jefferson Davis placed Albert Sidney Johnston in command of a large portion of 
Confederate operations in the western theatre of the war.  Leaving Richmond Virginia 
96 Thomas Speed, The Union Cause in Kentucky: 1860-1865, (New York: The 
Knickerbocker Press, 1907), 88-89.   
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with his new appointment, Johnston headed to Nashville to conduct operations from 
Central Tennessee.  General Johnston arrived and signaled a more aggressive approach as 
one of his first decisions was to appoint Simon Bolivar Buckner as brigadier general and 
to order him to occupy Bowling Green.97  But prior to reaching Nashville, Johnston 
stopped in Knoxville to confer with Confederate General Felix Kirk Zollicoffer.  
Zollicoffer, whose only military experience prior to the Civil War was as a volunteer 
lieutenant for Andrew Jackson in the 1835 Second Seminole War, received the command 
of East Tennessee on the recommendation of Confederate General Polk prior to 
Johnston’s appointment.98  Like Buckner and Polk, Zollicoffer prepared for a 
Confederate invasion into Kentucky.  
The Confederate military plans carried out in September 1861 did much to push 
the state of Kentucky further into Union arms.  As Polk moved Confederate Brigadier 
General Gideon Pillow into Colombia at the far western end of the state, and Buckner 
eyed Bowling Green near the southern center, Zollicoffer gathered soldiers around 
Cumberland Gap for a northern advance from the southeast on the old Wilderness Road 
toward Lexington.  The military operations on each southern corner of the state occurred 
within a week of one another.  However, the move into the area north of the Cumberland 
Gap presented logistical and environmental challenges for the Confederates unlike the 
other operations.  On September 10, 1861 Zollicoffer relayed the difficulty to Samuel 
97 Harrison, The Civil War in Kentucky, 16.  
98 For more on Felix Zollicoffer see Brian McKnight’s “Reconsidering Felix Zollicoffer: 
The Influence of Weather and Terrain in the Rise and Fall of a Military Commander in 
Appalachia,” in Kent T. Dollar, Larry H. Whiteaker, and W. Calvin Dickinson ed. Border 
Wars: The Civil War in Tennessee and Kentucky (Kent: Kent State University Press, 
2015), 147-169 and Raymond E. Myers’s The Zollie Tree (Louisville: The Filson Club 
Press, 1964).   
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Cooper at the War Department calling the country between Cumberland Gap and Camp 
Dick Robinson “poor and hostile.”99  The soldiers at Camp Dick Robinson represented 
the most important line of defense between an invasion from the southeast and 
Kentucky’s central region of cities, navigable rivers, and other resources.  Union military 
leaders assigned Colonel T.T. Garrard’s regiment to protect the Rockcastle Ford on the 
Wilderness Road, south of Camp Robinson.100  Colonel Garrard’s company, 
undersupplied and underfed, received little training before being moved to the strategic 
position.  During the time of preparation and guard, Garrard communicated to Brigadier 
General George H. Thomas who replaced General Nelson in early September as 
commander of Camp Dick Robinson.  General Thomas, in turn, wrote General William 
T. Sherman who oversaw the countering of Buckner’s move into the south-central part of 
the state.  
  The Confederate offensive into the far western portion of the state proved a 
poorly planned strategy and Pillow’s occupation of Columbus provided enough 
immediate concern for the General Kentucky Assembly to make the decision to end 
neutrality.  Under command from General John C. Frémont, General Ulysses S. Grant 
moved into Paducah to counter the Confederate advance.  Confederate leaders decried the 
actions of the Federals with complaints that Camp Dick Robinson, the shipment of guns, 
and covert actions into Kentucky’s Mississippi River towns were the first violation of the 
99 U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies 128 vols. (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1880–1901), Series I, Vol. 4, 199. 
100 Thomas D. Clark, A History of Laurel County: An Account of the Emergence of a 
Frontier Kentucky Appalachian Community (London: Laurel County Historical Society, 
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state’s neutrality policy.  The political criticism from the Confederates on who violated 
neutrality first, however, did little to influence Kentucky’s General Assembly.  For 
Kentucky’s members of the House and Senate, the Confederate earlier move into 
Columbus militarily justified the Union’s counter into Paducah—a place of more 
strategic value.  As historian Steven Woodworth noted: 
The irony lay in the fact that as long as the Federals held Paducah, 
Columbus, which could thus be easily outflanked, was of no military value 
whatsoever to the Confederacy.  The state of affairs that Polk saw as the 
confirmation of the correctness of his decision was in fact the very thing 
that made his action futile.  This fact was seen at once by an intelligent 
soldier and pro-Southern Kentuckian, Simon Bolivar Buckner, and pointed 
out within a few days in a letter to Richmond.101 
The town acted as a trap, and the political repercussions damaged the Confederate’s 
broader overall Kentucky strategy. 
In September 1861, the General Assembly flexed some of its new political 
strength gained from the August elections and ended the policy of neutrality only four 
months after passing the measure.  On September 18, following the first Confederate 
invasions into the state, the assembly passed a series of resolutions that favored the 
Union.  The statement started with a strong rebuke of Confederate actions and 
proclaimed, “Whereas, Kentucky has been invaded by the forces of the so-called 
Confederate States . . . be it resolved by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky, that the invaders must be expelled . . ..”102  The second resolution elevated 
101 Steven E. Woodworth, “The Indeterminate Quantities: Jefferson Davis, Leonidas 
Polk, and the End of Kentucky Neutrality, September 1861,” Civil War History, Vol. 38, 
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General Robert Anderson, federal hero of Fort Sumter and native Kentuckian, to “take 
instant command, with authority and power of this Commonwealth to call out a volunteer 
force in Kentucky for the purpose of repelling the invaders from our soil.”103  The 
resolutions ended with a plea “that the patriotism of every Kentuckian is invoked, and is 
confidently relied upon to give active aid in the defense of the Commonwealth.”  Four of 
the affirmative votes on all five of the resolutions came from James W. Anderson 
representing Knox County, Albert A. Curtis representing Estill and Jackson Counties, 
E.B. Bacheller representing Laurel and Rockcastle Counties, and Alex T. White 
representing Clay and Owsley Counties.  Two days after the vote, Governor Beriah 
Magoffin responded that he did not support the language of the resolution and showed 
specific concern about the appointment of General Anderson.  Magoffin stated: 
I object to these resolutions, secondly, because they needlessly invite a 
military officer in the Federal service to take command of the department 
of the Cumberland, embracing Kentucky, who will not be bound by the 
expressions of your resolutions, but will be required to obey the orders of 
the Federal government, whether they be consistent with your resolution 
or not, and whose powers will not be limited by any acts of the 
Legislature.104 
The governor’s stern warning about the implications of empowering federal authorities 
did not discourage the General Assembly and the body passed the measure over 
Magoffin’s objections.  The vote totals in the House hovered around a three-quarter pro-
Union and one-quarter state’s rights split.  The pro-Union caucus neutralized any of 
Magoffin’s actions to position Kentucky as either neutral or pro-Confederate.  Even 
though many Kentuckians wanted to keep the Commonwealth from becoming a 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 176. 
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battleground, the language and political posture from the summer of 1861 suggest that a 
Union path emerged.  
Zollicoffer found conditions in East Tennessee difficult as that mountainous 
portion of the state held a sizable pro-Union presence of its own.  The area resembled 
Southeastern Kentucky in environment and temperament.  A large portion of these 
Southern Unionists in East Tennessee traced familial lines to the North and many had 
relatives in Kentucky.  At a higher rate than anywhere else in the Confederate South, 
these residents developed a distrust of the slave power and viewed the Confederacy as an 
aristocratic regime at odds with the common folk of those areas.105  Like Southeastern 
Kentucky, a leftover Whig residue was one of the strengths in Eastern Tennessee that 
obstructed the earliest secessionist effort.  William G. Brownlow owned a popular paper 
called Brownlow’s Knoxville Whig that boasted a circulation of twelve thousand—the 
largest in the state.106  Historian Daniel Crofts adds: 
In November and December 1860 Brownlow and the Union Whigs from 
Knoxville undertook to block the ‘wild stampede toward secession.’ They 
stirred the ‘friends of the Union’ from the outlying countryside. . . At a 
memorable five-hour public meeting on December 8, in a courthouse 
building so jammed that many people could not fit inside, Brownlow and 
the unconditional Unionists adopted resolutions denouncing secession.107 
Considered for a Unionist candidate for governor, Brownlow established a strong Whig 
following in the eastern part of the state in the antebellum years.  Brownlow’s reputation 
and influence must have made an impact on the military loyalties of the area.  Historians 
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have estimated that up to 100,000 white southerners from seceded states fought for the 
Union, with 42,000 of those men coming from East Tennessee.108 
In Southeastern Kentucky, the movement of both Union and Confederates did not 
match the quick unfolding of events of Grant and Pillow near the Mississippi River.  
Instead, the environment and population interrupted and slowed the pace of Confederate 
advance.  One soldier remarked that some of the troops nearly walked off bluffs due to 
fatigue and another observed “long haired men with long squirrel rifles ever ready to 
shoot a Rebel when opportunity presented.”109  Twenty miles north of the Cumberland 
Gap, the small town of Barbourville became the first significant encounter of resistance 
for the invading Confederates on their way up the Wilderness Road.  On September 18, 
Zollicoffer ordered an advance of eight-hundred troops where they were met with three-
hundred Home Guard Kentuckians located at Camp Andrew Johnson.110  The clash 
resulted in a number of dead soldiers, the destruction of the camp, and a victory for 
Zollicoffer’s men.  Although small in scale, the event drew national, state, and local 
attention.  General Robert Anderson telegraphed Abraham Lincoln September 16 with 
the warning “We have received positive information that the Tennesseans are invading 
Kentucky through the Cumberland Gap.  We can get plenty of men if we can obtain arms 
108 Kenneth W. Noe, “Battle Against the Traitors: Unionist Middle Tennesseans in the 
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for them.  This is of vital importance.”111  Lincoln responded, “From what you telegraph 
today, I think you better take active command in Kentucky at once.  War Department will 
telegraph you about arms tomorrow.”112  Once Zollicoffer established a presence in 
Barbourville, the Goose Creek Salt Works in Clay County represented a cache of 
resources and became the first major Confederate target in Southeast Kentucky.  A week 
after arriving in Barbourville, Zollicoffer alerted Albert Sidney Johnston that he would 
make a move on the Manchester location.113  The raid proved to be a material success.  
Zollicoffer’s troops collected 8,000 cartridges, 3 kegs of powder, 6 barrels of salt, 3 
horses, 25 pairs of shoes, and several guns.  Beyond material gain, the general wanted to 
convert the population to his side.  Historian Brian McKnight assessed: 
Although Zollicoffer’s raid on the saltworks was successful, he remained 
doubtful about the support of the mountaineers.  During the raid on the 
works, several of Zollicoffer’s men took time to harass the population.  
While they did little more than destroy haystacks and burn rails, their 
inadvisable actions weakened the already limited Confederate support in 
the region.114   
The Louisville Daily Journal reported later that “Zollicoffer’s robbers have been running 
riot in Knox, Whitley, Laurel, Clay and Rockcastle Counties.”115  T.T. Garrard relayed 
news of the events in Manchester to General Thomas at Camp Dick Robinson.  
111 “Letter to Robert Anderson, September 16, 1861,” Abraham Lincoln and Roy P. 
Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln: Volume IV 1860-61 (New Brunswick, 
N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 524. 
112 Ibid.  
113 Zollicoffer to Lieutenant Colonel Mackall, 24 September 1861, Official Records IV, 
199. 
114 McKnight, Contested Borderlands, 39.  
115 Louisville Daily Journal, October 16, 1861, as found in Kentucky Soldiers and Their 
Regiments in the Civil War: Abstracted From the Pages of Contemporary Kentucky 
Newspapers, Vol. 1, 1861, edited by Stephen L. Wright (Utica: McDowell Publications, 
2009), 89.   
55 
On September 22, only a few days after the events in Barbourville and 
Manchester, President Lincoln penned his most famous statement about the importance 
of keeping Kentucky in the Union.  Lincoln’s message to Orville H. Browning, another 
Kentucky-born Illinois politician, revealed how important that the sixteenth President 
viewed the Bluegrass State as he lamented, “to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to 
lose the whole game.  Kentucky gone, we cannot hold Missouri, nor, as I think, 
Maryland.  These all against us, and the job on our hands is too large for us.  We would 
as well consent to the separation at once, including the surrender of this capitol.”116  The 
context of Lincoln’s concern related to Union General Frémont’s heavy-handed actions 
and confiscations in Missouri—an approach that alarmed the slaveholding populations of 
the Border States.  As the picture in the western and central portion of the state raised 
fears of Confederate political momentum, Lincoln turned toward gains made in the 
General Assembly and the situation in the eastern portion of the state to balance his 
negative prognostications.  The letter to Browning, and the fears of “losing the whole 
game” if Kentucky aligned with the Confederacy, is often quoted and captures the 
significance of the President’s birth state.  On October 1, two weeks later, Lincoln issued 
a “Memorandum for a Plan of Campaign.”  The message opened with thoughts on 
securing the area around Cumberland Gap.  Lincoln assessed the situation with more 
detail with a careful eye on Southeastern Kentucky: 
That point is now guarded against up by Zollicoffer, with 6000 or 8000, 
rebels at Barboursville, Kentucky, say twenty-five miles from the Gap 
towards Lexington.  
We have a force of 5000 or 6000, under General Thomas, at Camp Dick 
Robinson, about twenty-five miles from Lexington, and seventy-five from 
116 “To Orville H. Browning, September 22, 1861,” The Collected Works IV, 1860-61, 
532. 
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Zollicoffer’s camp on the road between the two, which is not a Railroad, 
anywhere between Lexington and the point to be seized—and along the 
whole length of which the Union sentiment among the people largely 
predominates.117 
Further north up the Wilderness Road from Zollicoffer’s position in Barbourville, 
Colonel Garrard guarded London with local volunteers, and the position developed into 
an important piece for the Union’s long-range plan and, more importantly, the immediate 
defense of Eastern Kentucky. 
The 7th Kentucky Infantry Regiment moved south from Camp Dick Robinson, to 
a position near the city of London, and the troops settled at Camp Wildcat near the 
Rockcastle River.  As Zollicoffer’s force of 5,000 approached north from Barbourville, 
Garrard’s group of 900 stood as the main obstacle.  Garrard reached out to General 
Thomas for more troops and provisions in desperation.  Union reinforcements arrived on 
October 20 when Hungarian-born Brigadier General Albin Schoepf took command.  The 
next day a battle involving over 12,000 troops led to a Union victory and Zollicoffer’s 
withdrawal back to the Cumberland ford.  Casualties were low, but the defeat marked a 
major disruption and setback to Confederate strategy.  In the weeks that followed, many 
of the Tennessee Unionists wanted to seize the opportunity to push south and to liberate 
eastern Tennessee.  Instead, Brigadier General William T. Sherman ordered General 
Schoepf to move from Somerset to central Kentucky in something frustrated Federal 
troops despairingly called the “Wildcat Stampede.”118 General Thomas convinced 
Sherman that the position in southern Kentucky needed Schoepf more and the general 
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was relocated back to Somerset.  Confederate leadership eyed a western shift for a 
follow-up Kentucky invasion as Johnston and Zollicoffer decided for a push toward the 
Cumberland River. 
Zollicoffer’s October attack and retreat stands as an important moment in 1861 
for the commonwealth of Kentucky—and the nation.  The federal response and Union 
leadership averted disaster in southeastern Kentucky.  Garrard’s unit of local men held 
the position and faced certain defeat.  But the bigger picture was that it symbolized a 
capstone of unwavering support from a people willing to defend their home and country.  
The recorded experiences of recruitment officials leading up to the engagement, 
alongside the percentage of Southeast Kentuckians who served in the early ranks for the 
federal cause, provide documented evidence of strong Union support.  Voting patterns in 
state and national congressional elections revealed a political leaning that matched the 
military service.  Northern political leaders around the country, including President 
Abraham Lincoln, spoke of the area with hope and a confidence that the people were on 
their side.  Headlines from partisan newspapers and even reflections from Confederate 
Generals seemed either eager to expose the alliance of these mountainous residents or to 
concede the prospects of changing their minds.  Lost Cause historians like E. Merton 
Coulter have minimized or ignored the buffer that these citizens provided for the Union.  
More recent scholars continue to attribute “mountain unionism” to the absence of a slave 
economy.  Like all areas, this region produced Confederates, proponents for slavery, and 
citizens who wanted to protect the institution from within a constitutional union.  But the 
overwhelming statistical evidence, partnered with the social history of the area, disputes 
that people of Southeastern Kentucky fought for any reason other than for what the 
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traditions and customs of their culture directed them.  While the geography of the region 
and the expensive cost of slaves did prevent the rise of a plantation society in 
Southeastern Kentucky, deep moral and social viewpoints combined to develop a culture 
that attracted settlers opposed to slavery to the area during the Antebellum Era.  Those 
negative attitudes toward slavery made a difference in the build up to war and the earliest 
stages of the war.  As the war progressed, Confederate and guerilla attacks on the area 
further hardened opinions of Appalachian citizens toward their southern neighbors.  
Southeastern Kentuckians also held and displayed a pride in the service of preserving the 
Union when many others around the state either bolted for the Confederacy, started to 
develop southern sympathies, or simply fought for state preservation.  Combined, these 
characteristics of the pro-Union sentiment in the region present a complex picture that 
may help uncover multiple causes related to Kentucky’s deepest pocket of loyalty to the 
Union.  Moreover, the political stance and military contributions of Southeast 
Kentuckians proved valuable to the preservation of the Union. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
“THEY ARE HAVING A STAMPEDE IN KENTUCKY, LOOK TO IT”: 
CIVIL WAR AND SOUTHEASTERN KENTUCKY IN 1862 
The Civil War shook Kentucky in 1862 more than any other year of the conflict.  
While the state experienced skirmishes, raids, and other war activity throughout the entire 
period of the national crisis, the size and scope of military focus toward Kentucky during 
1862 surpassed all other years of the Civil War.  Kentuckians expressed concerns during 
the presidential election of 1860 about the state becoming the front-lines if war broke out.  
In 1862, those fears manifested into a harsh reality during the second year of fighting.  A 
back and forth for control of the state between pro-Confederate Governor Magoffin and 
the pro-Union General Assembly offered positive signals to both sides in the earliest 
stages of the war.  As a result, this waffling caused Union and Confederate leadership to 
remain cautious in their approach to Kentucky’s loyalty.  After the initial 1861 
Confederate invasion into the state failed, and a Union path emerged for the 
Commonwealth, more aggressive military objectives replaced political strategy.  For 
Southeastern Kentuckians, the shift in direction brought violence and large foraging 
armies into their communities.  The residents of the area maintained a strong loyalty to 
the Union Army and many of the men who volunteered for the Union cause found 
themselves at the center of important battles—both near home and far away.  Within the 
state, engagements at Mill Springs, Big Hill, Richmond, and Perryville produced mixed 
results; yet, by the year’s end, the Confederates abandoned any real hope to seize 
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Kentucky.  The Union soldiers from Southeastern Kentucky, as well as larger portions of 
the local population, provided resistance and endured great hardships throughout 1862 to 
stop the Confederate military invasion and political takeover. 
I. 
After the October 1861 Battle of Wildcat Mountain and the retreat to Tennessee 
that followed, Confederate leadership planned to move General Felix Zollicoffer who 
was just outside of Somerset, in another effort to invade central Kentucky.  Instead of 
following the original path that held close to the Wilderness Road, the new Confederate 
position shifted the strategy of attack over forty miles westward into Pulaski County.  
That location provided access to the Cumberland River and the coal needed to supply 
Nashville.119   In charge of Kentucky operations for the Union, Brigadier General 
William T. Sherman believed the new Confederate movements posed a direct threat to 
the key cities of Louisville and Lexington.  No decision to march south after the Battle of 
Wildcat Mountain to liberate eastern Tennessee, as many of the troops within the Union 
ranks wanted, occurred.  Instead, Sherman reacted to the new southern positioning of the 
Confederates and pulled General Albin Schoepf back to central Kentucky to defend the 
Bluegrass region—a movement that signaled the priority of the Union military and one to 
the disappointment of the Tennessee Unionists.  A series of additional changes followed 
in November and December 1861.  Union General George Thomas advocated and won a 
119 Stuart W. Sanders, The Battle of Mill Springs (Charleston: The History Press, 2013), 
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decision that returned General Schoepf back to the Somerset area in the late fall of 1861.  
In addition, federal leadership replaced a worrisome Sherman with Don Carlos Buell as 
the new brigadier general in charge of Kentucky.120  Sherman’s hasty movements and his 
claims that hundreds of thousands of troops were needed to defend Kentucky led to the 
replacement.121   
General Buell faced an issue deemed important to the Lincoln administration with 
the situation in eastern Tennessee during the early stages of his military appointment.  
The concern was not a new development as advocates for an eastern Tennessee invasion 
emerged in the earliest stages of the war.  In September 1861 during the initial three-part 
Confederate invasion into Kentucky, a Unionist congressman from Tennessee, Horace 
Maynard, advised President Abraham Lincoln about the dire situation in his home state.  
Elected to the United States House of Representatives prior to Tennessee’s secessionist 
vote, Maynard came from a district that shared a political outlook much like Southeastern 
Kentucky’s—a concentrated pro-Union population in the slave south.  But unlike 
Kentucky, Tennessee had seceded, and the congressman worked to elevate the urgency of 
a federal military response to the relief of his Appalachian citizens.  
The advice and requests of Maynard shaped much of Lincoln’s correspondence 
with his generals in the western theatre in the second half of 1861 and at the start of 1862.  
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As early as September 1861, plans to liberate the Unionist portion of Tennessee drew 
support from Lincoln and the newly appointed General Commander of all Union 
armies—George B. McClellan.  Due to the area’s important logistical role in southern 
railroad commerce, eastern Tennessee stood as a place of strategic military value.  But 
other factors also weighed on President Lincoln.  As historian Michael Toomey noted: 
Lincoln also believed that he was morally obligated to come to the aid of 
Southern Unionists wherever possible, and no region of the South had a 
more visible or active Unionist population than East Tennessee.  That such 
extensive loyalty existed within the bounds of a seceded state was seen as 
remarkable at the time and has continued to attract the attention of 
scholars and others who seek to understand the origins and motivations for 
Southern Unionism in general.  It is clear that a number of factors were 
involved, but it appears that the strength of the Unionist movement in East 
Tennessee was among rural middle-class farmers.122 
General McClellan worked on complex plan to advance from Kentucky into eastern 
Tennessee as part of a “three-way pincer”—with the two additional Union positions 
closing in from Virginia and the Carolina coast.123  Hundreds of miles from Washington, 
D.C., however, regional Union command in southern Kentucky balked at such 
recommendations and turned attention away from a possible southeastern thrust to 
concentrate, instead, on central Tennessee.  The military department commanders of 
Buell (Kentucky) and Union General Henry W. Halleck (Missouri) decided the eastern 
Tennessee plans were either untenable or logistically impossible.124  Buell viewed 
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Zollicoffer’s move west and, with much more interest, a potential route to Nashville as 
more pressing targets. 
The Confederate Army experienced their own confusion and changes in 
leadership during the closing months of 1861 as well.  The son of famed Kentucky 
Senator John Crittenden, General George C. Crittenden assumed Confederate command 
over the occupied district of East Tennessee.  Confederate President Jefferson Davis’s 
choice of the West Point-educated Crittenden replaced General Albert S. Johnston’s 
reach at the critical time of Zollicoffer’s November reentry into southern Kentucky.  
Unbeknownst of the changes, Zollicoffer elected to take a westward route to the city of 
Jamestown, Tennessee, due south of Monticello, Kentucky, to begin a northern march as 
an alternative to the Cumberland Gap.125  In a November 27 message, Zollicoffer 
reported that the path was bountiful with beef, pork, and corn.  Commenting on the war 
sentiment he encountered the general added that “the better classes of citizens sympathize 
with us in this part of Kentucky.”126  This message contrasted with the General’s 
September communication where he expressed a frustrated tone during his prior journey 
through southeastern Kentucky along the Wilderness Road.  Zollicoffer arrived outside of 
Somerset and established a winter camp on the north bank of the Cumberland River at 
Mill Springs.  The camp placed his army between a river and an opposing force; a 
dangerous choice if faced with the need to retreat.  Military historians have speculated 
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that the lack of communication during the period of changing Confederate command may 
have led to Zollicoffer’s strategic mistake. 
While Zollicoffer’s Confederate campaign for a second Kentucky invasion 
unfolded, Tennessee Unionists stationed in southeastern Kentucky received news in 
November 1861 that renewed their hopes for a push southward.  Much of the arousal 
stemmed from written confirmation of a series of bridges burned in East Tennessee.  
Prior to the attack, federal authorities undertook an effort to elevate career naval officer, 
Samuel P. Carter, to the position of brigadier general.  Union command hoped to use the 
Princeton-educated Tennessean’s well-established connections to their military advantage 
in the Appalachian region.  Those plans appeared to coalesce when Carter’s younger 
brother, William, sent message that he had coordinated the destruction of bridges used 
between Tennessee and Virginia and between Tennessee and Georgia.  In November 
1861 Colonel Samuel Carter, stationed in London with three Union regiments including 
Colonel T.T. Garrard’s 7th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, hoped to make a move based 
upon his brother’s reports.  Historian Brian McKnight analyzed the effects of the news 
and concluded: 
With local citizens excited to the point of action and knowing that the 
destruction of those vital east-west links would result in a firm response by 
the Confederate Army, Samuel Carter urged General Thomas to “urge the 
commanding general to give us some additional force and let us advance 
into East Tennessee; now is the time.”127 
While exciting to the Tennessee Unionists, the destruction did not lead to any immediate 
change of General Buell’s federal plans in the closing weeks of the first year of the war.  
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However, a combination of pro-Union Tennesseans and Kentuckians proved instrumental 
in the engagement that took shape in southern Kentucky during January 1862. 
Prior to the Battles of Wildcat Mountain and Mill Springs, in private 
correspondence Union military leaders disparaged many of the inexperienced Kentucky 
recruits.  In a September 23, 1861 letter from Colonel Thomas Bramlette to General 
George Thomas, Bramlette remarked that “the inertness of the Union men, their 
sensationalism, their utter backwardness in rushing to the call of our country is 
annoying.”128  By October 1861 General Thomas wrote to General Sherman and added 
“to advance into Tennessee, I ought to have four more regiments from some other State 
than Kentucky to follow us as a reserve . . . If I could get four additional regiments of 
Ohio or Indiana volunteers, I would be perfectly willing to dispense with all the 
128 “Thomas E. Bramlette to George Thomas,” Sept. 23, 1861, United States War 
Department, Official Records, Series.1, Vol. 4, 270-271.  
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Kentucky regiments I have.”129  In the eastern portion of the state Colonel James A. 
Garfield, later the twentieth President of the United States, complained that: 
the Fourteenth Kentucky is composed of excellent material, but is in a 
wretched state of discipline.  Very few of its members have been drilled in 
the school of the soldier, much less that of the company and battalion.  It 
can be considered but little better than a well-disposed, Union-loving mob, 
which, if its scattered fragments can be gathered up, may be converted into 
a very serviceable regiment.130 
Stationed at Camp Calvert near London, General Schoepf struck a different tone and used 
his correspondence to repeatedly request supplies for his Kentucky men.  Many of the 
southeastern Kentuckians in London who protected the road to Richmond and Crab 
Orchard lacked the shoes, blankets, and coats needed for winter duty.  Soldiers faced a 
similar predicament near Irvine where Colonel Sidney M. Barnes raised the Kentucky 8th 
Volunteer Infantry at Estill Springs.  These men from Estill, Jackson, and Owsley 
Counties also suffered from a shortage of equipment.  As the group continued to 
assemble in September 1861, Barnes relayed to General Thomas that: 
we camped here yesterday with two full companies raised in this county, 
and we are looking for another from Owsley County this evening; also one 
from Jackson County. . .. We need blankets, tents, and other camp 
equipage, and guns, and I know we ought to have them right away.  Great 
activity in the counties around on the part of the secessionists. . .. 
Blankets, tents, and guns will help us and give our people confidence.  
More depends on this than men ordinarily imagine.  The mountain people 
are peculiar, and I know them.131   
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The 4th, 7th, and 8th Kentucky Infantries received praise for their organization and 
discipline in the earliest stages of the war.  Many of the other units, at least early, 
frustrated the command of which they served. 
The invading Confederates stationed around Somerset faced their own hardships.  
Zollicoffer’s winter camp boasted around 4000 Confederate soldiers with nearly a quarter 
who lacked guns to fire at the enemy.  Conditions deteriorated during the Kentucky 
winter and hampered Zollicoffer’s hopes for a potential advance east against London or 
north toward Danville.132  With the Confederates hunkered down, Union General Schoepf 
strengthened his Somerset position in early December with the addition of two regiments 
of East Tennessee Unionists from Colonel Carter’s London force.  Buell ordered General 
Thomas and General Schoepf to launch a tandem attack on the Confederate position just 
after Christmas.  Included in General Thomas’s army were the Colonel Speed S. Fry led 
4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry Regiment and the Colonel John Marshall Harlan (later 
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court) led 10th Kentucky Volunteer 
Infantry Regiment—both comprised of Kentucky soldiers organized at Camp Dick 
Robinson.  Men from central Kentucky made up the bulk of soldiers for the 4th Kentucky, 
but volunteers from the southeastern counties of Estill, Laurel, and Rockcastle also 
served in the ranks.  Fry, a strong Unionist, came from a family with central Kentucky 
ties and his grandfather had even taught the noted emancipationist politician Cassius 
Marcellus Clay.133  Colonel Harlan led central-western Kentuckians in the Kentucky 10th.  
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Infantry regiments from Minnesota, Ohio, Indiana, alongside a Kentucky volunteer 
cavalry, rounded out Thomas’s troops.  
In January 1862, just after Confederate General Crittenden arrived at Mill Springs 
to assume control, Union General Thomas continued to advance, through rugged 
conditions, on the Confederate position.  The swollen river canceled any ability for 
relocation.  Trapped between the Cumberland River and an approaching federal force, 
General Crittenden recognized the volatility of his situation and took preemptive action 
on January 19, sending troops at General Thomas.  One of the fiercest encounters of the 
clash developed between the Union Kentucky 4th and the Confederate Mississippi 15th at 
a location called Fishing Creek near Logan’s Crossroads.  The conflict featured soldiers 
fighting in close proximity, ammunition troubles, faulty weapons, and the order of fixed 
bayonets.  During the heat of the battle, General Zollicoffer mistakenly rode behind 
enemy lines and into the 4th Kentucky Regiment to issue an order.  Once the Union 
regiment realized the general’s identity, Colonel Fry fired his pistol and other 
Kentuckians launched a volley killing the Confederate leader.  Fry, and other veteran 
Kentuckians of the 4th, told and retold various accounts of the climatic encounter.   
Colonel Samuel Carter’s 12th Brigade experienced heavy fighting during the 
conflict as well.  The 12th Brigade consisted of around fifteen hundred men comprised of 
the 1st and 2nd East Tennessee Volunteer Infantries alongside the 12th Kentucky Volunteer 
Infantry.  Colonel Carter acted as brigadier general to lead the combination of 
Tennesseans and Kentuckians.  With roots in Garrard County near Camp Dick Robinson, 
Colonel William Hoskins led the portion of Kentucky volunteers in the 12th and noted the 
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cooperation between the units in an official report.134  Hoskins regretted “that in this 
action the soldiers of the Twelfth Kentucky did not have the opportunity of displaying 
more fully their chivalry” but added that “in any position in which duty may call them 
they will deport themselves as soldiers worthy the renown of their fathers.”135  
Colonel John Marshall Harlan offered similar praise for his group of soldiers of 
the Kentucky 10th Volunteer Infantry.  Harlan claimed his men “made a march (18 miles 
in about six hours) which indicated their willingness, even eagerness, to endure any 
fatigue or make any sacrifice in order to meet on the field of battle those wicked and 
unnatural men who are seeking without cause to destroy the Union of our fathers.”136 
In the end, the encounter at Mill Springs resulted in a Union victory and a second 
Confederate retreat to Tennessee.  The conflict involved around 8000 total combatants.  
The Confederates suffered over 500 killed, wounded, and missing while Union losses 
numbered under 300.137  Many Civil War scholars point to the January 19, 1862 battle as 
the first major Union victory of the war.  On January 22, President Lincoln and Secretary 
of War Edwin Stanton communicated praise through a congratulatory order in the 
immediate days that followed the battle: 
The President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, has received 
information of a brilliant victory by the United States forces over a large 
body of armed traitors and rebels at Mill Springs, in the State of Kentucky.  
He returns thanks to the gallant officers and soldiers who won that victory 
. . . The purpose of this war is to attack, pursue, and destroy a rebellious 
enemy, and to deliver the country from danger menaced by traitors . . . In 
the prompt and spirited movements and daring battle of Mill Springs the 
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Nation will realize its hopes, and the people of the United States will 
rejoice to honor every soldier and officer who proves his courage by 
charging with the bayonet and storming intrenchments, or in the blaze of 
the enemy’s fire.138   
The military success lifted the spirits of a nervous executive who had waited a half-year 
for a meaningful victory since the disastrous federal defeat in Northern Virginia at Bull 
Run in July 1861.  The event also marked a starting point for other federal advances in 
the Western Theatre, which stood in great contrast compared to the lack of military 
progress near the nation’s capital.  The outcome shaped the early direction of the Border 
States and darkened the overall Confederate prognostication of the war.  Historian 
Christopher Phillips concluded that “after a string of shocking Confederate defeats [east] 
of the Mississippi—Mill Springs, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Pea Ridge, New Madrid 
and Island No.10, Shiloh, and New Orleans—for southerners in the West the spring of 
1862 was a season of despair.”139 
For residents and veterans of Southeastern Kentucky who supported the Union 
effort, a sense of pride swelled for those who fought near the Cumberland River on that 
January day.  Zollicoffer was dead.  Local soldiers proved important, again, and aided the 
repulse of the second Confederate push into Kentucky.  Praise replaced criticism in many 
of the evaluations of Kentucky Union soldiers in the line of fire.  East Tennessee units 
fought alongside Unionist Kentuckians against enemy soldiers from their respective 
home states.  The differences in military strategy between Lincoln and many of his 
generals in the field revealed a divide in the priority of aiding the Unionist southerners.  
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The westward shift in attention continued and soon after the 1862 spring season, 
Confederates planned yet another invasion to “liberate” Kentucky. 
II. 
Events in the western portion of Kentucky pushed the war forward.  Following the 
Confederate defeat at Mill Springs, other early 1862 engagements south of Columbus, 
Kentucky, moved the center of the conflict toward the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers.  
General Ulysses S. Grant won two more important Union victories in Tennessee at Fort 
Henry and Fort Donelson in early February 1862—just below the Kentucky state line.  
With the fall of Fort Donelson General Grant earned the reputation of demanding 
“unconditional surrender” with his issuance of the order to native Kentuckian turned 
Confederate General Simon Bolivar Buckner.  After the defeat of the Confederates in 
Mill Springs and at the two river forts, General Albert Sidney Johnston concluded that he 
could not hold the important city of Bowling Green.140  The area surrounding Bowling 
Green and Barren County was home to some of Kentucky’s strongest Confederate 
sympathizers during Civil War Era.  The location even acted as the capital of a makeshift 
Confederate provisional government where George Johnson served as Kentucky’s 
“Confederate governor.”  But Union advance put the location between General Thomas’s 
troops to the east and, to the west, General Grant’s army near Columbus.  On February 
11, Confederates began to evacuate the city and destroyed bridges and anything of 
strategic military value that could not be transported south.  Confederate high command 
140 Lowell H. Harrison and James C. Klotter, A New History of Kentucky (Lexington: The 
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decided Nashville, too, was indefensible and pulled soldiers even further into secure 
southern territory.  The Union plans of General Halleck and General Buell had a pinching 
affect that pushed the western Confederate position down into Mississippi. 
The large-scale retreat south resulted in the concentration of Confederate forces 
near Corinth, Mississippi, and led to a climatic April 1862 encounter at Pittsburgh’s 
Landing—known better as the Battle of Shiloh.  Located in southern Tennessee above the 
Mississippi state line, the enormous clash at Shiloh included over 100,000 combatants 
and featured Kentuckians fighting on each side of the battle.  Grant and Buell defeated a 
Confederate force led by Generals Johnston, Braxton Bragg, and P.G.T. Beauregard as 
the Union, again, proved victorious.  To the shock of the nation, the engagement 
produced some of the most horrific casualties of the Civil War up to that point and 
surpassed all prior encounters in the number of soldiers lost on the field of battle.  
Confederate General Johnston and Kentucky Confederate Governor Johnson were both 
slain and among the combined 20,000 killed, wounded, and missing.  The collective 
reports that emerged from the Battle of Mill Springs, Fort Donelson, and Shiloh reflected 
“federal victories [with] each progressively bloodier than any yet fought on this 
continent.”141  Shiloh also did much to end national hopes for a short or limited war, but 
for Kentuckians the Confederate slide south helped the Commonwealth avoid a major 
battle fought on its soil during the spring campaign of 1862.  Kentucky state historians 
James Klotter and Lowell Harrison noted the possible alternative: “The expected battle of 
Bowling Green had been fought at Shiloh, and the Confederates lost.”142  
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From April to mid-summer in 1862, warfare and major engagements in Kentucky 
entered a lulled state.  Small bands of marauding guerillas replaced large mobile armies.  
The theft of resources at the hands of Confederate raiders gave rise to minor skirmishes 
and new federal policies.  On May 27, 1862, federal authorities appointed Jeremiah 
Tilford Boyle, of Mercer County, to oversee the District of Kentucky in an effort to curb 
guerilla and Confederate activity.143  Boyle enacted a policy that assessed the monetary 
damages of raiders, arrested southern sympathizers, and levied punishment to those who 
aided the Confederates.144  Many of the vulnerable farms and homesteads around areas of 
the state lacked men, or any type of organized law force, to counter the guerilla activity 
due to the absence of locals who fought and marched with armies far away.145  Violence 
and lawlessness filled the void.  Historian Christopher Phillips provided a vivid summary 
of the phase: 
Bits of news circulated illicitly of brave deaths on battlefields or senseless 
ones in the camps behind the lines, of wounded soldiers freezing to death 
and their mercy killings, of unmarked mass graves, and of prisoners being 
scalped by rebel Indians and merciless guerillas.  More frightening, armed 
nightriders stole indiscriminately, broke into homes, pistol-whipped or 
harassed white unionists, captured or shot free blacks and slaves, and 
burned houses and barns.146   
It was the beginning of a pattern of activity that returned and intensified in Kentucky 
during the latter half of the war. 
Plans for a third, and much more coordinated, Confederate invasion of Kentucky 
took shape in July 1862.  Stationed in eastern Tennessee, Confederate General Kirby 
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144 John E. Kleber, ed. The Kentucky Encyclopedia (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1992), 109.  
145 James C. Klotter and Freda C. Klotter, A Concise History of Kentucky (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 116.  
146 Phillips, The Rivers Ran Backwards, 170. 
74 
Smith looked to reenter the state through the Cumberland Gap.  Under the command of 
General George W. Morgan, Union forces occupied the gap and had strengthened their 
hold on the mountain pass in June 1862 with a flanking movement that moved the 
Confederates south of the position.147  But with Buell’s larger Union Army occupied in 
central and southern Tennessee, the success of John Hunt Morgan’s Confederate summer 
cavalry raids into Kentucky encouraged an anxious Smith to make an advance north.  
From Georgetown, Kentucky, John Hunt Morgan sent report that: 
I am here with a force sufficient to hold all the country outside of 
Lexington and Frankfort.  These places are garrisoned chiefly with Home 
Guards.  The bridges between Cincinnati and Lexington have been 
destroyed.  The whole country can be secured, and 25,000 or 30,000 men 
will join you at once.  I have taken eleven cities and towns with very 
heavy arms stores.148   
Morgan’s Confederate raids caught the attention of Union leadership as well.  President 
Lincoln messaged Henry Halleck, stationed in Corinth, Mississippi, to alert the general 
that “they are having a stampede in Kentucky. Please look to it.”149  From central 
Kentucky, Thomas Clay confirmed both Lincoln’s concerns and Morgan’s claims with a 
July 24 letter to the president that described Morgan’s presence in Lexington.  Clay 
indicated a Confederate struggle with the recruitment of locals but concluded with an 
urgent plea for help as he believed that the raiders posed an imminent danger to the 
property and people of central Kentucky.150  
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On August 9, 1862 Smith communicated to General Bragg his plan to move upon 
the Cumberland Gap and to march toward Lexington.  The following day, Bragg replied 
with a strategy that signaled approval of the plan, but the general counseled caution and 
suggested that his army should act as a supporting force to disrupt a potential encounter 
with General Buell’s Union troops to Kirby’s west.  Some of Kirby’s own Kentucky 
troops further incited the General with predictions that Kentuckians would join the 
Confederate ranks in large number and that the work of manipulative politicians had kept 
the state in the Union against the greater will of the people.151 
General Kirby Smith wanted to test the Union loyalty of East Tennesseans who 
served in the Union Army first.  In an August 13, 1862 pronouncement, Smith proposed: 
To the East Tennesseans in the U.S. Army.  You must all now be 
convinced that you have been grossly deceived by the misrepresentation of 
those under whom you are serving.  I therefore announce to you that a 
final opportunity is afforded you to return to your homes and your 
allegiance.  I offer you a general amnesty for all past offenses, the only 
condition being that you take the oath of allegiance to the Government and 
that you conduct yourselves as becomes good citizens.152 
On the same night, Smith began his northern march toward the Cumberland Gap on a 
path that resembled Zollicoffer’s first invasion a year earlier.  The heat and slippery 
conditions of the roads killed some of Kirby’s men, but local Unionists made the journey 
even more dangerous with the “bushwhacking” of tired Confederate troops.153  The 
march brought Confederates back into southeastern Kentucky and Smith set up camp on 
August 18 at Barbourville in Knox County.  From those headquarters, Smith sent an 
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August 25 message to General Bragg that expressed both his frustration and optimism.  
Smith complained of the limited supplies in the area and warned that he would not be 
able to wait long for the coordinated invasion Bragg wanted to develop, but instead felt 
that he faced the two options of either a retreat to Tennessee or a march on to Lexington.  
Like Zollicoffer in 1861, Smith assessed the sentiment around him in Southeastern 
Kentucky and determined that “thus far the people are universally hostile to our cause.  
The sentiment extends through the mountain region of Eastern Kentucky.”154  Smith 
concluded the correspondence with the positive prospect of finding a different situation 
with local sentiment in the Bluegrass Region of central Kentucky and hoped that he could 
soon “test their loyalty.”155  
A plea from members of the Kentucky Provisional Confederate Congress to 
Confederate President Jefferson Davis raised Smith and Bragg’s optimistic outlooks.  
Members of the delegation included Robert J. Breckinridge Jr. and George W. Ewing.  In 
the appeal to Davis, the Kentuckians alluded to the restrictive policies of Union General 
Boyle and stated that once the Confederate force reached central Kentucky “a large 
majority of the people of the State sympathize with the South and that a large proportion 
of the young men will at once join our army . . ..”156  Between the reports of John Hunt 
Morgan, optimistic predictions of a favorable outcome from Kentucky’s own 
Confederate soldiers, promises from pro-Confederate politicians, and the lack of a 
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formidable Union army presence beyond the Cumberland Gap, Kirby Smith pushed north 
through southeastern Kentucky with his goals set on reaching central Kentucky.  
Before Kirby Smith departed Barbourville, Colonel John Scott’s Louisiana 
Confederate Cavalry moved out in front of the larger invading Confederate force to 
secure the roads to central Kentucky.  Scott’s reconnaissance brought him into contact 
with Union troops in Laurel and Rockcastle Counties.  The mounted soldiers of Louisiana 
struck London first on August 17 and forced Union Colonel Leonidas Hauk’s 3rd 
Tennessee Regiment, who guarded the small city, into a retreat toward the Cumberland 
Gap.  The skirmishes and raids in London opened the opportunity for the Confederates to 
seize materials, horses, mules, and a shipment of military supplies in the surrounding 
area.157  Next, the Confederates ran into two companies of Colonel T. T. Garrard’s 7th 
Kentucky Voluntary Infantry a little further north in Laurel County.  Garrard’s detached 
troops guarded the Laurel Bridge, but the strategic defense proved little obstacle to 
Scott’s superior numbers which ended in another Union retreat—this time to Whitley 
County.  The Confederates continued their advance and descended upon Mt. Vernon 
before their push toward Richmond, Kentucky.    
A larger battle broke out on August 23, 1862 when Scott’s Confederates 
encountered Kentucky-born Mexican-American War veteran, Colonel Leonidas 
Metcalfe, and his inexperienced 7th Kentucky Calvary on the road between Mt. Vernon 
and Richmond.  On August 21, Metcalfe’s officers wired a frantic dispatch from 
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Rockcastle County to Governor James Robinson (replacement to Beriah Magoffin who 
had resigned the office only three days prior) which described his concern: 
I learn the Rebels are in Great Force and below Lebanon, about one 
thousand cavalry and three or four thousand infantry [soldiers] beyond and 
towards Barbourville.  Metcalfe says the country is desolate and no 
subsistence for man or Beast. He is falling Back and calls loudly for 
support if General Morgan is to be relieved.  We need every man who can 
raise a gun.158  
Metcalfe relayed the urgency of his situation in a separate letter to Union Quartermaster 
S. B. Brown stationed in Fayette County.  Metcalfe warned: 
They have destroyed everything south of here and we are feeding the last 
corn we can get: we cannot live here—there is nothing more for horses—it 
is all nonsense to talk about feeding the little patches of green corn to our 
horses, that would starve the women & children & kill our horses. There 
are also four hundred rebels at Mt. Vernon. They are threatening me from 
both positions & some danger of them getting between me and Richmond. 
The Country is perfectly desolated. How the people are to live here I can't 
see.159 
 The clash developed at a location where Jackson, Rockcastle, and Madison Counties 
joined.  The fresh recruits of Metcalfe’s 7th Kentucky Cavalry fared no better against the 
Confederate force than did the Union troops of the prior days.  One key difference was 
that Metcalf held the numerical advantage.  Mustered in near Lexington for less than a 
month, Metcalfe’s unit met Scott’s cavalry in an engagement later called the Battle of Big 
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Hill.  Union reports numbered Scott’s Confederates at 1,200 mounted troops during his 
rounds through southeastern Kentucky, but Scott reported he arrived at the mountainous 
location with 650.160  Scott’s approach to Big Hill found Colonel Metcalfe in a strong 
topographical position and with over one-thousand Union men at his command.161  A 
detachment of Hauk’s 3rd Tennessee Unionist infantry, led by Lieutenant Colonel John C. 
Chiles, supported Metcalfe’s Kentucky soldiers.  Early in the battle, Colonel Metcalfe 
called for a Union charge at Scott’s troops, but when the Colonel looked behind, less than 
one-hundred of his regiment followed him.162  After the failed charge, the Union men 
continued to break ranks and run from the sound of cannon.  Lieutenant Colonel Chiles 
and the Tennessee battalion provided cover and rescued Metcalfe from the predicament.  
The Battle of Big Hill between Scott’s Confederates and Metcalfe’s Union men 
marked the largest clash, up to that point, of the August 1862 campaign.  The battle 
resulted in 16 Confederate casualties and anywhere from 50 to 120 Union casualties.  
Aside from the poor performance of the raw Kentucky soldiers, Confederates captured 
Metcalfe’s horses and found his jacket which contained important details about the Union 
position at Richmond.163  The Union debacle, with untested recruits who suffered a 
lopsided defeat, foreshadowed a much larger failure to come within the same week only 
miles away. 
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The city of Richmond, Kentucky, is the gateway from the mountains of Eastern 
Kentucky into the Bluegrass region of the state.  After Scott’s successful clearing of any 
major Union resistance along the important roads from Barbourville to Richmond, 
General Kirby Smith marched over 6000 Confederate soldiers to where the Union 
military strategy had assembled a larger force to impede the Confederate advance.  At 
Richmond, General William “Bull” Nelson commanded a Union army, over 6000 strong, 
made up of the veteran 18th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Chiles’s 
Tennessee troops from Big Hill, as well as inexperienced soldiers from President 
Lincoln’s July 1862 call for volunteers that included men from Ohio, Indiana, and 
Michigan—some of whom conducted their first organized drills a day before the 
engagement.164  The August 30 encounter at Richmond proved to be another disaster for 
the Union.  Once again, Union command suffered a defeat as Confederates swept 
disorganized and inexperienced troops from the battlefield.  Even in defeat, the actions of 
the Kentucky soldiers impressed an Indianan, Brigadier General Charles Cruft.  Cruft 
reported: 
The men were all fresh recruits, except the Eighteenth Kentucky, which 
had seen no field service, very little drill, and was now, for the first time 
since its formation, collected as a regiment. . .. It was, however, 
impossible, with the troops composing our lines, to stand against the 
impetuosity of [the Confederate] charge.  The center gave way, then the 
right flank.  The left made still a show of resistance, and the Eighteenth 
Kentucky, Colonel Warner, was brought up to its aid.  This regiment made 
here a gallant fight, and by its brave stand broke the force of the enemy’s 
attack and prevented the retreat at this time from becoming a rout.  The 
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men and officers of most of the regiments, however, fled in confusion to 
the rear through the fields.165 
The Union Army mustered in the 18th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry on February 8, 1862 
and the unit was active in the pursuit of John Hunt Morgan prior to the Battle of 
Richmond.  
Another Indiana native, Brigadier General Mahlon D. Manson concurred with Cruft’s 
report and described the chaos: 
The three remaining regiments of General Cruft’s brigade arrived just in 
time when our troops were on full retreat and the rout had become general, 
the Eighteenth Kentucky being in advance, under the command of Colonel 
Warner.  This regiment was immediately deployed into the line and made 
a desperate effort to check the advancing enemy, and contended with him 
single-handed and alone for twenty minutes, when, after a severe loss, 
they were compelled to give way before overwhelming numbers. . .. The 
Twelfth Indiana and Eighteenth Kentucky Regiments, being placed in the 
woods, contended against fearful odds and repulsed the rebels several 
different times. . .. I have neglected to state in the proper place that I was 
joined in the second engagement by a portion of the Third Kentucky 
Infantry, who had passed from General Morgan’s command at the 
Cumberland Gap with some Government horses.  These men dismounted, 
hitched their horses, and did excellent service.  I do not know the names of 
any of the accomplished officers who commanded this detachment, or I 
should gladly give them a place in this report.166 
Troops from the Kentucky 3rd Volunteer Infantry were part of Colonel Thomas 
Bramlette’s initial wave of volunteers who organized at Camp Dick Robinson.  The aid 
of those veteran soldiers may have impressed the Indiana command, but it did little to 
affect the outcome.  Scott’s cavalry intercepted the retreat and General Nelson’s Union 
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men suffered around 1,000 casualties and 4,300 lost as prisoners.167  Smith and the 
Confederates lost fewer than 500 soldiers.  
The engagement at Richmond opened the road to central Kentucky and occurred 
during the same days as the Union defeat in northern Virginia at the Second Battle of 
Bull Run.  Historian Kenneth Noe added, “the Battle of Richmond would be the most 
lopsided Confederate victory of the war, as Kirby Smith’s men inflicted casualties so 
staggering that entire Union brigades ceased to exist.”168  With Buell’s veteran army 
away in Tennessee, the Union lacked a large supply of experienced soldiers to check 
momentum of the invading force.  The Battles of Big Hill and Richmond stood in stark 
contrast to the outcomes at Wildcat Mountain and Mill Springs where the Union 
prevailed.  Unlike Zollicoffer’s first two Confederate invasions, General Smith executed 
a plan to penetrate the central portion of the state, cut his army off from secure lines of 
communication in a show of confidence, and even compared the journey that anticipated 
no retreat to Hernan Cortes’s conquest of the Aztecs.169  
The Confederate Army occupied Lexington on September 1, 1862, and Frankfort 
in the days that followed.  General Kirby Smith, content to wait in Lexington for Bragg’s 
larger army to join him, elected not to advance his army on the open road to Louisville or 
Cincinnati where citizens waited in fear for the next Confederate move.  Instead, Smith 
only sent small detachments north and northwest to the populated locations on the Ohio 
River.  The Confederate General kept most of his troops in Lexington and hoped to add 
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recruits from around the Bluegrass region to enlarge his army.170  The pro-Confederate 
sympathies of central Kentucky raised the expectations of the invading force as citizens 
of Lexington greeted Smith’s troops with dozens of Confederate flags and enthusiasm.171  
Confederate General Bragg began his move north toward Kentucky from 
Chattanooga on August 28, 1862—two days before the Battle of Richmond.  With a force 
of more than 30,000 battle-hardened troops, Bragg crossed the Tennessee River, then the 
Cumberland River, marched through Middle Tennessee, and reentered Kentucky near 
Glasgow.  Much of the Confederate advance went undetected by the Union military.  The 
Lincoln administration, aware of the disastrous results from Richmond, Kentucky, and 
the Second Bull Run in Virginia, panicked at the loss of observation of the large force in 
the early weeks of September.  President Lincoln sent an inquiry on September 7 to 
General Boyle and asked “Where is General Bragg? What do you know on the subject?” 
and another to General Buell with the question of “What degree of certainty have you, 
that Bragg, with his command, is not now in the valley of Shenandoah, Virginia?”172  
Buell assured Lincoln that Bragg was in Tennessee and that his army would look to stop 
the Confederate plans in Kentucky. 
General Bragg arrived at Glasgow, Kentucky, on September 13, 1862 with a 
message that echoed General Smith earlier tests of loyalty.  Bragg announced: 
Kentuckians, I have entered your State with the Confederate Army of the 
West and offer you an opportunity to free yourselves from the tyranny of a 
despotic ruler.  We come not as conquerors or as despoilers, but to restore 
to you the liberties of which you have been deprived by a cruel and 
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relentless foe. . .. Will you remain indifferent to our call, or will you not 
rather vindicate the fair fame of your once free and envied state?173 
The strategic location of Bragg’s Army, between Smith’s force that occupied Lexington 
and Buell’s Union army that caught up from Nashville, put Confederate plans in a strong 
position for success.174  But the ease of Confederate plans for a takeover of Kentucky 
started to decline after Bragg left Glasgow.  Buell’s force, the Union Army of the Ohio, 
entered Bowling Green over thirty miles west of Glasgow around the time Bragg offered 
his proclamation.  Bragg, in effort to keep his army between Buell and Smith, marched 
north on September 15 and encountered a situation in Munfordville—an import railroad 
town with an elevated rail bridge near Mammoth Cave and Lincoln’s Hodgenville 
birthplace—that delayed the advance.  Bragg selected the native-born General Simon 
Bolivar Buckner to accompany him in an effort to win over fellow Kentuckians, and after 
a few days of deployments that surrounded the position, Buckner negotiated and accepted 
the surrender of the Union troops guarding the Munfordville rail line on September 17—
the same day as the Battle of Antietam in Maryland.  
The days lost at Munfordville proved critical to Bragg’s Confederate Army.  
Buell’s Union troops raced for Louisville and Bragg set up headquarters in Bardstown, 
with the expectation of a rendezvous with General Kirby Smith’s smaller force.  Smith’s 
troops, however, supported a Confederate cavalry engaged with Union troops at Mt. 
Sterling, east of Lexington, over a hundred miles away.  The two Confederate armies 
drifted further apart, and the lack of communication impacted coordination.  Bragg’s 
situation also deteriorated when any achievable goal, central to a strategic Confederate 
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military outcome, seemed to evade the general.  Kentucky historian Lowell Harrison 
added, “But on one important point the Confederate commanders were united: they 
shared a bitter disappointment over the failure of Kentuckians to join their armies in large 
numbers.  The wagon trains had hauled thousands of stands of arms to equip the 
anticipated horde of volunteers, but most of the rifles remained in the wagons, despite the 
obvious Confederate sympathy of many of the state’s inhabitants.”175  Another problem, 
Kentucky’s heat and conditions of drought, pushed the armies to search for water.  
Perryville emerged as one of the locations thought to have the precious resource. 
III. 
The important encounter at Perryville marked a turning point for the 1862 
Confederate campaign in Kentucky and for the broader Western Theatre in general.  
After a few weeks in central Kentucky, including a brief occupation of the capitol in 
Frankfort, General Bragg planned an October 4 Confederate gubernatorial inaugural ball 
for the slain George Johnson’s replacement—Kentucky’s second Confederate Governor, 
Richard Hawes.176  Bragg hoped the placement of Hawes as a state executive would 
signal proof of a permanent Confederate presence and that the new appointed governor 
could provide a means to enforce a conscription law to draft soldiers into the invading 
southern ranks—a measure the Confederate legislature passed in the spring of 1862.177  
However, Buell’s large Union army disrupted those plans through military pressure and 
forced the Confederates to turn away from their political focus.  By October 8, 1862, a 
series of Union movements had pushed Confederates out of Frankfort and other northern 
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portions of the state where they drifted south and collected with Bragg’s other scattered 
divisions in central Kentucky looking for water around the town of Perryville.  The 
largest battle ever fought in Kentucky followed.  A portion of Bragg’s army, 16,000 men, 
attacked Buell’s force of 55,000.  
Divided into three corps, Generals Don C. Buell and George H. Thomas led the 
Union Army of the Ohio.  General Alexander McCook commanded the First Corps, 
General Thomas L. Crittenden—another son of former Senator John J. Crittenden and 
brother of Confederate General George Crittenden—commanded the Second Corps, and 
General Charles C. Gilbert led the Third Corps.  The First Corps experienced most of the 
fighting at Perryville, followed by the Third who saw some action, while the Second 
Corps did not play a significant role due to the confusion that surrounded the battle.178  
Unaware of the consolidation of the Union force, Bragg launched an attack against 
superior numbers.  For Buell, a phenomenon known as an “acoustic shadow” prevented a 
larger engagement as the General did not hear the start of the battle even though the 
cannons thundered only a few miles away.179  This atmospheric condition delayed the 
Union’s ability to capitalize on their numerical advantage.  Even with the uncoordinated 
deployment of troops, the Battle of Perryville developed into the largest engagement and 
produced the costliest totals for Kentucky during the entire Civil War.  The one-day 
encounter resulted in 4,211 casualties for the Union and 3,396 for the Confederates.180    
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The two groups comprised of the most Southeastern Kentuckians experienced two 
different roles at the Battle of Perryville.  Colonel Sidney Barnes and the 8th Kentucky 
were present, under General Crittenden’s command, but like most of the soldiers of the 
Second Corps, not called into action.  In contrast, Colonel T.T. Garrard’s 7th Kentucky 
played a significant role as part of the First Corps, 10th Division, 33rd Brigade.  Garrard 
led a detachment comprised of one company of the original 7th Kentucky Volunteers 
formed of southeastern Kentucky men, a company of 32nd Kentucky Volunteers, and one 
company of 3rd Tennessee Volunteer Infantry.  The group of 193 soldiers provided 
support for an artillery battery alongside Ohio, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Illinois 
Infantries.181  The 33rd Brigade found itself engaged in some of the heaviest fighting of 
the entire field and located between two potential sources of water—Wilson’s Creek and 
Chaplin River—near Benton Road.  Colonel Garrard’s detachment suffered one killed, 
thirty wounded, and eight missing, while the entire 10th Division, made up of just two 
brigades, accounted for over a quarter of all Union casualties at Perryville.182   
The Union’s Third Corps experienced varying levels of participation at Perryville.  
General Schoepf and General Fry, both important in repelling Zollicoffer’s two prior 
invasions, helped command parts of the 1st Division in the Third Corps, but the veteran 
officers did not participate in a major engagement at the battle.  The 1st Division included 
the 4th, 10th, and 12th Kentucky Volunteer Infantries.  General Phil Sheridan led a separate 
division in the Third Corps that employed the aid of the 9th Kentucky Calvary.  Sheridan, 
who went on to become one of the most important generals by the war’s end, sustained 
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significant casualties at Perryville, although the Kentucky Calvary unit incurred only a 
minor role.  
The early confusion benefitted the Confederates and evened the numbers for 
Bragg’s attacking force.  Historians have even judged the results at Perryville as a 
“tactical victory” for the Confederates.183  However, by the day’s end, Bragg decided to 
retreat to Tennessee after he realized the size of the force he faced, weighed the cost of 
the battle, and speculated about his prospects in Kentucky.  Bragg’s retreat south brought 
the Confederate Army back into contact with Southeastern Kentuckians.  On October 12, 
Bragg met with Confederate command to decide to march to the relief of Chattanooga 
where Confederate reinforcements were needed.184  The lack of local Kentuckians joining 
the Confederate ranks did a great part to affect the decision.  An estimated 2,500 
Kentucky citizens took up arms for Bragg’s army, much less than the 25,000 to 30,000 
volunteers that some of the southern leadership had predicted and at a rate that did not 
even cover the losses of the campaign.185  Both Bragg and Smith disparaged the 
unwillingness to find support in Kentucky.186  The Confederate Army marched to 
Harrodsburg first, then Danville, before arriving at Lancaster where Bragg decided to 
split the force.  From Lancaster, worried about the numerous armed Unionists sure to be 
found along the way, Bragg chose to take his army through Crab Orchard, sent 
Confederate General Marshall’s troops toward Virginia, and instructed Kirby Smith to 
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move back toward the hostile area of Big Hill.187  Union General Buell chased the fleeing 
force as far as London, where he abandoned the pursuit to turn his attention, once again, 
to Middle Tennessee. 
Some historians have analyzed the Confederate invasion of Kentucky as part of a 
broader strategy that linked the two theatres, East and West, together.  Christopher 
Phillips called the coordinated effort the “Confederate Tet.”188  Historian James 
McPherson judged the results of the Confederate invasion and subsequent withdrawal as 
part of a progression of major turning points that affected the eventual outcome of the 
war: 
The first [critical point] occurred in the summer of 1862, when the 
counter-offensives of Jackson and Lee in Virginia and Bragg and Kirby 
Smith in the West arrested the momentum of a seemingly imminent Union 
victory.  This assured a prolongation and intensification of the conflict and 
created the potential for a Confederate success, which appeared imminent 
before each of the next three turning points.  The first of these occurred in 
the fall of 1862, when battles at Antietam and Perryville threw back 
Confederate invasions, forestalled European mediation and recognition of 
the Confederacy, perhaps prevented a Democratic victory in the northern 
elections of 1862 that might have inhibited the government’s ability to 
carry on the war, and set the stage for the Emancipation Proclamation 
which enlarged the scope and purpose of the conflict.189  
The impact of the failed invasion changed the path of the war.  Privately President 
Lincoln acknowledged the sacrifice of the soldiers in an October 8, 1862 letter to Thomas 
H. Clay where Lincoln denied Clay’s request—on the same day as the Battle of 
Perryville—to place additional Union soldiers in Cincinnati, Ohio, to protect exiled 
Kentucky Unionists.  Lincoln added, “Buell’s old troops, now in pursuit of Bragg, have 
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done more hard marching recently.  And, in fact, if you include marching and fighting, 
there are scarcely any old troops East or West of the mountains that have not done as 
hard service.”190  Lincoln’s admiration expressed toward the Army of the Ohio troops did 
not extend to the General himself. 
Buell’s movements, and lack of communication, concerned President Lincoln.  At 
the critical juncture of pursuit, the General avoided contact with the Commander-in-
Chief.  In two separate telegraphs in mid-October, Lincoln reached out to General Boyle 
and asked, “please send any news you have from Gen. Buell to-day,” and followed the 
next day with “we are very anxious to hear from Gen. Buell’s Army.  We have had 
nothing since day-before yesterday.  Have you anything?”191  Lincoln wanted Buell to 
pursue Bragg’s retreat though the rest of southeastern Kentucky and to the relief of 
Eastern Tennessee.  General Halleck relayed the President’s wishes to Buell and 
questioned the General’s logistical reluctance to carry out Lincoln’s objective.  Halleck 
ended the directions with the assurance, “once [you] hold the valley of the Upper 
Tennessee, the operations of guerillas in that State and Kentucky will soon cease.”192  
Buell refused to follow the path through the Cumberland Gap and raised the issue that 
insufficient resources in the area would not support an advance.  Lincoln’s patience wore 
out.  On October 30, 1862, General William S. Rosecrans assumed command of the 
Army of the Ohio after Lincoln removed Buell from his position and, shortly thereafter, 
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the Department of the Cumberland renamed the veteran group the Army of the 
Cumberland.  
Between Lincoln’s October message to General Boyle and his removal of Buell, a 
development in Southeastern Kentucky illuminated the cost and sacrifice endured by the 
civilian population during the Civil War.  Without the occupation of a formidable Union 
force in Southeastern Kentucky to guard resources, General Crittenden of the Second 
Corps for the Union Army issued orders to destroy the Goose Creek Salt Works inside 
Clay County, Kentucky.  A conglomerate of owners had claim to the salt production and 
operations for the business spread over several locations.  Less than two months from his 
command at the Battle of Richmond, the Union Army selected Brigadier General Charles 
Cruft to carry out the order and he began the two-day destruction on October 23, 1862.  
Cruft’s night arrival to the location found a large Confederate cavalry that occupied a 
nearby farm.  The Confederates broke camp and scurried away.  General Cruft also 
reported that “the people in the mountain districts in direction of Manchester are loyal 
and true to the Government.  They have been robbed by the rebel army of nearly all of 
their available property—cattle, horses, and crops—and are left generally in a destitute 
condition.”193  Soldiers destroyed the bored wells, over five-hundred feet deep, pumps 
and the drills necessary for new wells.  The commodity lost represented a very important 
nineteenth-century means to preserve food for the communities surrounding the area.  
But Confederate raids and guerilla warfare thrust women and children into the effects of 
war, as the shortage of food threatened starvation to many segments of the population 
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across the country.194  On the recommendation of General Cruft, the Union Army 
allowed local citizens to take as much salt as they needed before completion of the 
destruction.  An Ohioan and West Point graduate, Brigadier General William Sooy Smith 
added: 
The Salt-Works are situated in the midst of a population whose loyalty and 
patriotism are not excelled in any portion of our country.  Much suffering 
must result to the poor people in the surrounding region from the lack of 
salt . . . the noble conduct of some of those interested in the works, 
especially of Mrs. Garrard, who expressed her entire willingness that not 
only that valuable property, but all else that she and her husband (a colonel 
in our service [T.T. Garrard]) owned, might be destroyed if such 
destruction would help restore the Union, constrains an earnest 
recommendation that prompt restitution be made for the damage done.195 
In an area that both Union and Confederate officials deemed poor throughout 1862, the 
Garrard family surrendered a huge portion of the best resource the locality possessed for 
the Union cause and offered to sacrifice even more material aid than requested.  The act 
symbolized much of what the population that surrounded the location were willing to 
give to stop the Confederate occupation. 
Events in Kentucky during 1862 brought the war up close to residents who lived 
in the Commonwealth.  For the men who volunteered for the Union Army, military 
service resulted in long marches, a privation of resources, and violent encounters.  
Civilians in the area experienced the theft, destruction, and shortage of food.  The 1861 
Battle of Wildcat Mountain and the early 1862 Battle of Mill Springs stopped 
Confederate advance in southern Kentucky before it could reach the Bluegrass Region.  
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But in the summer of 1862, General Kirby Smith exposed the Union’s diverted attention 
to central Tennessee and entered Kentucky through the Cumberland Gap in a campaign 
that endangered the state’s place in the Union.  The mountainous topography—and a 
population loyal to the Union—helped disturb the beginning of that campaign.  Some of 
the armed men left behind to guard the state, including several like-minded Eastern 
Tennessee Unionists who were often paired with southeastern Kentucky Unionists, 
suffered casualties and put up resistance against Smith’s invasion.  Perhaps more 
important, Kentuckians and Tennesseans loyal to the Union did not join the ranks of 
Confederates in any significant number during the invasion.  Separate appeals promising 
liberty and amnesty from the invading Confederate generals had little effect on 
strengthening their numbers.  The disagreements between President Lincoln’s desire to 
come to the aid of Unionist southerners and General Buell’s refusal to advance through 
the portion of the country necessary to that aim left the Appalachian civilians in a tough 
situation.  Evidence, including numerous accounts from military leaders of both sides, 




“AS SOLIERS SUFFER TO ANYTHING, EVEN UPON DEATH”: 
KENTUCKY AND THE SECOND HALF OF THE CIVIL WAR 
Many historians break the five-year period of the American Civil War into two halves.  
Carrying out strategies for politicians, Union and Confederate generals fought the first 
half of the war with eighteenth century tactics and manners.  This approach produced 
horrific casualties as soldiers with modern weapons met on remote battlefields and 
volleyed musket and cannon fire into long lines of exposed soldiers.  The second half of 
the war devolved into a much uglier reality.  The war continued to cause alarming 
casualty rates and some military leaders clung to those old tactics, but the successful 
targeting of infrastructure and resources added effects felt by civilian populations.  The 
loss of those resources caused armies to take entrenched defensive positions or to raid 
communities for much needed materials.  Some historians have labeled the turn a “total 
war” or a “hard war.”  This model of “halves” may or may not reflect the nature of the 
Civil War; but, the model does apply to the experience of Kentucky during the national 
conflict.  In Kentucky, guerrilla warfare replaced the large organized and foraging armies 
of 1861 and 1862.  For the second half of Civil War in Kentucky, Union volunteers from 
the state played significant roles in securing important victories in the Western Theatre of 
the war and in defending Kentucky against raids and local uprisings.  The state 
population faced violent upheaval from frequent Confederate invasions and the political 
fallout from local residents in reaction to new federal policies.  Southeastern Kentucky 
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continued to provide a strong loyalty to the Union cause during the post-emancipation 
phase of the Civil War, while most of the state experienced a fracture or shift in national 




 The Confederate decision to abandon large-scale military operations in Kentucky 
following the failed 1862 invasion provided some relief for the Unionists of Southeastern 
Kentucky and for the Commonwealth in general.  Concluding with General Braxton 
Bragg and General Kirby Smith’s hasty retreat into Tennessee, many standard accounts 
on the Civil War depart from offering any further historical insight about the war’s 
impact on Kentucky.  President Abraham Lincoln’s October 1862 replacement of General 
Don Carlos Buell with General William S. Rosecrans to command the Army of the Ohio 
(afterwards renamed the Army of the Cumberland) signaled an ongoing difference in 
military strategy related to the Appalachian region—with Buell’s reluctance to pursue a 
retreating enemy through southeastern Kentucky or to liberate East Tennessee as major 
factors that led to his dismissal.196  However, General Rosecrans’s approach did not bring 
an immediate change in strategy, nor a large Union presence, to the Appalachian 
Mountains.  Like Buell, Rosecrans focused on securing central Tennessee.  But the Union 
Army’s October 1862 follow-up destruction at Manchester of the Goose Creek Salt 
Works suggested the Civil War would continue to affect Southeastern Kentuckians.  
Even with the Union’s dismantling of attractive resources in effort to deter a Confederate 
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return and the absence of a large military occupation by either side, Civil War activity 
remained close to the local population.  In December 1862, Union military plans brought 
the movement of troops back to the southeastern portion of Kentucky again, only a 
couple of months after the Battle of Perryville and the subsequent Confederate retreat. 
In the fall of 1861, Tennessee Unionists led the destruction of a series of southern 
railroad bridges to attract federal attention to an area sympathetic to the Union but under 
Confederate control.  Those attacks did not move the Union Army to act.  A year later, 
however, Union officials revived Samuel P. Carter’s November 1861 original request to 
infiltrate and target infrastructure in eastern Tennessee.  Moved up from colonel to the 
rank of brigadier general, officials selected Carter to lead a small expeditionary force 
with orders to strike the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad.197  Three weeks later the 
effort began to unfold when General Carter left Lexington, Kentucky, and traveled south 
with the 2nd Michigan Calvary and the 9th Pennsylvania Calvary.  The group marched up 
Big Hill, to Jackson County, where the soldiers waited two days in the town of McKee 
for a delayed provision train.198  Leaving McKee on Christmas Eve, Carter’s route went 
through Clay County, toward Red Bird River, where the 7th Ohio Calvary joined the 
group and bolstered the numbers of the expeditionary unit to over nine-hundred men.  
Next, the force crossed Pine Mountain on December 28, traveled both day and night, and 
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entered the southwestern portion of Virginia through a pass called Crank’s Gap located 
near Harlan, Kentucky.  Once in Virginia a few Confederates, believing the mounted 
troops to be friendly cavalry, passed through the lines of Carter’s infantry and the small 
Union force captured the confused soldiers.  News began to spread ahead of the group 
that a Union advance from Kentucky was underway, but southern locals dismissed the 
reports as unbelievable.199  
After an undetected arrival in Tennessee on December 30, the 2nd Michigan 
Calvary led an attack on a railroad line near the town of Blountsville.  The Union military 
encountered and captured thirty soldiers from Colonel Henry L. Giltner’s Confederate 4th 
Kentucky Cavalry.  General Carter’s troops managed to evade the larger Confederate 
presence in the area and executed the destruction of a 150-foot-long railroad bridge over 
the Holston River in a town once called Union, (at the time renamed Zollicoffer) 
Tennessee.  General Carter’s brother, Colonel James P.T. Carter, led a detachment of 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Michigan soldiers that destroyed another important railway 
bridge over the Watauga River, ten miles west of Union.200   The expeditionary force also 
laid waste to several supplies of Confederate material aid, a wagon bridge, and other 
equipment in addition to burning the two railroad bridges.  As the Confederates began to 
mount a counterattack in reaction to the destruction, General Carter, outnumbered and 
deep within Confederate territory, called for his men to leave the area on a path that 
retraced their arrival.  Armed bushwhackers and Confederate infantry disrupted the 
Union’s departure during their trek back through the mountain passes of Tennessee and 
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Virginia.  Carter’s men made a strenuous non-stop march that crossed the Cumberland 
mountains and reentered Kentucky through Crank’s Gap on January 2, 1863.  The group 
reached southeastern Kentucky on January 5 and, in an area safe from Confederate harm, 
General Carter allowed soldiers a couple days rest before their return to the central 
portion of the state. 
Union command heaped praise upon the actions of Carter and his men.  The 
operations in East Tennessee resulted in less than twenty casualties for the entire unit 
while reports counted over five-hundred killed, wounded, and captured Confederates as a 
result of the stealth journey into the South.201  General-in-Chief of the Union Army 
Henry W. Halleck responded to a summary of General Carter’s work in Tennessee and 
concluded that “the daring operations and brilliant achievements of General Carter and 
his command are without a parallel in the history of the war.”202  In his own report, 
General Carter acknowledged the leadership of the Kentucky cavalry who had 
accompanied him on the expedition.  Carter also singled out two individuals to credit for 
the mission’s success: 
To Colonel [James] Carter’s knowledge of the people and country in the 
vicinity of the railroad bridge is mainly due our success at those points, 
with so small a loss of life.  Colonel [T.T.] Garrard, an officer of sound 
judgement and great discretion, was of invaluable service in passing 
through the mountains of Eastern Kentucky.  He gave his whole heart to 
the work and was of great service to the expedition.203 
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Colonel Garrard directed Union soldiers through southeastern Kentucky without any 
significant violent confrontations in the area—an experience that contrasted with the type 
of encounters Union soldiers faced in eastern Tennessee and southwestern Virginia.  
Tennessee Unionist Colonel James Carter, who had already served as future president 
Andrew Johnson’s bodyguard in June 1861, utilized his local knowledge of the area south 
of Kentucky to help carry out the plan.204  The achievement owed much to the 
cooperation between Unionists of Southeastern Kentucky who provided safe passage and 
Unionists of Eastern Tennessee, determined to free the area of Confederate control, 
working together to aid the mission’s success.  
The impact of the expeditionary force did not offer immediate relief for the 
Unionist citizens, but the effort was important in disrupting the flow of materials to 
Confederates during a larger engagement to the southwest.  Around the same time of the 
Carter brothers’ destruction of Confederate targets in northeastern Tennessee, the larger 
Army of the Cumberland moved in to attack Bragg’s Army of Tennessee at a location 
south of Nashville near Murfreesboro, Tennessee.  The movement constituted part of a 
broader strategy that coincided with the beginning of General Ulysses S. Grant’s siege of 
Vicksburg, Mississippi, to the west, and General Ambrose Burnside’s attack against 
General Robert E. Lee at Fredericksburg, Virginia, to the east.  But in the weeks before 
that offensive took place, Union command started to note the preliminary fallout from the 
Emancipation Proclamation.  President Abraham Lincoln’s September 1862 
announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation, and the war’s new developments that 
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targeted southern slavery after the Union victory at Antietam, produced internal critics 
within the Union ranks.  The proclamation acted as a war measure that declared freedom 
to all slaves as a military exigent in areas under Confederate control.  Border State 
suspicions that the abolition of all slaves might follow more battlefield successes 
presented new challenges for the Army of the Cumberland during the winter campaigns 
of late 1862 and early 1863.  Union officers who expressed negative opinions related to 
the emancipation of slaves raised alarm among both the executive administration in 
Washington and the highest-ranking generals in the field.205   
Early in his appointment, General Rosecrans worried about how reactions to 
emancipation could influence the morale and strength of the Army of the Cumberland.  
Those concerns were well placed.  In the first weeks of his command, records reveal that 
6,484 soldiers had left Rosecrans’s Army of the Cumberland without permission either 
during or just prior to his takeover—including many disgruntled Kentucky troops who 
had not received pay for eight or nine months.206   Central Kentucky figures, such as 
Major Benjamin Forsythe Buckner of the 20th Kentucky Volunteer Regiment, expressed a 
bitterness and developed an open hostility toward executive emancipation in late 1862 
that symbolized many pro-slavery Unionists’ opinion of Lincoln’s effort.207  Some of the 
officers resigned, numerous more soldiers deserted, and historians have explored the 
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impact of the proclamation upon the North as “two-fifths of Union men had a Democratic 
background and at least one-tenth hailed from a border state.”208   
Negative protest emerged within the local populations in Kentucky as a result of 
Lincoln’s emancipationist policy and those protests threatened to divide Union soldiers. 
Some northern units, more sympathetic to both confiscation and emancipation, clashed 
with pro-slavery Union soldiers and citizens.  National headlines captured events such as 
when a mob of central Kentuckians from Georgetown assaulted a Wisconsin regiment 
nicknamed “the abolitionist regiment.”209  In Mount Sterling, another central Kentucky 
town, a tense confrontation occurred between an Illinois regiment and Kentuckians 
furious at the group for their reputation of being “slave hounds.” 210  The event 
culminated when Union soldiers of the 14th Kentucky Infantry arrived at the scene ready 
to attack the Illinois troops.  The standoff never erupted into a full violent exchange 
between the two Union regiments, but the situation in central Kentucky displayed a 
fracturing loyalty due to the nature of the war’s new policy toward southern slaves.  
Historian Michael Rhyne described the violence that engulfed the Bluegrass Region as 
“less a component of the larger war between the states but rather a blossoming revolution 
against federal authority.”211  Nonetheless, the Emancipation Proclamation became 
effective on January 1, 1863—one-hundred days after the September 17, 1862 issuance.  
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The soldiers who comprised the Army of the Cumberland, many from areas where 
resistance to Lincoln’s war policy was in hot debate, secured one of the war’s most 
important victories in the days surrounding the beginning of southern emancipation. 
Outside of Murfreesboro, Tennessee, Stones River resulted in another large battle 
between the Union and General Bragg’s Confederate forces.  Union General William 
Rosecrans reorganized the troops he inherited from the relieved Don Carlos Buell.  The 
corps in Buell’s former army took the new names of “the right wing,” “the center,” and 
“the left wing” with generals Alexander McCook, George Thomas, and Thomas 
Crittenden leading the respective three Union corps.212  On the morning of December 31, 
1862, General Bragg ordered an offensive at the approaching Union Army.  The first day 
of the battle, fought on the final day of 1862, ended with General Philip Sheridan’s 
division holding out against Bragg’s assault.  From Brigadier General Horatio Van 
Cleve’s division, Union Colonel Samuel Beatty led a brigade comprised of Indiana, Ohio, 
and Kentucky troops involved in some of the most intense fighting.213  By the end of the 
encounter, Beatty’s troops, which included two Kentucky regiments, suffered the 
heaviest casualties of any Union group at Stones River with nearly fifty percent of the 
brigade fallen to either death or injury.214  Overall, the Murfreesboro battle took shape as 
a deadly clash of brigades that vied for control of the coveted Nashville Pike and the 
Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad that ran just behind the road.215  General McCook’s 
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corps, as had happened at the Battle of Perryville, found themselves the most engaged.  
On January 1 the two armies did not order any significant attacks, but on January 2 
Confederate General John C. Breckinridge renewed the offensive and suffered heavy 
casualties when his divisions marched into a location fortified with Union artillery.  
Fearful about the number of Union troops that the Confederate Army faced and the 
potential reinforcements on the way, General Bragg ordered a retreat the following day 
and looked to reposition the Army of Tennessee further south to Tullahoma.  While the 
losses were high, the Union claimed a strategic victory. 
The Army of Cumberland’s success at Stones River helped offset Burnside’s 
December 1862 defeat at Fredericksburg and Grant’s slow progress with the Mississippi 
River town of Vicksburg.  The battle produced near 23,000 casualties total, and each side 
sustained over 10,000 soldiers lost to either death, wounds, or capture.  A distraught 
federal executive celebrated the victory as news of defeat to the east and a lack of 
progress to the west threatened to jeopardize the entire Union war effort.  Many believed 
that a Union defeat in southern Tennessee, alongside the other setbacks, may have 
brought foreign assistance to the Confederacy.  Stones River stood as the only good news 
to start 1863 and northern newspapers heaped praise on the leadership of General 
Rosecrans.216   Some executives even considered relocating Rosecrans to the Eastern 
Theatre where he could be used against the momentum of General Lee and the Army of 
Northern Virginia.  President Lincoln summarized the significance of the Tennessee 
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encounter months later when he addressed the Army of the Cumberland’s efforts as 
perhaps saving the nation.217  
II. 
In the very same week Kentucky’s Union soldiers made advances into Tennessee 
as either part of the small band who aided General Carter’s expeditionary force or as 
enlistees who served in General Rosecrans’s much larger three corps within the Army of 
the Cumberland, Confederate raiders made a destructive ride through the western portion 
of the state under the direction of John Hunt Morgan.  The raiders took a route north out 
of Tennessee like General Bragg’s summer invasion and crossed into Kentucky on 
December 24, 1862.  The Confederates made it to Glasgow, Kentucky on Christmas, 
traveled through Munfordville where they defeated a small garrison, and went on to 
capture six-hundred Union men near Elizabethtown, Kentucky.218  Historian Christopher 
Phillips assessed: 
Heavy cavalry raids offered many residents their first glimpse of regular 
Confederates since their armies had been forced south.  Home guards fled, 
useless against such numbers, and raiders tore up railroad lines, destroyed 
bridges and depots, and entered communities.  For many southerners these 
horsemen were bold cavaliers . . . But boasts of chivalry for these 
horsemen obfuscated a war they were already experiencing in the West 
that was anything but noble.219 
One of the primary goals of Morgan’s raids was to cut a major Union supply line that 
supported Rosecrans’s army.  The raids caught the attention of Union Generals Horatio 
Wright in Cincinnati and Jeremiah Boyle in central Kentucky as the two strategized in 
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tandem to keep the railroads in Kentucky operating and safe from Confederate harm.  
Central Kentucky Home Guards scrambled to protect the vital infrastructure as the 
railroads delivered a steady supply of food for Rosecrans’s army during their operations 
in Tennessee.220  The Confederate Morgan made his escape through Campbellsville, then 
Columbia, and finally Burkesville before reentering Tennessee.  And while General 
Bragg’s Army of Tennessee continued to take a defensive position at Tullahoma and 
General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia planned an offensive into Pennsylvania, 
Kentucky experienced numerous more raids and smaller invasions throughout the first 
half of 1863.   
The direct path of Morgan’s “Christmas Raid” spared southeastern Kentucky.  
But just before spring 1863, violence and theft at the hands of those who supported the 
Confederacy engulfed most of the state.  Colonel Roy S. Cluke and 750 of his 
Confederate 8th Kentucky Calvary crossed the Cumberland River in mid-February to 
foray through the Bluegrass, Confederate General John Pegram’s troops captured 
Danville on March 24, and General Humphrey Marshall’s cavalry attacked a Union 
garrison at Louisa in the northeastern portion of that state during the closing weeks of 
March.  The war had changed.  It was in Louisa, late 1861, that James A. Garfield met his 
Ohio troops to first assume command with the order not to steal from local citizens and 
declared that he would lead a “regiment of gentlemen.”221  Confederate commanders 
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issued similar demands in the early part of the war.  But the southern raiders, frustrated 
by failed invasions and the inability to bring Kentucky into its fold, abandoned careful 
behavior that courted loyalty for more aggressive measures.  By April, some of 
Marshall’s men made it into southeastern Kentucky.  Frances Peters recorded the news in 
an April 18 entry into her diary: 
. . . ‘Thursday’ says the Observer, ‘Mr. A.B. Gilbert of Owsley County, 
former member of [the] Legislature, was at our office and gave a sad 
account of the district in which he resides.’  Cluke’s men robbed him of 
grain and stock some weeks ago and on Wednesday of last week some of 
Marshall’s men under Jack May came to his house [and] in his absence 
appropriated 33 blankets and other articles. [They] took all the horses and 
robbed the bee hives, and though his wife offered them a thousand dollars 
not to do it, burnt two dwelling houses [,] a store house and granery, [sic] 
not permitting Mrs. Gilbert to save any clothes or anything but a bed from 
the flames. . . . The rebels burnt the jail at Booneville [in] Owsley County 
and fired the Court house, but the latter was saved by the citizens, but the 
records and papers of the Circuit and County Court were destroyed.  They 
were torn up and scattered in the streets. And these same men of 
Marshall’s in passing through Wolf [sic] County burned forty three 
houses. . . .222 
Colonel Samuel Gilbert of the 44th Ohio Infantry delivered a May 12 report from London, 
Kentucky to Lexington that relayed a similar story.  The 44th Ohio pursued three-hundred 
Confederates southeast of Manchester near Red Bird River.  Gilbert reported: 
They [the Confederates] fled at the first fire.  Captain Moore pursued for 
several miles, and captured some small-arms and other plunder, but his 
horses were not fresh enough to catch them.  He reports several wounded.  
He reports that they have been stripping the citizens of not only horses and 
provisions, but even of their clothing, and that they had put some to torture 
to make them tell where their horses and arms were hid.223 
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While citizens in the Bluegrass Region of the state exhibited an angst against federal 
authority, many Kentuckians, according to Christopher Phillips, determined that “the 
hard treatment at the hands of rebel horsemen crushed the illusion of the superiority of 
the South and its culture.”224   The Confederate pillaging brought a Union presence.  
Union Colonels John Marshall Harlan and Frank Wolford chased John Hunt Morgan, and 
other Confederate bands, around the Bluegrass portions of the state.  Union Generals 
Mahlon D. Manson and Samuel Carter worked together to disrupt Confederate activity in 
the southern part of the state.  During the months of April and May 1863, General 
Carter’s men encountered guerillas and other organized Confederates near Somerset.  
Carter identified a network of Confederates that stretched back into the southeastern 
section of Kentucky.  In an April 29 message to Brigadier General O.B. Wilcox, General 
Carter reported to have encountered a regiment of 900 enemy soldiers from a Georgia 
cavalry supported by a Confederate infantry in Livingston, Kentucky.225  Not only was 
the area in the middle of armed conflict, but the communities caught between the 
opposing forces suffered through the impact with the loss of local resources.  General 
Carter concluded his cavalry could not be foraged in his current location and added that 
“the country is stripped.”226  After his disastrous defeat in northern Virginia, Union 
leadership relocated General Ambrose Burnside to Kentucky to aid in the repulse of the 
increased guerilla activity.  As Confederates continued to probe portions of Kentucky for 
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resources and support, another larger invasion was not out of the question.  Historian 
Allen Guelzo analyzed the situation Confederates faced in early 1863: 
Three times, a Confederate field army tried to recover the lost territory in 
Tennessee and Kentucky, in battles at Shiloh, Perryville, and 
Murfreesboro.  All three times it failed, and now the Confederacy was left 
barely clinging to the southeast corner of Tennessee, while a Union army 
was fastening its grip on Vicksburg.227   
Guelzo added how that Lee, in preparation to his offensive into Pennsylvania, lobbied 
Richmond for another joint invasion like the 1862 push into both Maryland and 
Kentucky: 
This was the moment, Lee politely suggested, for Joe Johnston to take the 
Confederate armies in the West on the offensive, and magnify the pressure 
on the Lincoln government by invading Kentucky, perhaps even Ohio.228   
The Union’s defense in Kentucky against Morgan’s raids, and the resistance to the 
broader Confederate efforts that surrounded those raids, may have been just enough to 
deter Jefferson Davis from following Lee’s suggestions.  The Union’s renewed attention 
to the area made a difference as well.  In a May 1 report, a Confederate cavalry officer 
believed that General Burnside was near Crab Orchard with an army of “15,000 to 20,000 
men, the extreme advance of which is known to be at Williamsburg and London, 
Kentucky.”229  While Confederates often overestimated or misplaced the enemy presence 
in some instances, in other parts of the state the Union continued to initiate important 
operations that hindered the South’s overall plans. 
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Another expedition took regiments made up of Kentuckians into Confederate 
controlled areas.  In early July 1863 a group that included detachments from the 39th 
Kentucky Infantry, the 65th Illinois Infantry, the 10th Kentucky Cavalry, the 14th 
Kentucky Infantry, and one squadron of Ohio volunteer cavalry infiltrated Virginia at 
Beaver Creek located near Pikeville.  The unit consisted of just under one-thousand men 
and crossed into Virginia through Pound’s Gap to target another railroad juncture—this 
time at Bristol.  Once in southwestern Virginia, the Union force skirmished with 
Confederates where they captured one-hundred men and destroyed a cache of military 
supplies.  After the victory, Brigadier General Julius White split his troops and sent a 
detachment of the 39th Kentucky and the 65th Illinois to Tug Fork, located in West 
Virginia, to engage a separate group of Confederates.  West Virginia had become a state 
on June 20, 1863, only two weeks before the encounter.  Under Union Colonel Dan 
Cameron the detachment managed to defeat the Confederates.  In communication to 
Burnside, White relayed the news: 
Since my last dispatch, a detachment of the Sixty-fifth Illinois and Thirty-
ninth Kentucky, from this command, under Col. Dan Cameron, have 
returned from an expedition up the Tug River into West Virginia, where 
they routed and dispersed the enemy, under Buchanan, killing 5 and 
capturing 20.  The enemy took to the cliffs and mountain sides, but the 
brave Illinoisans and Kentuckians vied with each other in climbing the 
steeps under a galling fire, and driving the enemy from their mountain 
fastnesses.  Colonel Cameron and his officers and men have exhibited the 
utmost daring and energy, and have penetrated where no Union troops 
have been before.230 
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The event is evidence of the broader organization and scope of operations supporting 
General Burnside’s defense of Kentucky.  In addition, the engagement at Tug Fork 
included the 39th Kentucky Infantry—a unit comprised of several Appalachian 
Kentuckians from the far eastern portion of the state—fighting alongside Illinoisans to 
advance Union goals in a newly formed state with another population loyal to the Union.  
The soldiers in groups such as these played a small role as part a larger effort to protect 
Union objectives.  In the following months, West Virginia adopted a state seal that 
featured the Latin phrase Montani Semper Liberi—"Mountaineers are Always Free.”   
During the summer days of 1863 when Union troops guarded Kentucky against 
guerillas and infiltrated Confederate forces across state lines, the nation received news 
about two of the most important victories of the war that took place at Gettysburg, 
Pennsylvania and at Vicksburg, Mississippi.  Skirmishes in the southeastern portion of 
Kentucky continued throughout the same month as those monumental victories.  On July 
26, Union troops skirmished with Confederates in London, at Irvine on July 30, Lancaster 
and Stanford on July 31.  As General Burnside pushed south, Eastern Tennessee 
remained anxious and citizens petitioned both Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin 
Stanton to redeem their area of the state.  President Lincoln responded to the petitioners 
in early August with the assurance that he was doing as much for East Tennessee as if his 
immediate family were there and that Secretary Stanton, General Halleck, General 
Burnside, and General Rosecrans were all engaged to relieve them.231  A month after 
Lincoln’s promise of a Union effort to help East Tennessee, General Burnside arrived in 
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Knoxville with the Army of the Ohio, 24,000 troops strong, and occupied the city on 
September 3 with little resistance.232  The Confederate troops evacuated south to join 
Bragg’s Army of Tennessee in northern Georgia. 
President Lincoln pressed General Rosecrans to make an offensive thrust on the 
Confederates collected in southern Tennessee and northern Georgia.  Since the Battle of 
Stones River, resignations continued to plague the Army of the Cumberland as Rosecrans 
had lost additional Kentuckians in protested fallout to the Emancipation Proclamation.  
Historian Victor Howard accessed: 
Soon after the Battle of Stones River, December 31,1862, some fifteen or 
eighteen officers of the Fifteenth Kentucky Infantry tendered their 
resignation without giving any special reason.  All were sent back by Gen. 
Richard W. Johnson, who commanded the division.  Within a few days 
some half-dozen or more of the same officers again sent in their 
resignations without stating a reason, and again were turned down. . . 
.Colonel Cochran and other officers of the Fourteenth Infantry resigned 
because of the president’s proclamation.  More than a hundred men 
deserted the Twenty-fourth infantry . . . Many of the Kentucky regiments 
under Rosecrans were so depleted of forces that there was talk of 
combining some of them. . . .As the epidemic of resignations spread 
through Kentucky troops, Col. J.H. Ward, commander of the Twenty-
seventh Regiment, issued an order reminding his men that it was their duty 
“as soldiers to suffer anything, even unto death,” as long as there was at 
least hope of establishing the Constitution and perpetuating the Union.233 
McCook’s corps is where many of the Kentucky soldiers and officers, disgruntled at 
emancipation, served.  General McCook, himself, expressed an open opposition to 
Lincoln’s approach.234  Going into the Battle of Chickamauga, Union command 
reorganized the Army of the Cumberland again and placed many of the Kentucky 
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regiments under either General Thomas’s XIV Corps or General Crittenden’s XXI Corps.  
Rosecrans’s army added a cavalry corps that pushed his total number to around 56,000 
men.  As he pursued Bragg’s army into northern Georgia, Chickamauga Creek emerged 
as the location the Confederates chose to push back.  Named from a Cherokee word that 
translated into “River of Death,” Chickamauga developed into one of the deadliest battles 
for the Army of the Cumberland.235  The mid-September encounter lasted two days and 
produced over 16,000 Union casualties.  Rosecrans made mistakes and all his corps, 
except General Thomas’s, experienced near annihilation.  The 3rd Kentucky Infantry, 
made up of soldiers from the earliest 1861 calls for Kentucky volunteers, along with three 
Ohio regiments, played a key role in helping to save Crittenden’s corps.  Forced to 
retreat, Chickamauga represented a low point for the Army of Cumberland and the 
battle’s Union hero, General George Thomas, soon replaced General Rosecrans. 
Union troops retreated to Chattanooga to regroup after the Chickamauga disaster.  
In the two months before the next major engagement, Union leadership made more 
changes to the command structure in the Western Theatre of the war.  After General 
Grant’s success in his siege of Vicksburg, the executive administration placed him in 
charge of all Western Armies in October 1863.  Grant soon thereafter communicated his 
concerns to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton about General Rosecrans’s lack of ability to 
follow his orders and selected George H. Thomas to command the Army of the 
Cumberland.236  Thomas’s actions at Mill Springs, Stones River, and Chickamauga 
helped elevate him to the position.  By mid-November, Grant also had moved General 
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William T. Sherman’s Army of the Tennessee into Chattanooga to defend against 
Bragg’s attempt to force the Union north.  
General Bragg looked to dislodge the northern armies from Chattanooga and 
established a strong position that held various high points, which included Lookout 
Mountain and Missionary Ridge that overlooked the Union position.  On November 23 
General Grant ordered an attack on the elevated Confederate locations.  The Battle of 
Chattanooga, with over 120,000 troops engaged between the two opposing sides, lasted 
for three days and provided the Union with another important victory.  On the morning of 
the final day of fighting, the 8th Kentucky Regiment from the Army of the Cumberland, 
under General Charles Cruft’s division, volunteered to scale Lookout Mountain.  Colonel 
Barnes formed the Kentucky regiment in 1861 and recruited men from Estill, Jackson, 
and Owsley Counties.  When Colonel Barnes asked for a squadron to check the summit 
for a Confederate presence, a few soldiers expressed eagerness at the opportunity.  Peter 
Cozzens summarized the moment: 
Captain John Wilson, commander of the color company, jumped up and 
begged to be allowed the honor.  Barnes granted this request.  Wilson 
turned to the color-bearer and asked him to follow with the flag.  The 
bearer hesitated, glanced at the hundred-foot wall of rock and 
contemplating the weight of the flagstaff.  Wilson grabbed the flag and 
handed the reluctant sergeant his sword.  Six enlisted men volunteered to 
join Wilson.  Gripping with one hand a long wild grapevine that dangled 
from the summit, Wilson started up the natural stairway of broken rock.  
His Kentuckians followed him.  They clutched at rocks and bushes, 
grasped limbs and vines, and shoved one another upward.237 
Once Wilson reached the top, he unfurled the American flag from a vantage point that 
caught the Union Army’s attention from many points below.  The rest of the 8th Kentucky 
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soon followed to Wilson’s position in a skirmish line and only encountered a few 
Confederates.  General Cruft was “delighted at his boys’ daring.”238  The moment did 
little to affect the overall outcome of the larger battle, but Wilson’s actions, along with 
the 8th Kentucky Regiment, provided a momentary boost in morale for many Union 
soldiers at Chattanooga and the success formed a sense of pride in the Kentucky regiment 
that carried over into the years well after the war.  
The clearing of Confederates from Chattanooga started a new phase of the war as 
the beginning stages of Sherman’s “March to the Sea” unfolded in the aftermath of 
Bragg’s defeat.  Many of the Union Kentucky soldiers in the Western Theatre of the war 
soon found themselves at locations such as Kennesaw Mountain, Atlanta, and other 
locations on the way to Savannah.  President Lincoln called General Grant to 
Washington.  Prior to going to the nation’s capital, General Grant passed through 
Southeastern Kentucky and lodged at the foot of Big Hill, less than a mile from Jackson 
County’s northern boundary.  Grant wrote of the experience in his memoirs: 
It was an intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as 
zero every morning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on 
my way from there on horseback to Lexington, Kentucky. . . .The road 
over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of broken 
wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it on my first trip to 
Chattanooga over Waldron’s Ridge.  The road had been cut up to as great 
a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that condition 
frozen; so that the six days from Strawberry Plains to Lexington over these 
holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one, and very 
disagreeable.  I found a great many people at home along that route, both 
in Tennessee and Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal.  They 
would collect in little places where we would stop of evenings to see me, 
generally hearing of my approach before arriving.239   
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III. 
The course of the war shifted in the Union’s favor following the federal successes 
at Gettysburg and Vicksburg in the summer of 1863, along with fall events at the 
Tennessee and Georgia line, as the country entered 1864.  But for Kentucky, guerrilla 
activity continued across the Commonwealth.  The state’s loyalty remained endangered 
as splits over emancipation and federal policy threatened to alter the allegiance of many 
residents within the army and at home.  This situation, combined with the swaths of 
population already sympathetic to the Confederate cause since the war’s outset, produced 
an environment difficult to control.  
The appointment of General Stephen G. Burbridge to monitor potential threats, 
and to bring order to areas affected by Confederate defiance, produced mixed results.  
Governor Thomas E. Bramlette welcomed the news of Burbridge’s assignment to his 
troubled state.240  A native-born Kentucky farmer from Logan County, General Burbridge 
took over in Kentucky in February 1864.  Louis De Falaise described the general’s 
inherited situation: 
The most serious problem facing Burbridge as he took his new command 
was that of guerilla marauding.  As a border state, Kentucky harbored 
many with Southern proclivities.  The guerillas were of two types.  First, 
there were detached units of the Southern army.  Secondly, there were 
brigands, native Kentuckians and deserters from the Southern army, who 
were using the war as an excuse for looting.241 
Just prior to Burbridge’s new authority on these matters, an officer from the 45th 
Kentucky filed a report where the group encountered a band of guerillas attempting to 
hang a Union sympathizer and Governor Bramlette had already issued an order that 
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directed military authorities to arrest five Confederate sympathizers in every area where a 
Union man was targeted.242  But as Burbridge raised the hopes of Governor Bramlette’s 
desire to calm Kentucky of guerilla violence, he also emerged as a federal extension of 
the new policies of the war.  High-ranking officials started to issue directives to 
Burbridge.  General Sherman ordered the execution of guerillas who interfered with 
steamboat supplies, Judge Advocate Joseph Holt recommended the most severe 
punishment of southerners who broke parole, and the most divisive issue—what to do 
with the impressment and enlistment of African Americans for the war effort—also fell 
on Burbridge’s authority.243    
John Hunt Morgan’s 1864 raid into Kentucky accelerated the state’s problems.  
By late-May, the Confederate raider left Virginia and made entry into Kentucky from the 
southeast.  Morgan’s raid targeted Mt. Sterling, Lexington, and Cynthiana.  The 1864 raid 
brought Morgan’s raiders into contact with several southeastern Kentuckians who had 
just mustered in with the 47th and 49th Kentucky Volunteer Infantries.  The Union Army 
stationed the 47th and 49th at Camp Nelson under Brigadier General Speed S. Fry to 
protect the training of African-American troops.244  The 40th and 45th Kentucky Infantries 
242 Ibid., 104.  
243 Ibid., 106-107.  
244 For more on Camp Nelson see Richard Sears, “John G. Fee, Camp Nelson, and 
Kentucky Blacks, 1864-1865,” The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 85 
(Winter 1987): 29-45 and Richard Sears, Camp Nelson, Kentucky: A Civil War History 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002). Sears explores several issues that arise 
from the training of African-American troops in central Kentucky, including disputes 
between General Fry and General Burbidge on the purpose of the camp and the treatment 
of refugees.   
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were also active against Morgan’s men and many of the Kentucky units responsible for 
defending against the raids came from the fall 1863 call for recruits.  
Murders and harassment of southeastern Kentuckians resulted from the 
Confederate foray into the state.  As colonel in command of the 47th Kentucky Infantry, 
Andrew H. Clark received news of the murder of his father who lived in Booneville, 
Owsley County.  Confederate Colonel Henry Giltner’s men, including Giltner’s own son, 
tortured and murdered William Clark.  The Lexington National Unionist reported a story 
in the days that followed about a 101-year-old Baptist preacher in Clay County named 
John Gilbert.  The newspaper claimed that the same Confederate band who killed Clark 
also stole Gilbert’s money, all his horses, and all his food.245  A Union veteran of the 7th 
Kentucky Regiment, Elihu Webber experienced a similar fate.  Confederate guerillas 
robbed Webber of all his money and clothing as he returned home to Owsley County 
from three years of service.246  Numerous veterans from the 7th Kentucky Regiment filed 
a petition to Governor Bramlette to have Webber pardoned for a twenty-five dollar fine 
as the robbery left him “destitute of everything in the clothing line and money.”247 
Residents in the upper counties of Tennessee sent a petition to General Samuel Carter in 
hopes that the general might use his influence in an appeal for help.  The request read: 
As the harvest is now fast approaching and no help to reap or take care of 
the grain, and there being little corn planted this spring, in God’s name, 
what will the people of that section do, should they receive no aid from the 
Federal Government, and the rebels are permitted to reap and take what 
245 The National Unionist, June 28, 1864.  
246 “G. W. Daniel et al. to Thomas E. Bramlette,” n.d., Office of the Governor, Thomas E. 
Bramlette: Governor's official correspondence file, petitions for pardons, remissions, and 
respites 1863-1867, BR12-74 to BR12-75, Kentucky Department for Libraries and 
Archives, Frankfort, KY.  Accessed via the Civil War Governors of Kentucky Digital 
Documentary Edition, discovery.civilwargovernors.org/document/KYR-0001-004-1337.  
247 Ibid.  
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grain is now growing?  What will become of the mothers, wives, sisters, 
and children of the many soldiers and refugees that are now away from 
home? . . .Letters are received here daily from those loyal women who still 
remain at home, almost heartbroken, praying that the Federals may send 
them protection and relieve them of their awful sufferings. . . .Believing, 
as we do, in the Christian people of the United States, they will, they must, 
soon give us aid and relief.248 
Over three hundred citizens signed the petition and the message echoed the desperation 
of the area.  Under the command of General Burbridge, soldiers from the 37th and 39th 
Kentucky Regiments joined in and helped defeat Morgan at the Second Battle of 
Cynthiana.  The battle occurred over June 11 and 12 and produced over 2,000 combined 
casualties for the two sides.  The battle represented an endpoint for Morgan’s final raid, 
Morgan escaped back to Abingdon, Virginia.249  But like his earlier raids, the fallout and 
increase in violent activity remained in Kentucky. 
A series of controversial federal orders followed the May and June violence.  On 
July 16, 1864, General Burbridge issued General Order Number 59.  The order adopted 
stringent measures to protect against “the plundering and murdering [of] peaceful Union 
citizens.”250  The order called for the arrest of five rebel sympathizers living within a 
five-mile radius for every one Union citizen targeted.  Furthermore, the federal 
government promised to confiscate property in equal value from the perpetrators, and if a 
murder was involved, authorities were directed to publicly execute four Confederate 
248 “William H. Briant, et al to General Samuel Carter,” May 28, 1864, United States War 
Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-
1901), Series.1, Vol. 39, Part II, 75-76. 
249 Harrison, The Civil War in Kentucky, 74.  
250 “General Orders No. 59,” July 16, 1864, United States War Department, The War of 
the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Armies (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series.1, Vol. 39, 
Part II, 174. 
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sympathizers.251  Accompanying the announcement of Burbridge’s new policy, President 
Lincoln issued General Order Number 233 that amounted to “a proclamation to suspend 
the writ of habeas corpus, and establish martial law in Kentucky.”252  In a July letter from 
the Judge Advocate Holt to Secretary of War Stanton, Holt relayed that, “Kentucky has 
been for some time and is still in a deplorable condition.  A very large part of the State is 
completely overrun with guerillas, who plunder farm-houses, and fields, and villages at 
will, and often murder the helpless victims of their robberies.”253  Much of Holt’s concern 
revolved around Lincoln’s amnesty proclamation meant to quell Confederate behavior 
with the administration of an oath of loyalty.  Holt expressed his belief that guerillas 
manipulated the proclamation and oaths to avoid punishment.  In the letter, Holt 
communicated his frustrations of prominent politicians defiant to the recruitment of black 
regiments.  Holt advanced a theory that “a large number of influential men in Kentucky, 
embracing several occupying the highest positions under the State government, are found 
to be members and officers of this association or conspiracy.”254   
Divisions over federal policy swept the state.  Many Kentuckians, sympathetic to 
Confederate causes, expressed outrage at Burbridge’s approach to justice.  Leaders in 
Kentucky followed suit.  General Burbridge admonished General Speed Fry for his 
251 Ibid.  
252“General Orders No. 233 from the War Department,” July 19, 1864, United States War 
Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-
1901), Series.1, Vol. 39, Part II, 180-182.  
253 “Joseph Holt to Edwin Stanton,” July 31, 1864, United States War Department, The 
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Armies (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), 
Series.1, Vol. 39, Part II, 212-215. 
254 Ibid., 214.  
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treatment of black refugees at Camp Nelson.  Officials had already arrested and removed 
Union Cavalry Colonel Frank Wolford for a speech critical of Lincoln and the use of 
black regiments.  Even Governor Bramlette, who had welcomed Burbridge’s 
appointment, started to warn that federal policies were driving the state into the 
Confederacy.  At the federal level, Kentucky Senator Garrett Davis had “begun the year 
with a flurry of resolutions condemning the war measures of the Lincoln administration 
and in turn faced the threat of expulsion from that August body.”255  
Residents in the southeastern portion of the state did not express the level of 
resistance as did their counterparts around the state.  As central Kentuckians took a firm 
political stand against federal policy, many residents of Appalachia either did not hold 
that sentiment or chose not to rebel against the authorities offering them protection in any 
significant number.  The 47th and 49th Kentucky Regiments continued to guard Camp 
Nelson under new military leadership.  As a preacher of racially mixed ancestry in 
Jackson County who pastored at South Fork Baptist Church, John Drew left his 
congregation to answer Reverend John Fee’s 1864 August request to aid in the 
educational efforts with African-Americans at Camp Nelson.256   
In the Presidential election of 1864—an election where Confederate States did not 
participate—Lincoln defeated former General George McClellan.  The electoral tally 
resulted in 212 votes for Lincoln and 21 votes for McClellan.  Lincoln carried all states 
except for New Jersey, Delaware, and Kentucky—with Kentucky handing Lincoln his 
worst popular vote performance in the country.257  Within Southeastern Kentucky, 
255 Rhyne, “A Blood Stained Sin,” 572.  
256 Sears, Camp Nelson, 98.  
257 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 804-805. 
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however, nine counties returned results in favor of President Lincoln.  In Harlan County, 
Lincoln captured more than 80% of the vote, in Jackson and Whitley Counties, the total 
topped over 90%.258  Nine other Kentucky counties cast the fewest popular votes for 
Lincoln in a category that measured the bottom twenty in the nation.  Spencer, Meade, 
and Clinton Counties returned less than five popular votes each for President Lincoln’s 
reelection.259 
Enlistments is another area where historians can measure the negative federal 
impact in the post-emancipation phase of the war.  In 1909, the Secretary of War released 
Kentucky statistics from the 1864 draft.260  The release was in response to a United States 
Senate Resolution looking to clarify the number of draftees from the various districts in 
Kentucky.  A preliminary draft occurred in March and a second draft followed on July 
18, 1864.  In April 1864, the War Department adjusted the quotas, based on a 
combination of population and men still in military service, required from each district.  
The 1909 legislation was in effort to determine if claimants paid too much money for 
substitutes or for commutations.  Inside those numbers, however, the report revealed that 
most of the districts operated on deficiencies when it came to the number of troops 
provided.  Of the nine districts, only three provided a number of soldiers that surpassed 
258 For a county by county breakdown of presidential elections see Presidential Elections, 
1789-2008: County, State, and National Mapping of Election Data ed. Donald R. Deskin, 
Hanes Walton, and Sherman C. Puckett (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
2010), 178.  
259 Ibid.  
260 Drafts in Kentucky During Civil War, A Letter from the Secretary of War, In Response 
to Senate Resolution Number 63, by Mr. Bradley, of July 2, 1909, A Letter from the 
Adjutant-General of the Army Setting Forth Such Information as it is Possible to Furnish 
Concerning the Drafts in the State of Kentucky during the Civil War. Document 142, 61st 
Congress, 1st Session (Congressional Record), 1909, 1-14.  
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the quota the War Department set forth.  The eighth district, comprised of counties from 
the southeastern portion of Kentucky, accounted for the most “credits” in the entire 
state.261  Pulaski, Estill, Owsley, Clay, and Jackson Counties combined to have a 1,235 
surplus of soldiers.  In comparison, in the central Kentucky counties of Fayette, Scott, 
Clark, Bourbon, and Nicholas Counties, a 1,033 deficiency of soldiers existed.262  The 
final recapitulation of the state quota revealed that the War Department set Kentucky a 
quota of 80,611 soldiers of which the Commonwealth provided 72,099.263  The Provost-
Marshall-General also produced records that revealed over 7,000 either paid substitutes 
or commutation money.264  One might conclude that many of those payments did not 
come from the Appalachian counties. 
As the war entered its final months, the guerilla war did not wane.  Even with 
John Hunt Morgan’ death at Greeneville, Tennessee, in September 1864, new raiders 
arrived in the state to fill the void and new troubles emerged from the Kentucky 
population.  Dubious individuals such as Sue Mundy and William Quantrill brought a 
new terror to the state.  J. Michael Rhyne summarized: 
On the surface, this guerilla war appeared to be centered on the activities 
of well-known Confederate Kentuckians such as John Hunt Morgan or 
George M. Jesse.  But beneath this veneer, a much more personal war 
erupted as Kentuckians took up arms not only for the Confederacy but also 
against a federal government seemingly intent on destroying the institution 
of slavery, not just in the Confederacy but also in the states that had not 
seceded.265 
261 Ibid, 14.  
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Determining what drove the sentiments of Southeastern Kentuckians is difficult.  But 
many continued in military service.  Reactions to the violence and plunder to the Unionist 
population may have solidified the political and military loyalty in the region as much as 
any other factor.  One group that captured that spirit arose in the Three Forks Battalion of 
Kentucky State Troops.  As a captain in charge of the battalion, Elisha Treadway hailed 
as the former sheriff of Owsley County.  Treadway had also served in the Mexican-
American War with the 3rd Kentucky and joined the 7th Kentucky in September 1861.266  
Seven companies formed the battalion, and the group posted in areas from where the unit 
recruited—Breathitt, Estill, Owsley, Perry, and Harlan Counties.267  In a July 1865 appeal 
to Governor Bramlette, Treadway requested that the Three Forks Battalion be allowed to 
continue their work.  Treadway wrote: 
I am at this place with Six companies of My Battolion [sic], preparing to 
be mustered out, of the State service, I have two more companies on their 
way from the Counties of Harlan, and Perry, making Eight in all, I would 
verry [sic] Respectfully recommend that three of those companies be 
retained in the State Service, Some two or three Months longer, from the 
fact, we have not yet established Civil Courts or even yet put down all the 
guerrillas in the counties of Harlan, Perry, Breathitt, Letcher , &c. there 
are reported to be three Bands of guerrillas in those counties . . . I would 
ernestly [sic] recommend that you come to this place next Monday if it be 
Possible so to do the Citizens generally expect you, if you could be here 
on that day and address the citizens of this county, and my Battolion [sic], 
(which represents all Eastern Kentucky) I think it would do more for our 
cause than anything that could be done in this part of the State.268 
266 "Elisha B. Treadway" in the Civil War Governors of Kentucky Digital Documentary 
Edition, discovery.civilwargovernors.org/document/N00002436, (accessed October 27, 
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Historians often overlook Kentucky’s role and experiences from the second half 
of the Civil War.  After the Confederate retreat following the Battle of Perryville, through 
the southern armies’ final surrender, Kentucky played a role in national developments 
and they experienced a tumultuous period within the state.  Kentucky soldiers fought on 
each side of the affair, but a far larger number in military service wore Union blue.  Some 
Union regiments helped make up the large armies of the Western Theatre that brought the 
war to an end.  Others who served in Kentucky as Home Guards or in Union detachments 
protected resources, maintained transportation routes, and guarded camps where African-
Americans trained as soldiers.  Federal policies related to conscription and emancipation 
nearly tore the Commonwealth apart.  During that test, the Appalachian portions of the 
state experienced an uptick in the raids and plunder that a split population invited.  In the 
end, the loyalty of the area hardened at the ballot box and through the continued 
enlistment of soldiers.  As some portions of Kentucky started to identify with the 
Confederate cause or to revolt against federal authority, evidence suggests that the 
Appalachian region of Kentucky provided a counterweight, if only a small 
counterweight, to that movement.    




THE MYSTIC CHORDS OF MEMORY: 
VOTING PATTERNS, WAR MEMORY,  
AND ATTACKS ON THE MOUNTAINEER IMAGE 
Historians have elevated Kentucky’s significant role in the Union cause with 
Abraham Lincoln’s supposed, yet often repeated quote, “I would like to have God on my 
side, but I must have Kentucky.”  Modern historians select Lincoln’s 1861 written quip “I 
think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game,” with more 
confidence to capture the President’s opinion of Kentucky’s strategic value.269  
Regardless which quote makes it into the analysis; the events in Kentucky throughout the 
entire war substantiate the sentiment.  Kentucky provided resources, manpower, and an 
important geographic position that secured the Union’s victory.  Within the state 
population, splits occurred.  The first split formed during the early debates on secession, 
and a minority of Kentuckians tossed their lot in with the Confederates.  The second 
major split emerged in 1863 when Lincoln’s emancipationist policies took effect.  The 
federal efforts to curb guerilla violence that accompanied the emancipation phase of the 
war resulted in even more Kentuckians who shifted allegiance.  A large majority of 
Southeastern Kentuckians, however, not only held steady to the Union cause, but also 
relied on increasing federal support as Confederate violence threatened the region.  The 
rise of a Confederate identity during the postwar years in the central and western portions 
269 Richard Carwardine, Lincoln: A Life of Purpose and Power (New York: Knopf 
Publishing, 2003), 175-176.  
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of the state signaled a strong disaffection with the war’s impact in those areas.270  
Residents of the southeastern counties created a different environment to remember the 
war—one that offered support for Republicans and Republican ideas. 
In Kentucky, Conditional Unionists, proslavery Unionists, and other conservative 
groups formed a political partnership that kept the state out of the Confederacy in the 
earliest stages of the Civil War.  By 1865, events in the second half of the war had 
dissolved much of that coalition.  The results from the 1864 presidential election in 
Kentucky proved the waning influence and limited support of the federal administration.  
The Republican Lincoln and Unionist Democrat Andrew Johnson ran together under the 
split-ticket banner of a National Union Party.  Kentucky returned the worst vote totals in 
the nation for Lincoln and Johnson’s calculated effort at fusion politics.  Over thirty 
Kentucky counties, mostly in the central and west, produced popular vote totals of 90% 
or more for the Democratic challenger George McClellan.  The Eighth District, which 
included all the southeastern counties, provided a vote total of 6,409 votes for Lincoln 
and 3,701 for McClellan.  Lincoln garnered only 30.2% of the vote statewide, but it was 
an improvement from 1860 and the president carried twenty-five Kentucky counties total 
with twelve of those in the Eight District.271      
William Harrison Randall represented Kentucky’s Eighth District in the United 
States House of Representatives during the latter half of the Civil War era.  Randall had 
270 For the best analysis on how portions of Kentucky remade its Civil War legacy and 
identified with the Confederate cause see Anne Marshall’s Creating a Confederate 
Kentucky: The Lost Cause and Civil War Memory in a Border State (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 
271 James Larry Hood, “For the Union: Kentucky’s Unconditional Unionist Congressmen 
and the Development of the Republican Party in Kentucky, 1863-1865,” The Register of 
the Kentucky Historical Society, 76 (Summer 1978): 210. 
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served as Circuit and County Clerk for Laurel County and after he won the congressional 
seat in the 1863 election, Randall allied with the Republican Party.  Randall joined a 
group of Unconditional Unionists from Kentucky who defected from Union Democrats 
and, in one of his first actions, voted for an Army bill that allowed the arming of African 
Americans.272   In 1865, when the House voted on the 13th Amendment to abolish slavery 
in the United States, Kentucky representatives Lucian Anderson, George Yeaman, Green 
Smith, and William Randall cast votes in the affirmative.  Representatives Anderson and 
Yeaman, from western districts, gambled their political futures and left the House in the 
next election.  Smith scored a narrow victory in northern Kentucky and Eighth District 
voters reelected William Randall by a wide margin.273  Randall went on to lobby for more 
rights for African Americans after the war’s conclusion.  Historian Victor Howard added: 
“William H. Randall of Laurel County represented the eastern district of Kentucky in the 
House of Representatives and favored full civil rights for the Negro.  In autumn of 1866 
he traveled through his district while the county courts were in session and ‘strongly 
advocated negro suffrage.’”274  
Union veterans experienced political support from the southeastern counties as 
well.  In the 1867 gubernatorial race that featured Democrat John Helm, Republican 
Sidney Barnes, and Conservative William Kinkead, Helm won the race with 65.7% of the 
Kentucky vote.  Barnes received 24.7% and Kinkead finished last with 9.6% in the three-
272 Ibid., 208.  
273 For more on the Kentucky Representatives who voted for the 13th Amendment see 
Berry Craig’s Unconditional Unionist: The Hazardous Life of Lucian Anderson, 
Kentucky Congressman (Jefferson: McFarland & Company Publishers, 2016) and Berry 
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274 Victor Howard, Black Liberation in Kentucky: Emancipation and Freedom, 1862-
1884 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 72. 
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way race.  Jackson County led the voting for Barnes with 93.9%, Whitley County offered 
the Republican 88.8%, and Harlan County registered 84.9%.275  Barnes raised the 8th 
Kentucky Volunteers in southeastern Kentucky in 1861 and was present at Chattanooga 
when the group achieved national fame for raising the American flag on Lookout 
Mountain.    For comparison, Barnes received 8.3% in Jefferson County, 7.1% in Warren 
County, and 0.9% in Fulton County.276  The shift toward the Democratic Party occurred 
in locations like Louisville, Lexington, Paducah, and Bowling Green.  
In 1871, when Democrat Preston Leslie ran against Republican John Marshall 
Harlan, the state produced similar results.  Leslie won with 58.6% of the state’s popular 
vote.  In Western Kentucky, Ballard and Fulton Counties produced vote totals of over 
90% for the Democratic candidate; for Northern Kentucky, Trimble and Owen Counties 
combined for over 90% support for Leslie as well.  Five of the top eight counties for the 
Harlan’s Republican candidacy included Jackson, Clay, Owsley, Whitley, and Harlan.277  
When the Democratic candidate James B. McCreary defeated John Marshall Harlan in 
his second Republican bid to be governor in 1875, just six Kentucky counties favored 
Harlan with over 70% of the popular vote—all of those counties were in southeastern 
Kentucky.278  The former Colonel of the 10th Kentucky Infantry and future Supreme 
Court Justice lost his two attempts to become Kentucky’s governor, but Southeastern 
Kentuckians offered John Marshall Harlan his greatest political support of any region in 
Kentucky. 
275 Michael J. Durbin, United States Gubernatorial Elections, 1861-1911 (Jefferson: 
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Presidential races in the Commonwealth during the period of Reconstruction 
provided results that matched the gubernatorial contests.  In 1868, when Union general 
Ulysses S. Grant ran as the Republican presidential candidate against Democrat Horatio 
Seymour, Kentucky voted just under 75% for Democrat Seymour and over twenty 
counties provided over 90% support for the Democratic candidate.  Jackson and Harlan 
Counties were the only two counties that produced similar lopsided tallies in favor of 
Grant, and both counties eclipsed 90% in Republican support.279  Kentucky also provided 
Democrat Horace Greely a majority vote in Grant’s reelection bid of 1872.  Kentucky 
was one of only six states to go to the Democratic challenger.  Once again, Jackson, 
Owsley, Whitley, and the newly formed Bell County, voted at some of the highest rates 
for Grant observed in Kentucky, and the Republican carried most of the mountain district 
counties.280  The southeastern area continued with strong support for Republicans 
Rutherford B. Hayes and James Garfield in the 1876 and 1880 elections that followed the 
two-term administration of Ulysses S. Grant.  The state of Kentucky, however, continued 
to award its electoral votes to the Democratic challengers.281 
Modern historical efforts have downplayed the region’s Unionism.  In Kenneth 
Noe’s “Toward the Myth of Unionist Appalachia, 1865-1883,” Noe attacked the notion 
that Appalachians aligned with the Union as “ahistorical.”282  Noe and Shannon Wilson 
coedited a work that made similar claims in The Civil War in Appalachia: Collected 
279 Presidential Elections, 1789-2008: County, State, and National Mapping of Election 
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280 Ibid.  
281 Ibid. 
282 Kenneth Noe, “Toward the Myth of Unionist Appalachia, 1865-1883,” Journal of the 
Appalachian Studies Association 6 (1994): 73-80.  
130 
Essays.283  The Civil War in Appalachia suffered from the flawed approach of 
deconstructing a stereotype about an entire region and replacing it with an alternative 
revision of an entire region.  In short, localities within the broad Appalachian portions of 
America experienced different levels of loyalty, participation, and outcomes in the Civil 
War era.  Anne Marshall’s Creating a Confederate Kentucky: The Lost Cause and Civil 
War Memory in a Border State offered a better analysis of Kentucky’s complex history.  
Marshall’s chapter “Two Kentuckys: Civil War Identity in Appalachian Kentucky, 1865-
1915,” distinguished the experiences of Kentucky, but the historian placed most of the 
analysis on exposing numerous outside efforts that embellished Appalachian Unionism.  
The chapter also placed significant focus on the rise of violent feuds in the area.  
Marshall concluded: 
The perceived normality of the Confederate portion of Kentucky—an area 
capable of peaceful reunion—exacerbated Appalachian Kentucky’s 
growing lawless reputation.  Moreover, this perception that made 
Unionism seem an anomaly not only legitimized the state’s Confederate 
identity but made it look like the preferable, more civilized one.284 
Marshall’s treatment of the area revealed significant difficulties in the region and her 
work acknowledged some of the unique characteristics of Kentucky’s mountain 
populations.  But “Two Kentuckys” also fell short in delineating how some localities 
developed a postwar culture distinct from the more violent counties.  The southeastern 
portion of Kentucky experienced racial issues, suffered from lawless violence, and failed 
on social issues in the second half of the nineteenth century, as did much of the country.  
However, military service records, voting patterns, and other primary accounts suggest 
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that many of the southeastern counties of Kentucky aligned with those who sought the 
preservation of the Union before, during, and after the war.  And unlike much of 
Kentucky, a strong combination of Union loyalty and military pride survived the war and 
its aftermath. 
In June 1861 W.J. Landram wrote Phillip Swagert where he said “Our men are for 
the Union—& one thing is certain, Garrard [County] is going to stay in under all 
circumstances.”285  Records show that Landram possessed one slave, but went on to serve 
in a Union Kentucky Regiment.286   Garrard County stood as one of the northernmost 
counties in the Eighth District, but his sentiment at the beginning of the war perhaps 
expressed an outlook of the area more than he knew.  Charles C. Wells released a 
compilation of Union military records with his 1890 Special Veterans Census for Eastern 
Kentucky.287  The work listed the veteran records and rolls for thirty eastern counties, but 
many of the southeastern counties are not included.  For Kentucky’s one-hundred and 
twenty counties, only sixty-five of the records remain, as nearly half the state’s veteran 
census data was either destroyed or misplaced in transfer to the National Archives.288  
Historians face the difficult work in construction of the area’s Civil War history to 
resurrect it from its forgotten state.      
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THE FIERY TRIAL: 
A CIVIL WAR HISTIOGRAPHY 
Serious efforts to understand the Civil War emerged in the years following the war.  
Revisiting those earliest works, up through the voluminous amount of scholarship that 
exists today, reveals a rise in historical attention toward the subject.  A higher quality of 
professional historical work accompanied the same trajectory.  Biographies on Abraham 
Lincoln stand as an important strand of the larger Civil War histography as well.  Lincoln 
officials and acquaintances such as John Nicolay, John Hay, and William Herndon 
produced some of the earliest efforts to capture the president’s life in the years following 
the 1865 assassination.  Other writers followed with late 1800’s and early 1900s attention 
to Lincoln, prominent military leaders, and significant politicians.  Inquiry into specific 
regional Civil War history, however, marks a more recent turn.  As early researchers 
placed emphasis on the general history of the war and in producing biographical studies 
of its most important participants—with those works improving in quality as a hundred 
years passed—it has been only in the last twenty-five years that local histories connected 
to the Civil War have attracted historical scholarship.  All these developments leave 
scholars with a better understanding of the war’s leaders, causes, and consequences 
resulting in a rich library to advance new arguments as well as ask lingering questions 
worthy of deeper investigation.   
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Questions surrounding the history of the Civil War encountered several 
problematic issues near its beginning such as geographic bias, writing tied to personal 
experience, and amateur historical efforts.  These factors combined to present various 
interpretations of the war’s significance in the earliest works.  The “Lost Cause” 
approach produced many books that suffered from a pro-southern slant during the late 
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century.  Soldiers and politicians 
offered their memoirs on the conflict during Reconstruction and beyond.  Subsequent 
historians, such as James Ford Rhodes and his History of the Civil War: 1861-1865, 
represented a more academic approach to the field.289  These turn-of-the-century works 
from veterans, politicians, and early historians present uneven results but mark the 
earliest foundations of the historiography of the Civil War.  
By the mid-twentieth century writers such as Douglas Southall Freeman, Bruce 
Catton, and Allan Nevins published better researched works than the previous generation 
who addressed Civil War history.  Freeman’s multivolume study of Robert E. Lee in the 
1930s entitled R. E. Lee: A Biography won praise for the depth of historical writing.290  
Many still claimed to identify a strong southern bias, or at least an amount of Confederate 
romanticism, in Freeman’s account.  Later, Catton and Nevins introduced a generation of 
Americans to the topic of the Civil War with their narrative histories.  Catton’s 1952 
trilogy of Mr. Lincoln’s Army, Glory Road, and A Stillness at Appomattox introduced 
289 James Ford Rhodes, History of the Civil War: 1861-1865 (New York: Reservoir 
House, 2016). Original publication in 1917. Rhodes won the second Pulitzer Prize ever 
awarded for history the same year.   
290 Douglas Southall Freeman, R.E. Lee: A Biography (New York: Scribner & Sons, 
1936). 
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many readers to a deeper analysis of the Civil War.291  As a journalist who penned 
“popular history,” Catton’s work still stands as an important addition to the subject at a 
critical time in the historiography.  The work also established what historians have 
challenged as an emphasis, or overemphasis, on the Eastern Theatre of the war.  Allan 
Nevins published an eight-volume history over several decades of the mid-twentieth 
century with his The Ordeal of the Union.292  Like Catton, Nevins was not an academic 
historian, but he too fused prose and research in an academic way that presented Civil 
War history for a wider audience.  Some historians have criticized the work as being too 
pro-Union, and as with Freeman, historians accused the expansive study of a detectable 
northern geographic bias.         
Due to the growing interest of the last fifty years, scholars moved Civil War 
history forward from its popular and “Lost Cause” state.  New scholars shifted from older 
“drum and trumpet” military history to “new” military history embedded in society and 
culture.  The approach to the subject in the closing decades of the twentieth century 
challenged long-held assumptions.  The topic received an additional boost, around the 
turn of the twenty-first century, due to a renewed attentiveness born from these works to 
meet the public’s growing demand for new material on the topic.  Anniversaries in the 
period between 2009-2015 that celebrated milestones of the war’s significance made an 
impact as well.  But instead of a decline in focus, research continues even with the 
passing of Lincoln’s two-hundredth birthday and the conclusion of celebrations 
291 Bruce Catton, The Army of the Potomac, 3 volumes (New York: Doubleday Press, 
1952). 
292 Allan Nevin, Ordeal of the Union, 8 volumes (New York: Scribner & Sons, 1947-71). 
135 
connected to the sesquicentennial of the war.  Historians and publishers show no sign of 
abandoning the topic anytime soon.  
Much of the attention awarded to the subject is due to the complex and domestic 
nature of the conflict, access to new sources, the biographical interest in its participants, 
and the uncovering of a vast expanse of topics unknown or previously ignored.  More 
recent studies have shed new light on traditional subjects at the center of the conflict, 
while other historians have revealed original ideas and conclusions about matters long 
thought as peripheral.  Within this surge of newly published material are also those books 
of scholarly recognition that stand the test of time and are viewed as essential reading to 
understand the war.  These noteworthy scholars receive frequent reference for their 
thorough investigations that became indelible academic contributions to the field of Civil 
War history.  Indeed, the sheer amount of material on the Civil War era, new and old, can 
present an overwhelming sensation for those who choose to measure or contribute to the 
ever-expanding field of study.  It is useful to examine the modern study of the war 
starting with the works that appeared after the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam 
War Era. 
I. 
Historians have long analyzed the political history of the Antebellum Era and new 
conclusions on the topic emerged during the 1970s.  During that decade, scholars added 
valuable works to the historiography that focused on the political environment 
surrounding the Civil War.  Some of these efforts challenged prior positions and formed 
new views to advance a deeper understanding of the period.  Among the most important 
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of the new scholarship of the 1970s was Eric Foner’s Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: 
The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War.  Foner explored the formation 
of the Republican Party with an investigation into the development of a northern 
antebellum coalition organized around resistance to the further spread of slavery.293  The 
study examined the fusion politics of the period that coalesced members of various 
parties—including former Whigs, Know-Nothings, northern Democrats, Free-Soilers, 
and other northern political interests—into a political force that carried the 1860 
presidential election.  Additionally, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men analyzed the 
differences in regional perspectives, notably North and West, and emphasized the divide 
between politicians committed to the ideology of free labor, those who advocated 
colonization, and various aspects of radical abolitionism.  Foner concluded that political 
cooperation between these groups increased and “during the 1850s, Republicans accepted 
the idea that the Negro should be given an ‘equal chance’ to prove himself capable of 
economic advancement, and their actions in state legislatures and in Congress had the 
effect of breaking down some of the legal inequalities which surrounded the black 
citizen.”294  Completed during the turmoil of the Vietnam War and in a period of 
heightened awareness toward civil rights matters, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men 
offered insight to the political history connected to the Republican Party prior to the 
outbreak of the Civil War.  The work also broke down the southern dominance of the 
histography and offered a thorough and fair examination of the Republican Party.   
293 Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party 
before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press), 1970. 
294 Ibid., 299. 
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Daniel Walker Howe’s The Political Culture of the American Whigs provided 
another political study of the Antebellum Era at the close of the 1970s.  In The Political 
Culture of the Whigs, Howe analyzed the philosophies that undergirded the antebellum 
Whig Party.295  With a biographical approach, Howe explored the regional and political 
diversity of the Whig Party examining politics through the lives of prominent Whig 
politicians—a list that included John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, Alexander Stephens, 
and Abraham Lincoln.  The distaste for President Andrew Jackson and subsequent 
Jacksonians created a political point of interest that held these diverse politicians together 
in a loose, yet common, cause.  Foner and Howe’s contributions improved political 
understanding and advanced the historiography of the Civil War era.  With contemporary 
political issues, such as Vietnam, the Civil Rights Movement, and Watergate influencing 
the generation’s view of history, these two authors allowed further exploration into the 
deeper political causes of the sectionalism that led to the American Civil War. 
A modern comprehensive analysis of Abraham Lincoln’s life emerged in the late 
1970s with Stephen B. Oates’s With Malice Toward None: A Biography of Abraham 
Lincoln.296   Oates offered an updated biography of Lincoln’s life with a thorough 
examination of his rise from log cabin poverty through his actions as president.  One of 
the real strengths of With Malice Toward None came in Oates’s efforts to personalize 
Lincoln and his connection of the early biographical Lincoln to the political beliefs that 
the president later formed.  Like Howe and Foner, Oates concluded that the opportunity 
295 Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979). 
296 Stephen B. Oates, With Malice Toward None: A Biography of Abraham Lincoln (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1977). 
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for economic and social mobility shaped Lincoln’s core political philosophy against 
slavery.  Oates added, “Thus, in Lincoln’s view, slavery not only besmirched the ideals of 
the Declaration, but violated the principles of self-help, social mobility, and economic 
independence—all of which lay at the center of Republican ideology.”297 
Princeton historian James McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War 
Era, published in 1988, did much to correct lingering misperceptions and 
mischaracterizations of Civil War history.298  Prior to McPherson’s account, a few 
historians continued to view the war’s causes with some uncertainty—with many works 
still holding to ideas that states’ rights, tariffs, and other economic concerns formed the 
main catalysts of the war.  Battle Cry of Freedom offered a large synthesis of the social, 
political, military, and economic factors of the war.  McPherson placed his research in the 
broader context of antebellum issues where he argued that sectional strife, debates 
surrounding the institution of slavery, and efforts to halt slavery’s expansion led to the 
outbreak of war in 1861.  McPherson was not the first to link slavery and the Civil War 
directly, but the large volume won the Pulitzer Prize in history and represented a 
watershed moment in the historiography of the Civil War.  Since his work, most scholars 
accept slavery as the root cause of the Civil War and what remnants of Lost Cause 
explanations that existed declined.  The astute work found in Battle Cry of Freedom, 
combined with the widespread popularity of PBS’s 1990 release of Ken Burn’s 
297 Ibid., 166-67.  
298 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988).  
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miniseries The Civil War, created an environment where scholars and the general 
population were eager for more on the topic of the Civil War.299    
Gerald Linderman’s Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the 
American Civil War was another late 1980s addition that advanced understanding the war 
with focus on soldiers’ personal perspectives.300  Linderman examined the lives of 
ordinary soldiers who fought in the war to assess the motivations for enlistment, the 
characteristics of the men at war, and the outlook soldiers expressed through letters while 
surrounded by danger and death.  Embattled Courage revealed the experiences of men 
who marched and fought on the frontlines and the narrative helped readers to understand 
the source of courage that accompanied them during the war.  Works such as Battle Cry 
of Freedom, The Civil War, and Embattled Courage piqued the interests of historians in 
the late 1980s, led the way for more works, and helped to reestablish the war as a central 
topic of study. 
Perhaps more so than any other topic, the Lincoln presidency benefitted from the 
surge in interest and renewed focus.  Mark Neeley Jr. cleared some of the charges 
attached to Lincoln’s prosecution of the war as Commander in Chief in his 1992 Pulitzer 
Prize winning account The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties.301  
Neely’s research relied upon a thorough historical examination of Civil War arrest 
records to identify any potential motivations of partisanship behind the president’s 
controversial executive war measures—a popular charge made by Lincoln critics.  The 
299Ken Burns, et al., The Civil War (Burbank, CA: PBS Home Video, 2004). 
300 Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American 
Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1987).  
301 Mark Neeley Jr., The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991).  
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Fate of Liberty concluded that Lincoln had not acted with political revenge in mind with 
his suspension of habeas corpus or his declarations of martial law; instead the evidence 
suggested that he used the executive maneuvers sparingly and only as a necessity to 
protect Union interests during the war.  This revised perspective on Lincoln’s perceived 
blemish regarding his record toward civil liberties represented a perspective shift in the 
historiography of the topic.  Neely followed up his rich award-winning account with 
another look at the presidency in The Last Best Hope of Earth: Abraham Lincoln and the 
Promise of America.302   This addition kept the narrowed approach as Neely focused on 
the actions, strategy, and decisions that Lincoln made as president.  Neely attributed this 
change in direction to James McPherson.  McPherson led historical efforts to depart from 
the pure biographical and introspective psychohistory that dominated Lincoln research in 
the years prior to the 1990s with the hope of turning more historians toward examinations 
of “the war president.”303  The Last Best Hope of Earth detailed Lincoln’s leadership and 
tendencies in carrying out the war.  The work also increased focus on Lincoln’s habits as 
a war president, his ability to politically manage the war, and the military acumen that he 
developed. 
David Herbert Donald’s 1995 work Lincoln, released the following year, reverted 
to the previous mode of approach with a study large in both breadth and scope.304  In 
Lincoln, Donald highlighted a perceived passivity in Lincoln’s nature.  Among the chief 
characteristics illuminated as central to Lincoln the politician was a religious fatalism 
302 Mark Neeley Jr., The Last Best Hope of Earth: Abraham Lincoln and the Promise of 
America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).  
303 Ibid., v-vi.  
304 David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995).  
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based on the doctrine of necessity combined with a presidency directed by practical 
means.  Completed during the Bill Clinton presidency, the study showed signs of 
contemporary influence in its findings.  Additionally, the large biographical work placed 
a high value on the influence of Lincoln’s surroundings from his young days in a log 
cabin through his presidential years.  This approach began drawing a criticism from some 
in the field.  The reticent nature of Lincoln has always made him a difficult but attractive 
case study to historians; however, new approaches soon replaced the obtuse nature of the 
biographical approach.   
Prior to Donald’s Lincoln, works such as Michael Burlingame’s The Inner World 
of Abraham Lincoln, sought to psychoanalyze the sixteenth president.305  Another 
example, Gabor Boritt’s edited collection The Historian’s Lincoln: Pseudohistory, 
Psychohistory, and History, presented a group of essays that sought deeper sources of 
inspiration to analyze Lincoln’s motives and actions.306  One of the more insightful pieces 
included in the edition was Boritt’s own “Lincoln and the Economics of the American 
Dream.” 307  Boritt traced Lincoln’s economic philosophy more to his Whiggish leanings 
and the emergence of a Republican spirit than to the Jeffersonian philosophy of the 
independent farmer.  The essay also described the central idea of Lincoln’s vision for 
America as a transformational extension of Jacksonian democratic principles of common 
advancement combined with an anti-slavery attitude.  This combination acted to redefine 
305 Michael Burlingame, The Inner World of Abraham Lincoln (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1997).  
306 The Historian’s Lincoln: Pseudohistory, Psychohistory, and History ed. Gabor S. 
Boritt (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988).  
307 Gabor S. Boritt “Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream.” In The 
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equality for Americans as an “equal opportunity to get ahead in life.”308  The eclectic 
collection of essays marked an effort that represented the broader trends in Lincoln’s 
historiography that occurred in the last decades of the twentieth-century.  Some historians 
held to the abstract approach, while others were eager to analyze the better documented 
realities of Lincoln’s economic, political, and social reasoning—some tried both. 
Another addition into the field on the sixteenth president was Allen Guelzo’s 
Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President.309  Guelzo fused Lincoln’s economic outlook, his 
moral principles, and his political reasoning with an effort that produced a deeper 
understanding of the president.  Using an exploration of Whig political philosophy 
leading up to the formation of the Republican Party, along with new arguments centered 
on Lincoln’s faith and moral foundations, Guelzo advanced a more complex analysis 
about what directed the president’s actions.  Guelzo also connected Lincoln’s 
understanding of the American founding and concluded that “the Founding Fathers had 
never intended that slavery continuously extend itself over the continent and, contrary to 
John Calhoun, that the Fathers had always assumed that the federal government had full 
jurisdiction over the organization of the territories and the migration of slavery into 
them.”310 
After passing into the twenty-first century and anticipating the bicentennial of 
Lincoln’s birth, historical works on Abraham Lincoln increased in number and quality.  
308 Ibid., 93-94.  
309 Allen C. Guelzo, Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 
Publishing, 1999).  
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In 2002, William Miller published Lincoln’s Virtues: An Ethical Biography.311  Miller’s 
contribution examined Lincoln through the prism of morality and politics.  In a narrowed, 
yet biographical approach, Miller traced the shaping of Lincoln’s moral character and 
intellectual development through the experiences of his life and gave close attention to 
events that either shaped or revealed his ethical disposition.  Miller’s conclusions claimed 
that Lincoln experienced an escalation of moral character the further he rose in politics.  
Furthermore, Lincoln fulfilled the role as president and dealt with slavery with a unique 
human agency—much of it drawn from the moral principles that evolved from a lifetime 
of exposure to difficulty.  Writing from the University of Virginia as a scholar at the 
Miller Center of Public Affairs, Miller’s and other historians’ increased attention to 
presidents, particularly Abraham Lincoln, represented a trend of scholarly movement that 
improved understanding of the executive office. 
Richard Carwardine’s Lincoln is one of the most valuable additions to the library 
on Lincoln in the modern era.312  As Oxford University Rhodes Professor of American 
History, Carwardine offered a transatlantic viewpoint on Lincoln’s contributions to 
antebellum America and the Civil War era.  The central purpose of Lincoln—later 
republished as Lincoln: A Life of Purpose and Power—was to describe the sources of 
Lincoln’s power.  Carwardine argued that Lincoln’s power came from his personal 
ambition, his ability to react to public opinion, and through his political skill to navigate 
party politics.  Economic philosophy was a source of interest throughout Carwardine’s 
311 William Lee Miller, Lincoln’s Virtues: An Ethical Biography (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2002).  
312 Richard J. Carwardine, Lincoln (Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited, 2003). 
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work as well, and the historian suggested that Lincoln “empathized with those who were, 
as he had been, struggling self-improvers.”313  Holding firm to his Whig roots, Lincoln 
sought to establish a form of meritocracy and Carwardine believed that the “wartime 
program of railroad construction, high tariffs on imported manufactures, homestead and 
land-grant laws, scientific agriculture, progressive taxation, and a national banking 
structure, did indeed draw a line under the republic of Jefferson and Jackson, and 
announced the arrival of a national government pledged to a liberated commercial 
order.”314 Lincoln used a chronological approach to observe the evolution of the 
president’s skills and beliefs.  
Carwardine also addressed a topic of interest with Lincoln historians—his faith.  
In an earlier work, Evangelicals and Politics in Antebellum America, Carwardine 
researched the impact of religion and churches on various regional beliefs related to 
slavery.315  In the study, Cawardine gave specific attention to the denominations of the 
Methodists and the Baptists to identify any potential influences on the crystallizations of 
slave opinion.  As an authority on matters of religion and antebellum America, 
Carwardine also explored the faith of the president in Lincoln.  The historian viewed 
Protestant millennialism and Enlightenment rationalism to work in tandem to guide the 
president.  Over the course of previous efforts to identify Lincoln’s faith, historians have 
been quick to point to Lincoln’s deistic tendencies, some have carelessly labeled him an 
atheist, while others have found or invented evidence they used to place the president 
313 Ibid., 48 
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under a specific religious denomination.  Carwardine used a well-researched and 
balanced approach to determine that a broad influence was indeed important to Lincoln’s 
development and expression of religious beliefs.  Carwardine’s research and synthesis 
aided the understanding of the faith of the president thus shaping the historiography with 
a lasting perspective on this key aspect of Lincoln’s leadership and life. 
In 2005, acclaimed historian Doris Kearns Goodwin, a previous winner of the 
Pulitzer Prize, published A Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln.316
Goodwin’s much anticipated book received enormous attention from general readers and 
scholars alike.  The analysis focused on the political calculations of Lincoln with special 
attention on the relationships that he forged with, and between, William Seward, Salmon 
Chase, Edward Bates, Edwin Stanton—men that filled part of his cabinet.  The large 
study explored the skills of Lincoln’s ability to manage political personalities while he 
built a coalition of support for his own political and war aims.  The work marked a huge 
point in the historiography of Lincoln as Team of Rivals appealed to a larger audience as 
popular history; yet, the work put forth research valuable to scholars.  Another key 
element was the emerging focus on specific and narrowed historical aspects surrounding 
Abraham Lincoln.  Rather than the catch-all biography, Goodwin’s work presented a path 
for more nuanced work on the former president. 
 With the continued growth of interest in Abraham Lincoln, historians began to 
offer even more focused works that examined specific events and timeframes within the 
president’s life.  Harold Holzer’s 2004 release of Lincoln at Cooper Union: The Speech 
316 Doris Kearns Goodwin, A Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005). 
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That Made Abraham Lincoln President presented an effort that analyzed Lincoln’s 
famous New York address.317  Holzer framed the speech as a pivotal moment that 
captured national sentiments and concluded that the event gave rise to the political 
success that followed.  Furthermore, Lincoln at Cooper Union measured the reception of 
the February 1860 address and synthesized how that the speech symbolized and 
coalesced the political outlook of the North.  Louis Mansur’s Lincoln’s Hundred Days: 
The Emancipation Proclamation and the War for the Union isolated the specific time 
frame of Lincoln’s September 1862 announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation and 
the period in January 1863 when the measure took effect.318  Lincoln’s Hundred Days 
revealed an in-depth study of a critical policy and timeframe within the larger Lincoln 
administration.  These works reflected a movement within the historiography of Lincoln 
that attempted to isolate political aspects of the administration without revisiting the 
broader biography of the president. 
Other works took a similar limited approach and examined timeframes prior to the 
election and just before the inauguration of the president.  Douglas Egerton’s Year of 
Meteors: Stephen Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, and the Election that Brought on the Civil 
War addressed the critical year of 1860 in effort to advance the historical importance of 
numerous events leading up to the election of Lincoln.319  Egerton’s work focused on the 
political rivalry between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas and shed new light on 
317 Harold Holzer, Lincoln at Cooper Union: The Speech that Made Abraham Lincoln 
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the fracturing of the pre-war Democratic Party.  Published within a few years of Year of 
Meteors, Harold Holzer offered a similar work with his Lincoln President-Elect: 
Abraham Lincoln and the Great Secession Winter 1860-1861.320  As a follow-up to 
Lincoln at Cooper Union, Holzer continued the trend of examining specific periods 
concerning the significance of Abraham Lincoln in a way that allowed historians to fully 
explore the events and environment surrounding the Civil War.  
With the passing of bicentennial celebrations in 2009 to mark the two-hundredth 
birthday of Lincoln, works confronted scholars with new arguments.  Mark Neeley 
presented another focused approach with Lincoln and the Triumph of the Nation: 
Constitutional Conflict in the American Civil War.321   Neeley examined the legal history 
of the Civil War with specific interest on constitutional issues, Lincoln’s legal view of the 
prosecution of the war, and the elimination of slavery.  Neeley asserted that the president 
interpreted the Constitution the best he knew how and concluded that the sixteenth 
president did not developed a radical new nationalism at the core of his desire for change.  
In addition, Lincoln and the Triumph of the Nation revealed an original topic of study 
through weaving in the Confederate Constitution and reminding historians “it is 
important to recall constitutional history—especially that neglected constitutional history 
of the states.”322  Conscription, emancipation, and punishment are a few of the topics that 
Lincoln and the Triumph of the Nation addressed with interest in Lincoln’s constitutional 
reasoning. 
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Eric Foner published The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery 
the same year.323  In the historiography of Lincoln, some historians challenged Lincoln’s 
views on slavery and race—making special effort to deconstruct the “Great Emancipator” 
image.  The DeWitt Clinton Professor of History at Colombia University pushed back in 
his account.  A central purpose of The Fiery Trial was the belief that Lincoln’s fierce 
antislavery stance had more in common with the abolitionists than some studies 
suggested.  To measure Lincoln’s impulses toward slavery, Foner linked the president’s 
free-labor outlook to his antislavery views and argued that the ideas conjoined to 
concentrate on matters of social and political economy.324  The relevance of this 
sentiment underscored the fact that Lincoln wanted a social advancement for the country, 
reconciled some matters of race to pursue a legal economic equality in opportunity, and 
did not hold, nor project, some of the more extreme views toward free blacks of the time.  
Moreover, Foner made a case for Lincoln’s careful handling of the slavery issue with 
practical and political realities in mind.  The strong contextualization of Lincoln’s views, 
words, and policies through his evolution on the issue of slavery was the strength of 
Foner’s work.  The Fiery Trial won the 2011 Pulitzer Prize for History.  
   Founders’ Son: A Life of Abraham Lincoln is one of the latest additions to the 
crowded field to address the Civil War President.325  As the senior editor of the National 
Review, Richard Brookhiser traced Lincoln’s political courage to his high admiration of 
the Founding Fathers.  Brookhiser connected Lincoln to George Washington, Thomas 
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Jefferson, Thomas Paine, and other figures of early American history to derive the origins 
of Lincoln’s deeper philosophies.  Brookhiser analyzed numerous primary sources from 
Lincoln’s speeches and letters to establish a connection to Lincoln’s affinity to founding 
documents such as the Declaration of Independence, the Northwest Ordinance, and the 
Constitution.  Brookhiser argued that Lincoln’s view of the Union, with the eventual 
abolition of slavery, reflected an interpretive effort to be congruent with the Founding 
Fathers’ long view.  In historiographical relevance, Founders’ Son is a strong example of 
an opposition to the Lost Cause portrayal of Lincoln as a radical destroyer of liberty, as 
well as the more exaggerated claims of his presidency being a drastic progressive 
departure from the founding generation.  With Lincoln’s newfound popularity and 
undeniable historical significance, all sides of the political spectrum stretched efforts and 
conclusions to claim him. 
A recent effort that made bold claims on Lincoln’s view on national economic 
policy emerged in the 2015 work A Just and Generous Nation: Abraham Lincoln and the 
Fight for American Opportunity.326 Historian Harold Holzer and economist Nicholas 
Garfinkle work together to uncover Lincoln’s economic outlook and conclude that the 
president’s desire to create an environment where individuals could self-improve had a 
far greater influence on actions than previous historians have addressed.  Critics charged 
A Just and Generous Nation with modern political bias as the authors used Lincoln’s 
economic reasoning to attack contemporary policy.  Nonetheless, scholars praise the first 
326 Harold Holzer and Nicholas Garfinkle, A Just and Generous Nation: Abraham 
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half of the book for its depth and clarity in examining a specific outlook that influenced 
Lincoln’s actions.       
While the actions of the newly elected Republican administration of the 1860s 
serve as one aspect of a larger body of work on the Civil War, some of America’s most 
talented scholars shaped the new historiography of Lincoln with dedicated research.  In a 
large field where hagiography and biased attacks on leaders of Lincoln’s stature both 
exist, these works offer a balanced look at the president and are grounded in good 
research and historical methods of study. 
II. 
As perspectives changed with political and national examinations of the war, new 
views related to regional and state history emerged as well.  With Kentucky, most 
historians identify E. Merton Coulter’s 1926 account, The Civil War and Readjustment in 
Kentucky, as the early cornerstone of history focused on Civil War Kentucky.327  Coulter 
argued that Kentucky’s economic ties with the North, its beliefs that slavery would be 
better protected in the Union, and a long tradition of compromise kept Kentucky, a slave 
state, from abandoning the Union in favor of the Confederacy.  Coulter also viewed 
Kentucky’s policy of neutrality and events that pulled the state into the Union as a 
precursor for the trouble that followed the war.  In short, Coulter argued that Kentucky’s 
Confederate sympathies rose from the sense of betrayal that manifested in the state and 
its residents with emancipation as well as heavy handed Reconstruction policies.  This 
dated work, now approaching one hundred years old, has drawn both praise for its lasting 
327 E. Merton Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky (1926). 
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influence, but also faces modern criticism in the detection of southern bias in its 
conclusions and the number of new sources made available since its completion. 
Fifty years later, Lowell Harrison produced a short influential work with focus on 
Kentucky’s experience with the Civil War with his The Civil War in Kentucky. 328  This 
study offered a concise account of military and political events that occurred during the 
war in Kentucky.  Though not intended as a comprehensive account of the war in 
Kentucky, Harrison’s work provided a valuable summary of military battles in the state.  
Long viewed as an essential companion to Coulter’s work, The Civil War in Kentucky 
documented the outbreak of war, the Confederate invasions of 1862, and Kentucky’s 
reaction to military and executive measures used through the declaration of martial law.  
Harrison used military records, political correspondence, and newspaper sources to 
highlight the actions of notable politicians and military leaders.  Harrison echoed Coulter, 
“It has been said with considerable truth that Kentucky joined the Confederacy after the 
war was over.”329  Many scholars have repeated this assertion, but the expression 
overlooked the diversity of regional sentiments in the state.   Harrison and James C. 
Klotter coauthored a comprehensive look at the state in A New History of Kentucky.330  
The book offered a short update to the Civil War in Kentucky with chapters named “The 
Road to War” and “The Civil War.”331  Released in the mid-1990s, A New History of 
Kentucky sounded a more balanced tone than earlier works reminding readers that “the 
328 Lowell H. Harrison, The Civil War in Kentucky (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1975). 
329Ibid., 106. 
330 Lowell H. Harrison and James C. Klotter, A New History of Kentucky (Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 1997). 
331 Ibid., 181-212. 
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ties with the Union were also strong.  An appreciable number of Kentuckians had 
connections with Pennsylvania and other northern states, and Kentuckians were proud of 
the reputation they had established in fighting for the nation in several wars.”332 
Amid an increased turn-of-the-century focus on Abraham Lincoln at the national 
level, Harrison also published Lincoln of Kentucky in 2000.333  Lincoln of Kentucky 
explored the relationship between Lincoln and his three law partners, his three romantic 
interests, his political idol (Henry Clay), and his best friend (Joshua Speed) who were all 
Kentuckians.  This approach helped to establish the relevance of the state on Lincoln’s 
life.  The real strength of Harrison’s book, however, was his analytical approach to 
Lincoln’s relationship with Kentucky during the Civil War.  The immediate concerns for 
Lincoln at the outbreak of war centered around how to hold the slave state in the union.  
Harrison traced Lincoln’s handling of Kentucky through numerous state-specific 
correspondences between military leaders such as General Ulysses S. Grant and General 
Jeremiah Boyle, Kentucky governors such as Governor Beriah Magoffin and Thomas 
Bramlette, and information obtained from trusted local individuals—trust he developed 
from previous friendships.  Lincoln of Kentucky asserted that “with all the other burdens 
that he bore as the wartime leader of the nation, Lincoln had to devote considerable 
attention to affairs in his native state.  He understood prickly Kentuckians better than 
most of the military commanders who were assigned there.”334  As admiration for 
Lincoln rose nationally, Kentucky, too, celebrated the memory of the sixteenth president.  
332 Ibid., 181. 
333 Lowell H. Harrison, Lincoln of Kentucky (Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 2000). 
334 Ibid., 213. 
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Harrison’s work was an important addition to the historiography of Kentucky in the Civil 
War and marked a departure from some of the Confederate sympathies expressed in 
works throughout the previous century. 
Border State history attributed to the growing historiography of the Civil War and 
received increased attention amid the rise of other national efforts in the 2010s.  William 
C. Harris’ Lincoln and the Border States: Preserving the Union examined Lincoln’s 
efforts to maintain Maryland, Missouri, Kentucky, and Delaware in the Union.335  
Building on Coulter’s and Harrison’s arguments, Harris used Lincoln’s letters to political 
and military leaders to extend the understanding of Lincoln’s careful approach that kept 
Kentucky in the Union.  Lincoln and the Border States assessed Lincoln’s preoccupation 
with problems in the Upper South, his handling of controversies in certain regions, and 
the patient management he developed with troubles in the area.  Furthermore, Harris 
argued that the states were not safely in the Union as early as some historians have 
suggested, and that Lincoln’s masterful approach to these areas proved critical for 
emancipation efforts and winning the war.  Aaron Astor’s Rebels on the Border: Civil 
War, Emancipation, and the Reconstruction of Kentucky and Missouri followed a year 
later.336  Astor analyzed similarities between Kentucky and Missouri with focus on the 
Border States that remained in the Union.  Astor’s study examined how guerrilla war, 
race, and shifting allegiances combined with broader trends to create a unique and violent 
335 William C. Harris, Lincoln and the Border States (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2011).  
336 Aaron Astor, Rebels on the Border: Civil War, Emancipation, and the Reconstruction 
of Kentucky and Missouri (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012). Astor 
also built upon Daniel Croft’s arguments from Reluctant Confederates: Upper South 
Unionists in the Secession Crisis. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1989). 
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Civil War experience for these localities.  Christopher Phillips’ The Civil War in the 
Border South: Reflections in the Civil War Era offered a different view on the Border 
States the following year.337  Phillips’ work acknowledged the importance of military 
affairs on holding the Border States in the Union and he analyzed the chronological 
unfolding of the war with specific attention to the military campaigns conducted.  One 
chapter connected the Confederate offensive mounted in Kentucky to General Robert E 
Lee’s Antietam campaign.  The direction of historiography seemed to use the events in 
these pivotal states to explain the larger implications on the national execution of the war.  
Prior efforts often separated the war into the Eastern and Western Theatres.  
Patrick Lewis’ For Slavery and Union: Benjamin Buckner and Kentucky Loyalties 
in the Civil War represented a continuation in attention to local Civil War history.338  
Lewis’s account, examined Benjamin Forsythe Buckner as a model proslavery unionist.  
For Slavery and Union analyzed the deterioration of Buckner’s loyalty to the Union that 
resulted from Lincoln’s federal policies and the eventual emancipation of slaves.  The 
study provided interesting insight on the decline of wealthy Central Kentucky families’ 
loyalty with regards to support of the Union.  Lewis used local history and accounts to 
determine that emancipationist policies created a wide disaffection in slaveholding 
families within Central Kentucky.  The Buckners began the war with a form of 
conservative unionism that stood against secession but transformed to represent trends of 
defiance with Kentucky’s wider disillusionment toward Republican and military policies. 
337 Christopher Phillips, The Civil War and the Border South: Reflections on the Civil 
War Era (Santa Barbara: Praeger Publishing, 2013).   
338 Patrick A. Lewis For Slavery and Union: Benjamin Buckner and Kentucky Loyalties 
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War memory has a short yet valuable historiography as well.  Barbara Gannon’s 
The Won Cause: Black and White Comradeship in the Grand Army of the Republic 
explored the integration of GAR posts.339  Gannon noted, “Black veterans were the 
political and social equals of white Americans in one of the most prestigious 
organizations in the United States. In an era in which race trumped virtually all other 
social identities, black and white veterans created an interracial organization at both the 
national and state levels.”340 The Won Cause demonstrated the way that Civil War 
memory and the celebration of experiences from the war created unique opportunities for 
historians to examine social and political change. 
Anne Marshall’s Creating a Confederate Kentucky: The Lost Cause and Civil 
War Memory in a Border State is another title that contributed to the historiography of 
the Civil War.341  In her study, Marshall established a pre-war Unionist majority in 
Kentucky and revealed a variety of motives that drove that loyalty.  Like other historians 
who have examined Kentucky’s diverse and unique Unionism, Marshall found that the 
federal protection of slavery, anti-slavery attitudes from Appalachian residents, small 
pockets of abolitionism, economic opportunists, and calculating politicians all 
represented a conglomerate of Union interests in the state.  Marshall’s analysis of the 
complex prewar attitudes and her investigation of reactions to interwar events provide an 
important pretext to the synthesis located throughout the rest of the book.  Political 
realignment, racism, and other Lost Cause activities are points of emphasis for Marshall’s 
339 Barbara A. Gannon, The Won Cause: Black and White Comradeship in the Grand 
Army of the Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). 
340 Ibid., 7. 
341 Anne E. Marshall, Creating a Confederate Kentucky: The Lost Cause and Civil War 
Memory in a Border State (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 
156 
exploration of post-war Kentucky.  As most Kentuckians began to identify themselves 
both with, and as, Southern Democrats during Reconstruction, Marshall connected the 
strong Republican disaffection to attitudes generated from the military and federal 
government’s emancipation of slaves and controversial war measures.  Creating a 
Confederate Kentucky identified the way memory can change to fit a new political 
opinion with a location. 
Sister States, Enemy States: The Civil War in Kentucky and Tennessee edited by 
Kent T. Dollar and Larry H. Whiteaker offered several essays that investigated the 
motivations and historical causes of loyalty within Kentucky and Tennessee.342  A few 
works from this collection include Thomas Mackey’s “Not a Pariah, but a Keystone: 
Kentucky and Secession” that examined the deeper relationship between Kentucky and 
the state’s decision to remain in the Union.  Kenneth Noe’s “Battle Against the Traitors: 
Unionist Middle Tennesseans in the Ninth Kentucky Infantry” provided insight to 
soldiers who left the Confederacy to fight for the Union.  John D. Fowler’s "We Can 
Never Live in a Southern Confederacy: The Civil War in East Tennessee" also looked at 
the regional differences between the Appalachian portion of the state versus the more 
pro-Confederate middle and west.  This compilation of essays from modern scholars 
committed to the study marked an effort to understand the complexities of these two 
important border states often ignored by more general Civil War works.    
Christopher Phillips’s The Rivers Ran Backward: The Civil War and the 
Remaking of the American Middle Border represents one of the most expansive studies 
342 Kent T. Dollar and Larry H. Whiteaker, ed., Sister States, Enemy States: The Civil 
War in Kentucky and Tennessee, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2009).  
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on the border region to date.343  Phillips’s work investigates the contested loyalties of the 
border region with attention to the factors that influenced diverse populations in those 
areas.  The Rivers Ran Backward sheds light on the complex political and economic 
bonds, North and South, to the respective sides that citizens chose to align with across 
several states where political opinion varied.  The work stands as the first serious modern 
effort that attempts to look beyond simple state lines in the hopes of identifying causes 
for either support or resistance to the Union or Confederate cause.   
IV. 
The secondary literature on Civil War history has experienced a dramatic 
evolution and improvement in the last fifty years.  As the subject continues to receive the 
increased attention of scholars, the national complexities of America’s greatest domestic 
crisis become clearer and more understandable.  It is estimated that a new book related to 
the Civil War hits the market each day.  The history surrounding Abraham Lincoln has 
grown exponentially.  Work from scholars like Eric Foner, Mark Neely, James 
McPherson, Richard Cawardine, and others have allowed readers to better understand the 
significance of his presidency.  Local and state history is a beneficiary of the trend as 
well.  With the rise of genealogical studies, digital record keeping, and technological 
means of sharing information, both the interest and the ability to pursue historical 
questions have improved. 
343 Christopher Phillips, The Rivers Ran Backward: The Civil War and the Remaking of 
the American Middle Border (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).  
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Some areas are still catching up and the historiography of the Civil War is far 
from complete.  Appalachian areas are just starting to receive the contemporary attention 
that other topics have long received.  Instead of simplifying explanations with blanket 
geographical conclusions, historians are now beginning to narrow down to towns and 
areas in the search for relevant, unique, and interesting historical studies.  An example of 
a gap in the literature is the southeastern portion of Kentucky.  Union participation in the 
war was high, slave ownership was low, and more interesting—the area bucked state 
trends and offered sustained support for the Republican party well after the war.  
One can look for the trend of the growth in Civil War studies to continue, it will 
be both valuable and interesting to see what this renaissance in Civil War history 
produces in the decades to come.  To match the work of scholars over the last half 
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